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Abstract
Is political fragmentation within the metropolitan area and within central city
government a cause of central city decline or just the benign evolution of governance?
Advocates of regional governance consider political fragmentation, the number and types
of governments in a metropolitan area, a causal factor in decline. However a multiplicity
of governments offer individual households greater choice and variety, in other words
fragmentation represents the will of the people. All metropolitan areas are fragmented to
some degree and whether or not this is harmful to cities and their regions is the empirical
question considered. Political explanations on the impact of fragmentation break out into
two overarching groups. One school of thought argues that regions struggle and
experience slow growth or decline because the problems of the central city act as an
anchor pulling the region down, while the other school believes cities struggle due to
competition from other governments in their metropolitan area for residents and
economic investment. This dissertation seeks to test the long term effects of political
fragmentation across metropolitan areas on region-wide segregation, population and ownsource revenue in 100 central cities from 1950 through 2000.
Political fragmentation is broken down into horizontal and vertical fragmentation,
which considers the impact of geographically coterminous governments and
jurisdictional overlap, and also includes internal fragmentation, which is the division of
governing authority among elected officials. The results of the analyses show that
horizontal fragmentation increases segregation across metropolitan areas and reduces the
city's share of regional population. Both vertical and horizontal fragmentation are shown
to increase the own-source revenue of central cities, and evidence is presented that shows
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internal fragmentation also increases own-source revenue. Essentially city residents pay
more in taxes living in cities with more elected officials, and are surrounded by higher
numbers of government and jurisdictional overlap. Fragmentation at the metropolitan
level is complex but it is clear that high levels can pose problems to both the city and its
region. The implications of these results are thoughtfully analyzed and recommendations
are made for future research.
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Chapter 1
An Introduction to the Puzzle
In 1876 our nation was both on the cusp of the Industrial Era and participating in
one of most dubious presidential races in our history. St. Louisans, however, were paying
more attention to issues on the home front. In what can only be described as an ironic
distortion of our nation’s history, the city described then and now as the gateway to the
Western territories had slowly begun to turn away from its own western – and other –
counties. In a colossal failure of imagination later referred to as “The Great Divorce,” St.
Louis City seceded from the perceived burdens of St. Louis County and established itself
as a home-rule city. The parting of ways, like many relationships that sour, was fueled by
differences over money. St. Louis City was more prosperous than the county and outward
rural growth was a concern to city voters who were weary of diverting tax money for
roads and the maintenance of other services to their hinterlands (Jones 2000). When city
voters approved a legal separation they most likely did not foresee the dramatic changes
that have had a negative and lifetime effect on St. Louis City. For example, by 1950 St.
Louis County would hold more wealth, population, and would be a competitive force for
economic development with which St. Louis City would be forced to forever contend.
The Great Divorce locked up the City’s boundaries, restricting St. Louis’ ability to mold
the growth of its region meaning today St Louis City is surrounded by a sea of
governments, making it an iconic picture of political fragmentation. Over time almost
every aspect of population growth, economic development, and political influence has
shifted away from St Louis City as the main hub of activity and towards a far-flung
territory that spans hundreds of miles and is made up of hundreds of governing units.
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The impact of the Great Divorce was immediate and city planners reacted swiftly
beginning in 1926 when the first measure was put before city and county voters to reunite
city and county. The measure failed then and each subsequent time (four more attempts,
the last of which was in 1987) voters rejected the initiative. Reconciliation was not to be.
These unsuccessful attempts to reduce jurisdictional separation reflect a controversial
belief that fragmentation, at least between St. Louis City and St. Louis County, is harmful
to the better interests of both the city and the region. Within the region there is a general
sense of animosity and mistrust that frames most discourse, covering such diverse topics
as the uneven burden of caring for the homeless to managing air quality to traffic
congestion.
The story of mistrust between cities and their surrounding regions (and their
ultimate separation) is a universal one even though the characters in the St. Louis story
and the ultimate divorce are unique. Over the last sixty years the predominant areas of
growth in population, land area, development and in the number and types of government
have been outside the central city. As a result, central cities tend to be plagued by
depopulation, racial tension, economic disinvestment, concentrated poverty and criminal
activity. Within each metropolitan region, jurisdictional boundaries can mean the
difference between an idyllic community and one plagued by blight and concentrated
poverty.
When a city suffers population loss, economic disinvestment, rising crime and
failing schools, the surrounding region is affected in a harmful way. The phrase “as the
city goes, so goes the region” reflects this mindset (Peirce 1993). Several studies draw
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connections between the health of the metropolitan region and the condition of the central
city, but generally focus on how central city conditions impact the greater region.1
So does political fragmentation affect the growth (or decline) of the central city
and, if so, what is the effect? There is a consensus among urban scholars (Lowi 1979,
Jacobs 1961) that the fragmentation of governments, at the metropolitan level, is a causal
factor in the depopulation, racial separation and economic disinvestment that has plagued
central cities for over fifty years. As metropolitan areas face crises that traverse
jurisdictional boundaries, political fragmentation is accused of impeding the necessary
steps to problem solution, such as coalition building and resource pooling. The St. Louis
case illuminates the tension between city and suburb, which plays out between those who
view political fragmentation in metropolitan areas as watering down political power so
thinly that problem solution is ineffective and those who maintain that fragmentation is a
bastion of democracy.
Fragmentation of government is purposefully embedded within the U.S.
Constitution and Americans have been bequeathed a healthy distrust of centralized
political power. In the American system of government the crafting, enforcement and
legality of public law and policy is carried out in different governing bodies across a
tiered governing structure by hundreds of public servants. Today’s political discourse
regarding government’s size and scope at the metropolitan level reflects some of the
constitutional balancing act the Framers so expertly created: strong but not too strong,
capable of changing but not too quickly or easily swayed, attentive to our citizenry yet
not unduly influenced by often-fickle public opinion. These are natural tensions between
state and national government yet they exist within the microcosm of the metropolitan

Wiedlocher

3

Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments

area.2 The fundamental right to self-government and the relative distrust of concentrated
political power is played out within all metro areas, which is evident in the pervasiveness
of political fragmentation seen today.
There are three key components of political fragmentation in metropolitan areas
in our current climate, the first being the proliferation of governments across American
society and geography (Weiher 1991, 4), which in general refers to the expanse of
general-purpose governments (municipalities), school districts, and single-purpose
special districts (libraries, water, fire, and the like) across metropolitan areas. The second
is the layering of governments within a defined geography. Within a region there can be
municipalities nested within school districts and special districts as well as counties - and
in some cases regional governments. The third component is the political fragmentation
within governing entities as evidenced by the number of elected officials which oversee
the functioning of government. This division of government, in terms of elected officials,
the layering of governments, and the multiplicity of governments, is at the heart of the
American ideal that the function of government should be a response to the needs and
desires of its citizens.
The decentralization of power within metropolitan areas reflects the principle that
political power should be distributed closest to the people, traditionally the municipality
(Hills 2005), which allows citizens to check the powers of their government. Within
urban areas, there is a quilt-like effect of governments that range in size, function,
capacity and political importance, but this web-like pattern of governments is not
necessarily welcomed by all as a triumph of the American system, and political
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fragmentation has often been criticized as chaotic and inefficient (Benjamin & Nathan
2001; Orfield 2002; Carruthers 2002).
Political fragmentation at the metropolitan level can adversely affect the central
city, a phenomenon coined “suburban exploitation,” which is the idea that residents
outside of the city limits regularly use the city’s costly and elaborate service system yet
carry none of the financial burden for maintaining it (Bradford and Oates 1974; Hawley
1951; Kasarda 1972; Slovak 1985). Suburban residents place "demands" for services
such as work space, cultural and sporting entertainment, and retail shopping but because
they live outside the city limits they avoid paying any incurrent costs of building or
maintaining such services.
Bradford and Oates (1974) postulate that political fragmentation has allowed,
especially, upper-income households to create homogenous communities which
effectively prevent tax redistribution to poorer households and leave the city footing the
bill to provide services to those both most in need and least able to pay. They examine
fiscal spending on education by the jurisdictions in three Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (SMSA), in New Jersey: Jersey City, Newark, and Paterson-CliftonPassaic, which include five central cities and fifty-three surrounding municipalities and
conclude that more important than the amount spent per pupil is the governing structures
within the metropolitan area (1974, 84). While their quantitative analysis only marginally
supports their “exploitation hypothesis,” Bradford and Oates’ suggestion that a unified
governing structure (i.e., reduction of fragmentation) will create a more equitable
redistribution of income rings true with scholars who argue that political fragmentation
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causes inequalities spanning race and income (see Morgan and Mareschal 1999; Gordon
2008; or Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004).
Here are two general views of metropolitan political structure and they embody
the same constitutional tensions over government’s power and size with which the
Founding Fathers grappled. On the one hand, a plethora of local governments maintain
decentralization of political power and keep access to government as physically close to
the people as possible. On the other hand, large region-wide governments can streamline
the governing process, offer economies of scale for public services, and develop uniform
policy for collective problems like air pollution and growth. How this tension has played
out over the past century reveals a hodgepodge solution of cooperation and competition
among counties; towns; townships; school districts; and regional, general-purpose,
municipal and single-purpose governments.
Average citizens remain unaware of the political synergy occurring around them
when governance is functioning well, at each level: among other things their trash is
picked up on time, streets are cleaned or plowed if it snows; house fires are responded to
promptly; schools are well funded; sewers and drainage are maintained; even mosquitoes
are kept at bay with regular neighborhood sprayings. Let a problem come up, however,
and an individual’s experience with local government becomes confusing and fraught
with frustration. What happens when a neighbor refuses to mow her grass and calls to
local officials go unheeded, the trash service is spotty or an emergency call leads to a
slow or worse no response? What if attempts at redress or change are both timeconsuming and there is no guarantee of a positive outcome? Eighty percent of the
population of the United States currently lives in metropolitan areas. The structure of
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governments and governance within these areas therefore plays an important role in
determining the quality of life for most of America.
Fragmentation
In the broadest sense, political fragmentation is the division of political power.
Historically, fragmentation was seen as a hallmark of the American Constitution and a
necessary safeguard against political corruption. To keep political power from coalescing
around one figure or governing unit, power is split in several dimensions. Government is
tiered with each level (federal, state, county, municipality) nesting within each other in
descending areas of geography and jurisdictional control. Political power is also divided
within each level, and each governing body is run by public officials, most of whom are
elected.
This intentionally redundant, nuanced structuring of government, combined with
its general abundance, makes for a research field that approaches fragmentation in many
different ways. This is reflected in the literature where the range of studies have focused
on one type of government (see, for example, Berry’s (2008) or Foster’s (1997) work on
special districts) to more general approaches that also include financial and population
components (for example Lewis’s (1996) political fragmentation index). There is no
universal or consistent approach to measuring and modeling political fragmentation. A
key component of this work is the careful accounting of fragmentation over time therefore it is of use to discuss, briefly, the three general types that will be modeled in
this study: horizontal, vertical, and internal political fragmentation.
Horizontal Fragmentation
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Metropolitan areas are host to many types of governments and governing
arrangements including counties, school districts and other special districts,
municipalities and townships. Perhaps the most common definition of political
fragmentation is simply the number of local governments within a metropolitan area.
Horizontal fragmentation captures the multiplicity of governments and generally focuses
on one type of local government. Common measures of horizontal fragmentation include
the number of municipalities per capita, the number of local governments per square
mile, and the percentage of central city population in a region (Hendrick et. Al 2011).
Metropolitan areas with higher concentrations of municipalities or governments per
capita are considered more fragmented, whereas areas that have a higher portion of their
population residing in the central city represent areas that are less fragmented and more
centralized.
Within metropolitan areas, higher levels of horizontal fragmentation are believed
to lead to greater competition between local governments (Tiebout 1956), increase
pressure on elected officials by local citizens to efficiently provide public services
(Oakerson and Parks 1989), and diminish the likelihood that governments will collude in
order to impose higher tax rates. Contrarily horizontal fragmentation is also thought to be
less efficient and more costly at service delivery because a multiplicity of small
governments are unable to take advantage of economies of scale (Woods 1961), and
because there is duplication of services (Foster 1997). Metropolitan areas with higher
levels of horizontal fragmentation increase the difficulty in coordination between
governments and the central city. Municipal governments in particular feel pressure to
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protect their political turf and the interests of their population base. There tends to be
animosity, therefore, as each municipality views all others as competitors.
Vertical Fragmentation
Vertical fragmentation is defined by Boyne (1992) and Hendrick, Jimenez, and
Lal (2011) as a number of overlapping governments. Governing units such as counties,
municipalities, and special districts do not always fit neatly within the boundary lines of
larger geographies and the number of jurisdictions that overlap or intersect create vertical
fragmentation. Within the metropolitan area vertical fragmentation is perhaps most
evident in special districts. Berry's (2009) work on special districts demonstrates that
vertically fragmented metropolitan areas have more complex revenue structures. This is
because the layering of local governments creates a common fiscal pool that each
government must draw from to meet its own expenditures. As the number of
governments that are drawing from the common fiscal pool increase, the overall tax
burden for residents also increases.
Vertical fragmentation can be measured by the ratio of special purpose
governments to general purpose governments or by the percentage of special purpose
governments of total local governments. Higher levels of vertical fragmentation are
associated with higher government expenditures, particularly in metropolitan areas with
more special districts (Hendrick et al 2011). The effect of vertical fragmentation on
central cities can affect their ability to compete for residents because suburban areas,
where there are more services provided by special districts, can be perceived as more
attractive. The effects of vertical fragmentation may be experienced by cities in their
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ability to draw from the common fiscal pool to provide quality services to their residents
as well.
Internal Fragmentation
Each governing unit is overseen by a governing body and, with some exceptions,
these are publically elected officials. The division of political power within a jurisdiction
among elected officials is internal political fragmentation. Each publically elected
government official represents a finite amount of political power and influence over
government operations. Nelson and Foster (2000) point out that cities with higher
numbers of elected officials represent governments that are more responsive to public
needs, whereas cities with few elected officials are subject to higher scrutiny and
accountability. Cities with greater numbers of elected officials usually represent larger
government structure, which to the typical resident can be a turn off because of the
complexity. Internal fragmentation within the central city is measured by the number of
elected officials per capita and higher concentrations of such will have a negative effect.
Cities may lose residents to suburban communities which tend to have fewer elected
officials because they appear to be a simpler beast to wrangle.
Internal fragmentation may also have an adverse effect in that cities have a harder
time responding quickly and nimbly to policy problems when compared to other
municipalities with different governing structures. Looking at the number of government
employees per capita is another measure of internal fragmentation that can indicate the
relative size of city government. A city-manager style government may have an easier
time navigating policy problems than mayor-council simply because there are fewer
elected officials involved in the decision-making process.
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The horizontal, vertical, and internal fragmentation of government within
metropolitan areas reflects the principle that political power should not only be
fragmented but distributed closest to the people, traditionally at the municipal level (Hills
2005). The movement of people across the United States from an agrarian society to a
nation of cities over the last sixty years has been noteworthy with most households now
rooted in suburban communities outside city limits. As the population has changed so too
have the number government bodies that serve them. As the government arrangements in
metropolitan areas have increased in complexity, the usefulness of decentralized political
power because of political fragmentation has come under increased scrutiny. An excess
of local governments maintain decentralization of political power and access to
government physically close to the people. On the contrary, large, region-wide
governments can streamline the governing process, offer economies of scale for public
services, and develop uniform policy for collective issues like air pollution and managed
growth.
This pattern is illustrated well in the St. Louis case. Consider the hierarchy of
government and number of elected officials that serve the typical resident of the city. St.
Louis is governed by the elected, city-wide offices of mayor, comptroller, and the
president of the board of aldermen; there is also district representation through the
twenty-eight member Board of Aldermen. The Great Divorce made the city its own
county and so voters elect city-wide the offices of circuit attorney, circuit clerk, collector
of revenue, license collector, recorder of deeds, sheriff, city treasurer and public
administrator. The city has one school district, which is overseen by a superintendent
along with a school board.3 The city provides water, fire and ambulance services, but
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until 2012 the state of Missouri controlled the police force, a holdover from the Civil
War. Each public official has a distinct slice of political power and authority. The citizens
of St. Louis have had little to fear from the threat of large scale political corruption but
the system is prone to a feudal mentality where turf battles and status can prevent true
policy innovation from occurring. The complex governing arrangement within the city is
matched by a complex and vibrant array of fragmentation across the metropolitan area.
Within the St. Louis region there is a patchwork-like pattern of governments that
range in size, function, capacity, and political importance. Figure 1.1 illustrates the steady
growth of governments across the St Louis metropolitan region from 1950 to 2000. As of
the 2002 Census of Government, surrounding the city and comprising the greater St.
Louis region are 16 counties, 286 municipalities, 144 school districts, and 423 special
districts, each with a finite geography and realm of political power. The feudal protection
of political turf and power within the city makes cooperation and collaboration with
governments within the region incredibly complex if not downright discouraging. What
remains unclear is whether the City of St. Louis would fare any better if there were fewer
levels and types of government surrounding it.
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Figure 1.1: Number of Governments in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area, 1950 –
2000. This figure shows the growth of governments across the St. Louis metropolitan
area. Noteworthy is the explosion of special district governments and the consistent
uptick in the number of municipalities. With the exception of school districts, which
experienced some consolidation during the time period, the number of governments has
grown steadily. Source: U.S. Census of Governments.
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Fragmentation and Central City Decline
Many of the underlying problems facing urban areas such as housing,
transportation, pollution, education and access to open spaces were determined to be due
to political as well as fiscal fragmentation as determined by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relationship (1976). Dreier, Mollenopf, and Swanstrom (2004) as
well as Morgan and Mareschal (1999) describe the metropolitan maze of governments as
a key determinant of economic and racial isolation within metropolitan areas. However,
there is a contingent of urban scholars and political economists who view political
fragmentation within metropolitan areas, what the ACIR term an “urban jungle” (ACIR
1976, 145) as a reflection of the fundamental right to self-govern and for individuals to
work out problems themselves (McGinnis 1999, 3; Jones 2000). Resistance to regional
governance is fierce in most metropolitan areas and city leaders, academics, and policy
makers have turned their attention to building stronger regional governance rather than
regional government. Within metropolitan areas there are great disparities in the quality
of public services ranging from police to education, and if these differences are driven by
political boundaries (Weiher 1991) then fragmentation warrants further investigation.
Despite much scholarship, the relationship between urban decline over the past century
and political fragmentation remains unclear. Tension between metropolitan government
structure and urban decline leads us to the question of what role, if any, political
fragmentation plays in the varying outcomes of central cities.
The Research Question
Conceptually, fragmentation represents a continuum of political power. At one
end there is no fragmentation of political power; all decision-making is done by one
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central authority and at the other end, political power is highly decentralized within and
across several levels of government. Americans have a fundamental distrust of
concentrated power and value the separation of political power, which is why
fragmentation occurs horizontally, vertically, and internally. Does the existence of
fragmentation within levels of government as well as across governments contribute to
the decline of a metropolitan area’s central city? An assumption of the research question
is that fragmentation is a causal factor of decline. Decentralization of political power at
the metropolitan level may or may not have a direct impact on the decline of central cities
over the last sixty years, but I believe that higher levels of political fragmentation within
a central city and across a metropolitan area will lead to greater central city decline over
time.
Consider the individual – household, corporation, small business - facing the
decision of where to locate within a metropolitan area. The degree of political
fragmentation within the central city plays a role in that decision-making process, albeit a
subtle one. Central cities, particularly older ones, can have complex governing
arrangements compared with their surrounding municipalities, which may offer a more
streamlined system of government. A city, where power is separated between several
elected officials and administrative offices, presents a potentially confusing and
intimidating bureaucratic maze, whereas a suburban government overseen by one
governing body or even no formal governing arrangement, in the case of unincorporated
areas, can make the locating process more clear cut. The attractiveness of the central city
to one suburb over another can also be driven by the number and type of places.
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For example, a metropolitan area such as Portland, Oregon offers a limited
number of jurisdictional choices; only 58 municipalities in 2000 which compared to a
metropolitan area like St. Louis, home to 287 municipalities, (the third highest behind
Chicago and New York) offers an overabundance of choice. All other factors being
equal, the City of Portland may have retained more residents over time because the
choices available to residents seeking a higher quality living arrangement are limited. The
abundance of choices available to St. Louisans may only increase the likelihood that
some place other than the central city will appear more attractive.
Hirschman’s theory concerning responses to decline is useful for understanding
the relationship of a central city to its surrounding metropolitan region. Hirschman argues
that when a consumer good deteriorates in quality, those consumers who value quality
over cost will purchase a higher quality product even if it is more expensive (1970, 49).
However, when choice is limited or a higher quality option is unavailable, consumers will
voice their dissatisfaction in order to try to prevent deterioration (Hirschman 1970, 53).
At one time the central city was the only option for individuals seeking employment,
culture, entertainment, and political influence. Social mobility, particularly to a higher
economic class, was possible principally within the city limits. Residents had few options
to maintain the same quality of life living outside of the city, and thus problems that
threatened their quality of life were confronted using voice. With advances in
transportation coupled with availability of land, a high quality life outside of the city was
made possible. Not surprisingly, when faced with quality options, those who desire to
leave the city choose to exit. The growth of municipalities around central cities presents a
milieu where quality conscious residents (consumers) are presented with a variety of
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options. Hence the growth or decline of a central city is affected by the number and
perceived quality of the governing arrangements surrounding it.
The choice to exit (or never to enter) the central city in preference for suburban
living is determined by many factors and metropolitan fragmentation or the complexity of
governing arrangements within the central city represent only one schema. There is fine
scholarship which suggest the choice of living arrangements is hardly an all things equal
situation but race (Cutler, Glaeser & Vigdor 1999), education (Bischoff 2008), and
employment opportunity (Wilson 1996) play significant roles. Historic policies at the
federal level such as urban renewal and offering mortgages in suburban areas that are
cheaper and more attractive than within central cities, combined with practices like
redlining and blockbusting, have made residential choice uneven across racial and
economic groups (Jackson 1985). The loss of manufacturing jobs within cities has also
played a significant role in undermining fiscal health and population stability. Whether or
not cities fare worse in urban areas that are more fragmented than others is an explanation
of decline that can only benefit from continued research.
Political fragmentation occurs both at all levels of government as well as within
each individual level and this makes measurement of the concept somewhat unwieldy.
Because it is so pervasive, it is important to understand the effect fragmentation plays in
relationship to the central city within its particular region. Of the many measures of
political fragmentation, Hendrick, Jimenez, and Lal (2011) identify twenty specific ones
in the literature and unsurprisingly researchers have had varying levels of success
determining fragmentation’s effects. Understanding the nuanced and complex
relationship of cities and their suburbs will hopefully lead to better policy and greater
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appreciation of how seemingly independent decisions in the suburbs can affect the central
city. As metropolitan areas face crises that traverse jurisdictional boundaries, and
political fragmentation is accused of impeding upon the necessary steps to problem
solution such as coalition building and resource pooling. These tensions are particularly
pronounced when they occur between the central city and its suburbs. Historical tensions
unfurl between those who view political fragmentation in metropolitan areas as watering
down political power so thinly that problem solving is ineffective, and those who
maintain that fragmentation is a stronghold of democracy and individual choice.
Theoretical Foundations of Metropolitan Government and Governance Structure
Scholarly work on the structure of metropolitan political structure has evolved
over time from a focus on the optimal governing arrangement to optimal arrangements of
governance. The call for institutional reform of governing structure in metropolitan areas
from many governing bodies into one regional government for each metropolitan area
was dominant during the Progressive Movement. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren’s 1961
article was provocative in its argument that governments within a metropolitan area could
compete like markets and allocate public goods and services through combinations of
provision and production. As empirical evidence accumulated showing that individuals as
well as institutions collaborate in order to provide and produce services, studies of the
metropolitan area have shifted toward issues of governance. While the impact of
metropolitan fragmentation on the central city may seem somewhat dated given the
current discussions on governance, a better understanding of how metropolitan areas
relate to their central cities is critical to the current success of metropolitan areas to
collectively solve problems, despite diversity of communities and governments.
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Institutional Reform
Institutional reform was the dominant paradigm during the Progressive Era
(1890-1920s), the urban renewal programs in the 1950s, and through the Model Cities
program, which ended in the mid-1970s. Political scientists and public administrators
facing rapid change in government demands and the decentralization of cities’ population
across an expanding metropolitan area concluded that government works best when its
services are delivered with greatest efficiency and minimized fiscal separations between
areas of need and areas of resources. Institutional reformers viewed city machines as
corrupt institutions that had to be squashed and replaced with a governing structure that
was more businesslike, efficient, and responsible (Frug 1999, 52). Reformers view
political fragmentation as something that diminishes efficiency and equity for several
reasons. They assume that individual jurisdictions will not view themselves as
interdependent economic, social and political entities in a regional sense and thus forsake
the well-being of the region in pursuit of their own interests.
The reform school is grounded in the classic theory of collective action. This
traditional view assumes that individual, rational actors will proceed in their own selfinterest and not in a way to benefit the group without coercive authority to enforce the
rules (Olson 1965). The multiplicity of governments within a metropolitan area is seen as
harmful because each community, made up of individuals seeking their own self-interest,
demand their local government to act for their benefit even if those actions harm the
region as a whole. Proponents of institutional reform view metropolitan governing
arrangements in terms of how institutions ought to be in order to achieve the twin goals
of efficiency and equity. As the number of suburban municipalities increases and
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competition for wealthy residents intensifies, communities become self-centered and
exclude individuals, housing developments and businesses that are perceived as harmful.
As part of his study of city incorporation in the Los Angeles area, Miller (1981, 173)
describes how municipal boundaries were used to stratify groups by income and race.
Similar observations are made by Ladd and Yinger’s (1989) study of fiscal health in
central cities between 1972 and 1982. Gordon (2008) and Gamm (1999) describe how
exclusionary practices, such as redlining and discounted mortgages were used to entice
middle-class whites out of city limits and prevent impoverished minorities from exiting.
Downs (1999) succinctly describes how federal policies offered cities a token gesture of
aid while at the same time encouraging households and firms to move into suburban
communities (466).
Forty years after Woods’ (1961) study of the New York metropolitan area, in
which he argues that fragmentation prevents individual jurisdictions from achieving
efficiency through economies of scale in service provision, Benjamin and Nathan’s
(2001) study demonstrates that services continue to be duplicated or overlap within a
jurisdiction. Both studies recommend that fewer governments would facilitate greater
efficiency and equality in the New York metropolitan area. Lyons and Lowery (1989)
argue that political fragmentation leads to higher information and transaction costs for
citizens creating participation barriers, spurring voter apathy and inflating budgets and
expenditures. Political fragmentation is also seen as something that exacerbates
inequality through institutional structures that mismatch tax resources and service needs
and thwart redistribution in order to achieve economic, social, and political equality
(Orfield 2002); thus there is need for a regional government that would enforce the
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production and provision of public goods to achieve equity and efficiency for all
residents within a metropolitan area.
Public Choice
The remedy to problems outlined in the traditional theory of collective action was
that public goods had to be left in political hands (Hardin 1968, Olson 1965). This
remedy was challenged by scholars who believed the empirical evidence was weak and
institutions were not the only mechanism by which to solve social dilemmas. The
emergence of a behavioral approach to collective action theory was driven by political
scientists and economists whose application of market principles formed the school of
public choice. This school argues that a competitive market environment could be
simulated by municipalities competing for residents, thus creating a market rationale for
the production of public goods. Tiebout’s (1956) watershed article “A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures” pioneered the idea that public goods could have a market if a
metropolitan area has sufficient levels of fragmentation. If residents had enough choices
they could seek out their preferred ratio of taxes to services when deciding where to live
and “vote with their feet.” Public choice theory focuses on the individual motivations for
living in one community over another. The theory assumes that individuals have known
preferences and, if given enough choice, could match their tax and service ratio to their
ideal community. Public choice theory approaches political fragmentation as something
useful to the health and vitality of the metropolitan area.
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren’s article “The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas,” published in 1961, pushed back against calls for reform by arguing
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that the various governing arrangements within metropolitan areas can function like a
market and deliver services efficiently. Public choice theory forms a foundation for future
work to build empirical research to further push back against calls for metropolitan
reform.
Metropolitan
In the face of the theoretical claims made by proponents of public choice,
reformers still argued that the continued proliferation of political fragmentation was only
exacerbating the differences in the efficiency and equity of services across metropolitan
areas. The metropolitan school of thought encompasses the assumptions of institutional
reformers by recommending the dissolution of all fragmented entities into one
metropolitan government for each metropolitan area. Orfield’s 2002 work, American
Metropolitics outlines a sweeping number of benefits that would be incurred by the
metropolitan region if adopting a unified system of government. These benefits range
from cohesive land use planning and a diminished mismatch of affordable housing
between cities, older suburbs and wealthier, newer communities, to improving transit and
solving population retention problems facing at-risk suburbs (Orfield 2002, 162-167).
Illustrative of the potential in unified government is Baltimore County,
Maryland. Maryland counties are quite resilient and there are no municipalities in this
county. Each county government takes in revenue and provides services for much of its
metropolitan area. Vicino’s (2008) study of suburban decline in Baltimore County
illustrates the redistributive ability that a large, centralized government can have in
moving dollars from one area of wealth to areas of need. Rather than the norm, however,
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Maryland counties are the exception for the characteristic powers of county governments.
Calls for metropolitan government are not only driven by a theoretical view that
individuals will act in their own self-interest to the detriment of the group, but also are
driven by a belief that if political power is spread too thinly across governing units, the
overall governing system can become out of balance. Even the efforts by citizens to
check and correct the system are ineffectual, thus a restructuring of governing
arrangements is the best solution.
Institutional reform and metropolitan theory focus upon the humanitarian and
political ills that have plagued metropolitan areas for a century. Their central remedy to
the inefficiencies and inequality within the metropolitan area is the creation of regional
government, which voters in most locations have consistently rejected. Despite reformers'
continued efforts to change the public discourse in their favor, political reality favors a
fragmented governing structure. The frustration that reformers feel towards the current
governing arrangements in the metropolitan area resonates with many practitioners and
claims that fragmentation is an underlying source of social and economic disparity
between cities and their surrounding communities. However, the lack of momentum to
create regional governments has become motivation to study the governance in
metropolitan regions (Hall 2009).
Polycentricity
Developed by the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana
University, the concept of polycentricity emerges in response to calls to reform
fragmented metropolitan political structures into one “Gargantua” (Wood 1958)
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government. Polycentricity is defined as the idea that within a metropolitan area the
political system would have many centers of decision making that are independent of
each other (Ostrom 1999). In essence, polycentricity argues individuals can and do
collaborate to solve problems. Polycentricity theory adds to public choice theory with
assumptions that in urban areas, service production and function vary substantially; there
is a preference for homogenous neighborhood, and competition among service producers
will encourage innovation, production and delivery (Ostrom 1999). The Ostroms’ 15-year
study of police performance in metropolitan areas across the country found that smaller
police departments provide services with better quality and satisfaction (according to
residents) than their larger counterparts (Ostrom and Whitaker 1999). Oakerson’s (1999)
analysis of local public economies argues that through combinations of service
production and contracting for service provision, communities are able to function with
efficiency, equity and be highly fragmented. Polycentricity theory looks out over the
politically fragmented landscape and does not see a crazy-quilt but a complex
development of competition and collaboration, operating in a cohesive and stable pattern.
In regard to urban decline, particularly of central cities, public choice and
polycentricity theorists believe in multi-level governance and view the argument that
suburbs (i.e. fragmentation) take away population and revenue as overstated. Hawkins
and Ihrke’s (1999) review of the suburban-exploitation literature conclude that suburbs
may not hurt cities and in some cases cities benefit from their suburbs. Their analysis
suggests that economic and technological changes are to blame for central-city decline,
not political fragmentation. If citizens are unhappy with their government, the impetus for
change rests not only upon attentiveness of public officials, but on the determination of
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the community, neighborhood and individual to demand change. Fragmentation,
according to public choice theory, is not an impediment to citizens acting as a check on
their governments but rather as a stronghold of the democratic process.
Regionalism
The case for regional cooperation and governance is the raison d’etre for the
regionalism school, a derivative of institutional reform. Instead of focusing the
dissolution of all fragmentation into one metropolitan government for each metro area,
the focus of regionalism is on how communities build cooperative agreements and
collaborate to solve social dilemmas or, more simply put, issues of governance rather
than government. Regionalists still view political fragmentation as a mechanism for
social disparity but believe that metropolitan governance, with its focus on civil society,
can effectively foster healthy levels of participation, manage public goods, and keep
public officials accountable (Oakerson 2004).
Theoretical Crossroads. While the reform, metropolitan, and regionalism schools
of thought hold unified government as an ideal, reformers have not been blind to political
realities. Advocates for inter-governmental cooperation not only between suburban
municipalities but between the central city and its surrounding municipalities argue that
collaboration through informal and formal agreements is currently the best way to combat
problems of a regional scale. Collaborative efforts between governments still have to
overcome political fragmentation as getting public officials across a metropolitan area to
agree, even on an informal policy arrangement, is difficult.
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Public choice and institutional reform set the foundations for two distinct theories
of political fragmentation’s effect on central city decline; however, the empirical
evidence indicates that something is still missing from what is known about these
interactions. Studies in the polycentricity school of thought have accumulating evidence
that small scale service provision performs with efficiency to the satisfaction of their
consumers, and promotes local control of government. In other words, political
fragmentation is not harmful but reflects the will of the people. This seems to fly in the
face of evidence amassed by reformers and advocates of regional governance who have
painstakingly detailed that economic and racial disparities appear to escalate with the rise
of political fragmentation. In other words, political fragmentation appears to lead to
systematic inequalities.
The Puzzle
From these differing views emerges the following question: Has political
fragmentation within the metropolitan area and within central city government been a
cause of central city decline or just the benign evolution of governance? The literature
clearly identifies two points of view concerning whether or not fragmentation is a public
good or public evil but the tensions remain unresolved. The argument that political
fragmentation is harmful to the central city stems from a theoretical view of the
individual as rational, seeking to get the most out of a living arrangement for the least
amount of cost. When individuals behave in this way, the governing arrangements within
the city put it at a disadvantage compared with its surrounding communities.
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Causal Mechanism. The Tiebout hypothesis, which states that given enough
choices individuals will sort themselves out by tax-service ratio into their ideal
communities, is the basis for the assumption that individuals have a known preference for
where they live. Based upon the work of Tiebout and others, I assume that individuals
will attempt to maximize their utility in a relatively rational manner, seeking to improve
their self-interest, loosely defined as getting the most out of their living arrangement for
the least amount of cost. When deciding where to live, these individuals will search to
find optimal living arrangements. Theoretically, individuals (both households and firms)
could move ad infinitum until their preferences were met. Naturally, the empirical
evidence demonstrates that most individuals are not constantly on the move, seeking out
their ideal living arrangement, but are operating under certain constraints. For instance,
poverty or community attachment may hinder the ability to move. There are numerous
factors that affect where and how often individuals change residences ranging from
proximity to work, cost of moving and selling a home, as well as family needs.
A plausible motivation to move or to remain in a community for some is
proximity to public transportation. Whether because of financial savings or
environmental conscience, the desire to be close to public transportation may hinder a
household moving even if there is a desire to move out of the community. The decisionmaking process of choosing a community involves prioritizing, taking stock of the
benefits as well as the costs, and making the best choice in the face of constraints. I
assume that individuals still seek to behave rationally and have an internally known
optimal living arrangement that motivates a desire to move, but that there are several
factors that inhibit, encourage or prevent their capacity to move. As clearly laid out by
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institutional reformers, institutions play a key role in an individual’s choice and ability to
move.
The ability of an individual to exercise choice is affected by not just a desire to
move, but is either encouraged or discouraged by the number and perceived quality of
communities. In an effort to attract and retain residents, communities will compete with
each other and distinguish themselves by altering their service-tax ratio. Whether an
individual is able to start house shopping is encouraged or discouraged by the
institutional rules in place. Under certain conditions, communities can act with
exclusivity to keep undesirable residents out and attract those they deem more desirable.
These institutional rules have historically been a cause of the concentration of poverty
within central cities. For example, federal housing and interstate highway policies as
described by Jackson (1985) and others, encouraged suburban growth and did almost
nothing to help cities retain or attract desirable residents.
Political fragmentation manifests itself in two ways, across a metropolitan area
and by higher levels of fragmentation within central city government. Higher levels of
fragmentation across a metropolitan area increase the number and perceived quality of
choices to individuals. The more communities with which a city has to compete for
residents (thus higher levels of political fragmentation) can lead to greater decline in the
central city. Fragmentation within central city government in terms of public officials,
bureaucratic departments, and segmentation of fiscal and political power hamstring the
ability of a city to act nimbly when competing with surrounding communities for
residents.
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Political power within city government is generally divided between a mayor and
council as well as other elected officials. Cities may also have a city manager as well as a
mayor. Whether by resistance to reforms or political history, city government can vary in
strength, resources, and ability to institute change. Rich’s (1996) seminal work regarding
African-American mayors and city schools demonstrates the difficulty a mayor can have
effecting change within its own school district. Elected school boards were cautious and
mistrustful of calls for reform emanating from the mayor’s office and the perception of
city schools as “failing” further weakens the city’s ability to compete for residents.
Portz’s (1990) work on the politics of plant closings discusses how city officials can
struggle to respond with meaningful public policy to either prevent or circumvent a plant
closing. When it comes to decision-making, particularly crafting public policy that is
timely, cities can be at a disadvantage simply because of the number of decision-makers
who must agree for a policy to move forward (Pressman and Wildavsky 1979). The
number of elected officials within city government can be a hindrance because each
official will not only guard his political and financial resources but can be slow moving
in response to competition for households or firms. Thus the fragmentation within a
central city can be a real disadvantage when competing with suburban communities for
households and firms.
The general hypothesis among advocates of metropolitan reform is that
metropolitan areas with more fragmentation will have more decline than metro areas with
less fragmentation. Much of the scholarship written in support of the “fragmentation
causes urban decline” hypothesis relies upon descriptive statistics and case study
analysis. The literature is rife with subjective examples of cities wrecked by fragmented
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government. Jackson’s acclaimed work Crabgrass Frontier is representative of the rich
anecdotal evidence used to explain the devastation fragmentation can have on central
cities. The vicious cycle between fragmentation and urban decline is described by
Jackson: “The same broad patterns of downtown decline, inner-city deterioration, and
exurban development so evident in Saint Louis are actually typical of the large
population centers of the United States” (1985, 218).
However, while every metropolitan area in the United States is fragmented, not
every metro area has experienced the same levels of urban decline. The New York
metropolitan area is highly fragmented, as detailed in Robert Woods’ work 1400
Governments (1961) and yet the city’s economy, infrastructure, and population have
endured, despite Woods’ own recommendation for broad, sweeping reforms of the
government structure (Wood 1958). According to the Nathan and Adams Index4, New
York is characterized as prosperous and its central city is growing, even as its
metropolitan area expands. Though its population dropped between 1970 and 1990, it
experienced population gains, primarily through immigration, in the following decades
giving the city a positive net change over the past thirty years (Savitch and Kantor 2002,
12). The city is not without its problems. There is still poverty, housing projects, and
New York City experienced its own share of white flight, particularly after the black out
and subsequent looting in 1975. The economy of the city has not always been vibrant –
the city has been on the brink of bankruptcy several times. But despite the growth of the
metropolitan area over the last fifty years, the city thrives.
Detroit is considered by many measures to be relatively low on the fragmentation
scale but the decline of the city has continued unabated since the 1950s. For example,
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Orfield’s fragmentation index gives Detroit a score of 3.3, which is quite low, but even
though Detroit has less fragmentation than New York, it has experienced far greater
decline (2002, 134). Looking at the Nathan and Adam’s Index over the same time span as
New York, Detroit is considered distressed, its central city in decline, and has had a net
change in population of -36% between 1970 and 2000 (Savitch and Kantor 2002, 12).
Much of Detroit’s decline stems from the changes in the American auto industry (Glaeser
2011). As its markets have changed, moving business out of Detroit, indeed even out of
the country, Detroit has been unable to fill the industrial vacancy. The city itself has
grown to be majority minority, while the surrounding areas remain white enclaves.
Despite or perhaps because of political fragmentation a city like New York has continued
to grow and prosper whereas Detroit has been unable to stem the waves of decline
emanating from its central city.
Herein lies the puzzle: Does the pluralistic ideal of decentralized government
actually cause more harm than good to the central city? New York and Detroit represent
somewhat extreme cases of fragmentation but their contrary conditions draw out the
tension in the debate. If political fragmentation is harmful to central cities it should help
Detroit and hurt New York but the effect of fragmentation on these cities is not clear.
Over the last century, all metropolitan areas have experienced changes in political
fragmentation; some of them have experienced severe levels of central city decline as
well. Whether varying levels of political fragmentation have a causal impact on central
city decline has not been firmly established and needs to be carefully, systematically
measured and tested over time.
Implications
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The problems facing cities and metropolitan areas are varied and complex ranging
from local issues like government employee pensions and health services, to regional
issues such as traffic congestion and air quality, and even national and international
issues like competition for trade hubs and economic development. The belief that fewer
governments will make solving these problems easier has become conventional wisdom.
Even in St. Louis, there is renewed dialogue concerning rejoining the city to St. Louis
County and while many tout advantages like economies of scale and the leveraging of
resources, it is still murky as to whether or not changing the governing structure will
make solving any of these problems easier. While not all academics and policy-makers
are persuaded that consolidated government like what exists in Louisville, Kentucky or
Indianapolis, Indiana is the ideal governing arrangement, regional consolidation and
cooperation keep cropping up as problem solutions.
This study will contribute to the long debate over the role of metropolitan political
structure by teasing out some of the complexities of how political fragmentation across
metropolitan areas and within cities has affected the health and vitality of cities over
time. There are several political and policy related implications of this analysis. If
political fragmentation has an adverse effect on cities, it implies that building cooperative
agreements as well as formal partnerships for the managing of resources, outward
growth, and transportation are not exercises in futility but can help culture a metropolitan
perspective, rather than an "us" versus "them" mentality between urban municipalities
and their central city. Tracking the condition of central cities in relation to their growing
metropolitan areas over sixty years and modeling that data with panel study regressions
represents new analysis of political fragmentation and central city decline.
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A Road Map for the Analysis
The central hypothesis is to test the impact of political fragmentation on central
city decline between the years 1950 – 2000, for 100 central cities. I predict that
metropolitan areas and cities with higher degrees of political fragmentation will have
central cities with greater levels of decline. The 100 largest cities in 1950 make up the
sample for this study. Using primarily U.S. Decennial Census data and U.S. Census of
Government data measures of population, education, race, income, employment, poverty,
fiscal health as well as several measures of political fragmentation have been compiled
for each city and their metropolitan area. A list of the 100 cities included along with their
rank and population in 1950 is displayed in Table 1.1. The data is used to construct three
time series cross-sectional models of central city decline. Three components of decline
are chosen, population loss, racial segregation, and declining fiscal health, to model
decline. While many measures of political fragmentation were considered, ultimately
nine distinct measures are included to capture the conceptual components of horizontal,
vertical, and internal fragmentation. The results of these time series cross-section
analyses are discussed in chapter four.
Chapter Two is a discussion of several causes of central city decline, such as
technological advances, decline of manufacturing, racial bias, and federal government
policies and considers how political fragmentation helps explain city outcomes. Chapter
Three carefully examines the two overarching schools of thought about political
fragmentation and government structure; small is beautiful and large is lovely. In
addition, chapter three further draws the theoretical connection between political
fragmentation and central city decline. Chapter Four includes an explanation of the
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measures used, data anomalies, and pertinent summary statistics. Finally, Chapter Five
presents and summarizes the findings from four panel study cross-section analyses and
offers suggestions for future research.
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Table 1.1: The 100 Largest Cities in 1950 by Population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau
City, State

Rank

Population

New York, NY

1

7,891,957

Chicago, IL

2

Philadelphia, PA

Rank

Population

Memphis, TN

26

396,000

3,620,962

Oakland, CA

27

384,575

3

2,071,605

Columbus, OH

28

375,901

Los Angeles, CA

4

1,970,358

Portland, OR

29

373,628

Detroit, MI

5

1,849,568

Louisville, KY

30

369,129

Baltimore, MD

6

949,708

San Diego, CA

31

334,387

Cleveland, OH

7

914,808

Rochester, NY

32

332,488

St. Louis, MO

8

856,796

Atlanta, GA

33

331,314

Washington, DC

9

802,178

Birmingham, AL

34

326,037

10

801,444

St. Paul, MN

35

311,349

11

775,357

36

303,616

12

676,806

Jersey City, NJ

37

299,017

Milwaukee, WI

13

637,392

Fort Worth, TX

38

278,778

Houston, TX

14

596,163

Akron, OH

39

274,605

Buffalo, NY

15

580,132

Omaha, NE

40

251,117

New Orleans, LA

16

570,445

Long Beach, CA

41

250,767

Minneapolis, MN

17

521,718

Miami, FL

42

249,476

Cincinnati, OH

18

503,998

Providence, RI

43

248,674

Seattle, WA

19

467,591

Dayton, OH

44

243,872

Kansas City, MO

20

456,622

Providence, RI

43

248,674

Newark, NJ

21

438,776

Dayton, OH

44

243,872

Dallas, TX

22

434,462

Oklahoma City, OK

45

243,504

Indianapolis, IN

23

427,173

Richmond, VA

46

230,310

Denver, CO

24

415,786

Syracuse, NY

47

220,583

San Antonio, TX

25

408,442

Norfolk, VA

48

213,513

Boston, MA
San Francisco,
CA
Pittsburgh, PA

City, State

Toledo, OH

Wiedlocher

35

Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments

Table 1.1 Continued
Jacksonville, FL

49

204,517

Mobile, AL

77

129,009

Worcester, MA

50

203,486

Evansville, IN

78

128,636

Tulsa, OK

51

182,740

Trenton, NJ

79

128,009

52

182,121

80

127,206

53

177,965

Baton Rouge, LA

81

125,629

54

177,397

Scranton, PA

82

125,536

55

176,515

83

124,769

56

174,307

84

124,681

57

168,330

85

124,555

58

168,279

Cambridge, MA

86

120,740

New Haven, CT

59

164,443

Savannah, GA

87

119,638

Flint, MI

60

163,143

Canton, OH

88

116,912

Springfield, MA

61

162,399

South Bend, IN

89

115,911

Spokane, WA

62

161,721

Berkeley, CA

90

113,805

Bridgeport, CT

63

158,709

Elizabeth, NJ

91

112,817

Yonkers, NY

64

152,798

Fall River, MA

92

111,963

Tacoma, WA

65

143,673

Peoria, IL

93

111,856

Paterson, NJ

66

139,336

Wilmington, DE

94

110,356

Sacramento, CA

67

137,572

Reading, PA

95

109,320

Albany, NY

68

134,995

New Bedford, MA

96

109,189

Charlotte, NC

69

134,042

Corpus Christi, TX

97

108,287

Gary, IN

70

133,911

Phoenix, AZ

98

106,818

Fort Wayne, IN

71

133,607

Allentown, PA

99

106,756

Austin, TX

72

132,459

Montgomery, AL

100

106,525

73

131,041

74

130,803

El Paso, TX

75

130,485

Kansas City, KS

76

129,553

Salt Lake City,
UT
Des Moines, IA
Hartford, CT
Grand Rapids,
MI
Nashville, TN
Youngstown,
OH
Wichita, KS

Chattanooga,
TN
Erie, PA

36

Shreveport, LA

Knoxville, TN
Tampa, FL
Camden, NJ

Chapter 1

Introduction
Summary
Political fragmentation is at the root of why central cities can no longer be treated
as isolated, but must be considered as part of a larger urban area. Thus, it is important to
increase our understanding of fragmentation and its effect on urban decline, racial
isolation, political efficacy, and civic participation. Danielson and Lewis (1996) state this
eloquently, “The point is neither that central cities are unimportant or unworthy of serious
study. It is only that cities are not enough to understand urban politics, and that city
politics cannot be understood without encompassing the rest of the spreading
metropolis.” This dissertation aims to add to the discipline by studying fragmentation at
the metropolitan level for the hundred largest central cities in 1950 and following them
through time, to explain the relationship between fragmentation and central city decline.
Fragmentation has the potential to be a powerful mechanism to better understand
the political context in which most of America lives. Though some scholars and public
officials would like to see metropolitan governance reformed and the degree of
fragmentation diminished, the federalist value of keeping power separated across units of
government and the important role elections play in keeping government in check will
more than likely maintain a polycentric system. A study that models the complex nature
of fragmentation in metro areas will shed some light on this puzzle of fragmentation and
urban decline. Understanding the historical relationship between central cities and their
surrounding communities helps policymakers and academics build healthier metropolitan
areas. Pollution, energy efficiency, workforce displacement, education quality, these are
all problems facing metro areas that grow ever serious, and a greater understanding of
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how a central city fits into the metro area will help craft more efficient and equitable
solutions.
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Introduction
Notes: Chapter One

1

For example see Savitch et al. 1993, whose work finds evidence that the prosperity of
the central city contributes significantly to the prosperity of their surrounding suburbs.
Also Dreier et al. 2004, demonstrate how the problems of decay, crime and poverty are
creeping over central city boundaries and into first ring suburban communities.
2
Federalism typically refers to constitutionally shared powers between two relatively
coequal levels of government. Because local governments are creatures of the state, the
idea of dual sovereignty does not apply, federalism is an idea with many meanings and in
this case the use of federalism refers not to the hierarchical nature of governance but the
multiplicity of governance. A more accurate term might be intergovernmental relations.
3
The current governance of the public school district is even more complex. In March
2007, after multiple evaluations gave the school district provisional accreditation, the
state transferred governing authority from the school board to an appointed board. The
school board still exists but with limited powers, which it shares with the appointed
board.
4
The Nathan and Adams Index is a composite of six equally weighted factors,
unemployment, dependency, education, income level, crowded housing, and poverty. The
values are a comparison of central city conditions to their surrounding suburbs within the
metropolitan area (Nathan and Adams 1989).
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“A suburb is ultimately an instrument by which the periphery can exploit the center … a
suburb is a parasite whose residents can enjoy the benefits of scale and specialization
without sharing in all the attendant costs.”
- Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism

U.S. cities represent a complete spectrum of urban experience; in the Northeast
cities such as New York are densely populated with metropolitan areas bleeding into
others like Hartford, Philadelphia and Newark. Others like Phoenix and Houston have
smaller cores of population density and have miles of low density bedroom communities.
Some cities sprang up out of pioneer trading and shipping posts; others, because of
proximity to natural resources or location along westward expansion routes. They have
all served as home to those who beat the drums of progress. The manufacturers who
turned raw elements into goods, inventors, entrepreneurs, researchers, the arts,
entertainment, engineering, architecture, and science, as well as the great schools of
education and medicine, have mostly called cities home. While cities have served as the
meeting ground for countless creations that have advanced America down the road of
progress, they have also had their share of great troubles from natural disaster, financial
strain, riot, gang violence, poverty and pollution. Explaining why some cities have grown
and thrived over time while others have diminished is a puzzle scholars have spent much
effort piecing together. Part of what makes cities so complex is the fact that they are all
nested within larger metropolitan areas and understanding the causes for success or
decline in any particular city should include its position within its region, for the two are
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linked by economy, the movement of its citizens, and by its common problems and
triumphs.
According to the U.S. Census’s classification of urban places, the United States is
considered an urban nation and in many regards this classification is an apt description.
As of the 2000 Census nearly 80%1 of Americans no longer live on farms and in rural
communities but in a kind of urban-rural hybrid, part traditional city and part rural oasis
(the suburbs). Alongside the growth of urban areas as population centers has been the
growth of governing structures to provide services and political representation. The
growth of suburban areas has had dramatic and in some cases devastating impacts on the
American city, however this growth pattern has not been universally bad for cities.
Suburban life has also become an iconic image of the American Dream and has made
possible home ownership, mobility and access to urban amenities possible for millions
(Glaeser 2011). Southern and Western cities have experienced tremendous outward
growth in their metropolitan areas spurred by population growth and economic
development and typically have fewer municipal governments. Some of America’s most
vibrant cities, New York, Los Angeles and Chicago, exist in incredibly fragmented
metropolitan areas. As outlined in Chapter 1 the governing arrangements within a
metropolitan area may have a causal role in explaining why some cities thrive and others
decline. While cities across the country have had their share of difficulties, the question
endures: How much of their continued struggle, resilience, or success can be explained
by the amount of political fragmentation surrounding them?
Theories examining the impact of racial bias, federal urban policy, technological
innovation, and the decline of the manufacturing industry within the central city have
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attempted to explain why cities have experienced population loss, fiscal strain, enduring
segregation, struggling schools, and criminal activity (Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom
2004, Judd & Swanstrom 2006, Rich 1996). However these explanations are not entirely
adequate for explaining the vast differences in outcomes cities have experienced. Having
a racially biased urban housing policy was harmful to city residents but the implication
here is that cities that thrived did not suffer the same ill effects. No urban scholar would
argue that cities like New York, Chicago or Los Angeles are vibrant because they were
not negatively impacted by racial bias or loss of manufacturing jobs. There is need for
other explanations that might explain the differences in city outcomes. If not all cities
exposed to negatives like white flight, declining housing stock and economic
disinvestment experienced persistent decline, it implies that there must be other
explanations.
The urban politics literature clearly identifies symptoms of decline. Fitting them
within the larger theory of urban politics and policy, however, and grappling with why
cities decline can be both a nuanced and complex undertaking as there remains an
element of mystery in our understanding of cities. This becomes apparent simply by
examining the causal mechanisms of urban theories. Many of the symptoms for decline
could just as easily be the causes of decline. The ease with which one could switch the
equations’ sides enables a self-reinforcing cycle that has become the established view
regarding cities. Conventional wisdom explaining the causes for city decline are many
but vary along some common themes: Schools are terrible in cities; interstate highways
devastated neighborhoods and were black removal; cities are dirtier and more polluted
than suburbs; cities are dangerous – you’re more likely to be victim of crime in the city;
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traffic in cities is awful, there is nowhere to park and it takes an eternity to get anywhere.
Although a few of these ad hoc conclusions are rooted in scholarly research, many are
perpetuated by common misconceptions. Despite struggles, there is still much greatness
in U.S. cities. For example, many of the highest ranking high schools in the U.S. News
annual report are routinely located in cities; some of the best research hospitals in the
world call American cities their home; and violent crime rates are actually falling in cities
across the board, according to FBI data.2 It is not always clear what the key factors are
which separate a city's perceived success from others thought to be in decline. Also
uncertain is the role that metropolitan growth over time, particularly that outside of the
core city, has upon the health of the region and the central city. One plausible explanation
to explain the differences in city outcomes and the effects of regional growth is political
fragmentation.
Political fragmentation, or the number and types of governments at play in a
metro area, create a powerful and complex context in which governance, public policy,
housing and economics must go about their work. A common banner to place problems
such as pollution, traffic congestion, racial isolation and concentrated poverty is under the
notion that too many governments in a region make it near impossible to govern as a
region. The argument that suburban communities have a parasitic effect on cities (Lowi
1979) is just one of many explanations for the decline in central cities over the last 60
years.
This idea is illustrated nicely in work like the Peirce Reports. These
commissioned studies, first published in newspapers beginning in 1987, were charged to
identify the most salient problems facing the city and its region in six cities (Phoenix,
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Arizona; Seattle, Washington; Baltimore, Maryland; Owensboro, Kentucky; Dallas,
Texas; and St. Paul, Minnesota). The Peirce Reports have three common themes, poor
cities and their affluent suburbs (the socioeconomic gulf), sprawl, and a lack of coherent
governance (Peirce, Johnson and Hall 1993). Political fragmentation is charged with
enabling the outward migration of residents, increasingly converting green space into
residential and business space (29) and allowing the wealthy and affluent to create safe
havens for their wealth by excluding poorer households, through zoning codes and
ordinances (27). Fragmentation of government also creates an environment where
problems that cross jurisdictions are incredibly difficult to solve (Peirce, Johnson and
Hall 1993, 32). Government officials are alternatively cast as "too many cooks in the
kitchen" or view other governments as "us versus them." The detriments of political
fragmentation hit core cities particularly hard because they are left to care for those who
cannot afford to leave, or for those who have historically been excluded from suburban
life. This means that core cities are disadvantaged when competing with suburbs for
economic growth.
Though political fragmentation has been charged as harmful, the verdict is still
decidedly undecided. This is, in some sense, a problem of causality and perhaps over
identification; there are many plausible explanations why some cities have suffered (or
not) over the last sixty years. The negative consequence of factors such as the exodus of
white households out of the city into suburban enclaves, the decline and relocation of
manufacturing in the US, the effects of interstate highways and federal urban programs
all tend to correlate with political fragmentation. This is makes is difficult to distinguish
if differences in city outcomes is a direct effect of political fragmentation or other factors.
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While exposure to each of these factors has impacted cities in different ways, particularly
in terms of regional location, cities were all affected by things like highway construction
and federal housing policy, yet some have had markedly different outcomes.
A hallmark of the American political system is fragmentation of governing
authority across governing bodies, and all cities in the US exist within politically
fragmented metro areas. Though the amount of fragmentation varies, the principle goal of
this research is to examine the popular notions of why cities thrive or decline in the
presence of fragmentation and to see how they measure up alongside theories of political
fragmentation’s effect. In other words does a city like New York grow and thrive because
political fragmentation allows increasing levels of economic interconnectivity and access
to urban amenities to rich and poor alike, or does it thrive in spite of vast degrees of
fragmentation? A summary of the usual suspects for city decline will be examined and
then political fragmentation will be presented as an alternative explanation for the
variation seen in city outcomes.
Death and Life of Cities
One of the most striking character changes experienced by urban America is the
continued and ongoing population migration toward the edges of metropolitan areas over
time. It is not simply that cities lose citizens in their center that is devastating; it is the
specific nature of that loss that has been so damaging. The desire to move away from the
noise, pollution and crowding in cities (yet remain able to avail oneself on its benefits)
stretches all the way back to the earliest cities (Bruegmann 2005). The ability to escape
the pathologies of the central city was limited to those wealthy enough to afford the
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commute. It was not until the middle of the 20th century that affordable automobiles and
housing made it possible for the middle class to choose to exit en masse.
Up until relatively recent life in suburbia was also limited primarily to Caucasians
(Kruse 2005; Sugrue 2005; Jackson 1985). Through public policy and practice white
families were encouraged to exit the city; this move to suburban governments was not
random nor was it uniformly distributed across households. While the choice to move is
made by individuals, the enticements to do so are a matter of policy and politics. The
explanations for the growth of metropolitan America and the decline of core cities
include white flight, federal urban policy, manufacturing industry decline, highway
development and financial hardship. These components make up a cadre of some of the
most influential reasons for sprawl and city struggles.
White Flight. On the surface, America in the late 1940s appears to have been a
fantastic place to live. We were experiencing a post-World War II economic boom, Harry
Truman was president, we emerged victorious not only in a just and moral war but were
key players on the international stage, and we were experiencing an expansion of the
middle class. Our manufacturing industry continued to thrive as it shifted from a war
industry to the production goods and products. The mood in the country was jubilant.
Cities were bustling as all manner of people flooded to them looking for new jobs,
careers, lives, starts, and fresh adventures.
A deeper exploration, however, reveals the strains of such rapid growth. The
Great Migration of African-Americans during the 1940s and 50s from Southern states to
the industrial cities in the north to pursue opportunities for employment in the
manufacturing industry grew urban populations dramatically both during and after World
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War II. Additionally, immigrants the world over came to the States for the chance at a
better life, which often hinged upon employment in manufacturing in a city center. This
influx of people, coupled with our returning servicemen from overseas, soon led to a
housing shortage in cities. During the war years, new construction and renovation had
ground to a halt and afterward could not keep pace with the demand. The use of frame
style home construction combined with federally-backed home mortgages kept the
housing crisis focused on construction of new homes and creation of communities at the
periphery of the city (Jackson 1985).
Access to these new homes and the mortgages to afford them were not available
to all, however. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and later the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) adopted the same hierarchical lending structure that had
been used by realtors and lenders in urban areas nationwide. Cities had long been
segregated and realtors used a color-coding system to impose a racially centered housing
policy. The term “redlining” refers to the practice of drawing a perimeter around certain
sections of the city where it was unacceptable to buy and sell homes to what was thought
of as “less desirable” clients. Racial and ethnic segregation was supported and maintained
in cities by the housing industry (Gordon 2008; Judd & Swanstrom 2006; Sugrue 2005).
The rise of suburban communities expanded this racial and ethnic segregation by
replacing the realtor's redlining tactics with jurisdictional boundaries. For example a
white household interested in a new suburban home could qualify for a 30-year, FHAbacked loan with as little as 10 percent down. Thus, whites were encouraged to pack up
the equity in their homes and move outside the city limits. It was also common practice to
use restrictive covenants, refuse loan services, or offer prohibitively strict mortgage terms
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to potential minority homeowners in order to prevent integration in the suburbs. From the
creation of the earliest suburban municipalities through the early 1970s there emerged
entire communities that were entirely homogenous in terms of race, ethnicity and income
and an alarming number of these remain intact today. African-Americans, Hispanics and
Asians were excluded from participating in federal housing programs until the passage of
the Fair Housing Act in 1968.
The exodus of white households from Atlanta from the 1950s through the 1970s
is described in Kevin Kruse’s seminal work, White Flight (2005). While unique in many
aspects, Atlanta's story exemplifies several important practices within cities that further
encouraged white households into suburbia. As white households departed, over-crowded
African-American sections of cities began taking up residence outside the infamous
redline. Kruse demonstrates how the practice of "blockbusting", a highly effective tactic
used in neighborhoods that were in the process of integrating, was employed. Realtors
would approach white homeowners on a block-by-block basis and encourage them to
sell, telling them that their block, street, or neighborhood was "going black" and when
that happened they would be victims to falling housing values, rising criminal activity,
vulnerable to the spread of disease, and that their beloved public spaces, parks and
schools would be "infiltrated." Using these unscrupulous scare tactics, the realtors would
capitalize on one or two black households as the starting point for entire streets emptying
out.
The practices of redlining, blockbusting, and restrictive covenants facilitated the
beginning of what is known as geographically driven racial sorting (Gordon 2008), where
minorities were left with aged housing stock (FHA loans for home renovations were
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practically non-existent) while white families enjoyed their choice of new communities
with varying levels of services and taxes. The FHA-eligible loans had several
requirements which had the effect of focusing home loan services outside the city, such
as requirements for lot size, width, distance from other buildings and the street (Jackson
1985). By the time overtly racist policies like restrictive covenants and redlining finally
became illegal with the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, followed by the
Community Reinvestment Act in 1977, suburban communities had perfected the use of
zoning codes based on household income to maintain their much-cherished homogeneity.
While it may be unlawful to discriminate by race or ethnicity, there is nothing unlawful
about keeping minimum standards for lot size, house size or distance from the street; in
effect setting a minimum standard using income in lieu of race as the metric for future
residents.
For decades the core city held a concentration of our country's poorest and
minorities. During the 1970s the movement to suburban communities was opened to
minorities and poorer households as further outward migration to newer communities on
the metropolitan fringe left older suburbs available. Suburban America may have begun
as an escape for wealthy and upwardly mobile but represents diversity in wealth, race and
housing quality. Problems such as drug violence and failing schools, which have been
traditionally been associated with the inner-city are now suburban problems as well
(Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom 2004; Orfield 1998). White flight offers a compelling
explanation for central city decline by arguing that it was the loss of a particular
population class and race that devastated cities. The implication is that cities that thrive
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must not have experienced white flight, or at least not to the degree which Rust Belt cities
did.
The exodus from central cities like Detroit, Michigan and Atlanta, Georgia does
not represent anomalies but reflect a shared experience across all American cities. The
growth of suburban America was pioneered by wealthy and upwardly mobile white
households and this process began long before the federal government started securing
mortgages or the advent of frame style housing (Glaeser 2011; Jackson 1985; Sugrue
2005). White flight as an explanation by itself is unable to explain why cities like San
Francisco, California and Detroit, Michigan have found themselves in remarkably
different places in terms of urban growth, economic development and racial diversity,
despite experiencing exodus to communities outside the city limits. Certainly white flight
has had negative consequences for many cities but it has not necessarily a death-knell. To
understand why a city like San Francisco which is considered by many as a desirable
destination to work, vacation and live, can be so different from Detroit - a bankrupt city,
where whole sections of the city are now turning back to prairie and could become urban
farmland3- other explanations need to be considered, such as the role of the Federal
government.
Federal Urban Policy. During the administration of John F. Kennedy and
culminating with President Johnson's Great Society, the federal government turned the
full weight of its good intention and policy toward the problems of the city. The 1960s
saw the rhetoric of an urban crisis shift from a local issue to being wrapped up as part of
a larger national dialogue on cities. The Civil Rights Act (1964) and Brown v Board of
Education (1954) made enormous legal inroads toward changing social and political
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inequities in cities. President Johnson’s Great Society programs were crafted to further
help impoverished residents and city neighborhoods and seemed to hold great potential
and yet in the end failed to live up to expectations (Moynihan, 1969). In 1965 Congress
enacted just over 80 programs to address everything from education, health and economic
development to workforce training in cities, raising the amount of federal
intergovernmental transfers to state and local governments to $41.7 billion by 1973
(Peterson 1981, 86). While each of these programs originated at the federal level, they
were administrated and implemented by state and local governments.
Frieden and Sagalyn (1994) write that federally funded urban renewal was an
extremely useful program for cities in that it provided "a way to assemble and clear land
in and around downtown, to use land for what they wanted, and to do it almost all at the
federal expense"(..). The focus of business and civic leaders on demolition and
construction led to decades of social unrest and tension. The abuses of urban renewal
were manifold, coined by scholars like Lowi (1979) as “black removal” and in cities like
Detroit, New Haven, and Newark it created views of deep distrust of government and
tensions which sparked riots (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1994). Altshuler and Luberoff point out
that, “central city leaders experienced a growing sense of desperation. In order to head off
the spiral of decline, they came to believe, nothing short of radical surgery would do to
clear away slums, to assemble and write down the large cost of development sites, to
build expressways from the suburbs and regional airports into downtown, and more
generally to retrofit obsolete elements of the urban fabric for the dominant technologies
and corporate space demands of the second half of the twentieth century” (2003, 14).
Urban renewal programs successfully enabled cities to cheaply double down their efforts
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to stabilize downtown business districts but this was often at the expense of residential
neighborhoods.
In the face of mounting dissatisfaction with urban renewal programs, President
Nixon transferred control of urban federal grants from Washington D.C. to the states and
cities and then merged urban renewal programs into a single funding source now known
as community development block grants (CDBG) (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1994). Cities
could no longer depend upon federal dollars to demolish or construct new buildings, but
would have to compete with other cities, done by a formula originally more beneficial to
newer cities, for a share of each year’s community development grant. The fallout from
federally funded Urban Renewal program meant that cities had to pursue different
avenues in order to keep economic life flowing into central business districts, the hope
being that a revitalized downtown will lead to revitalization throughout the city.
Frieden and Sagalyn (1994) have studied some of the efforts city governments'
have made toward modern-day urban renewal. Most have continued to focus on central
business districts and the struggle to bring dollars into a city with significantly less
federal aid. Before the suburban boom in the early 1950s, US cities were the primary
market for goods and services. It did not take long, though, for suburban areas to start
competing with cities to be a new home for some of its business life. Businesses that
specialized in providing goods and services to the typical household followed the middleclass to the suburbs. Even in the 1950s, city officials felt the trend of business decline and
wrung their hands over tax revenue losses. City leaders and businesses keenly observed
the economic successes of suburban malls since the opening of Northgate Mall in Seattle,
Washington. One tactic used in the 1980s and 90s that has helped many a city's

52

Chapter 2

America's Great Cities

downtown area bring business back has, ironically, been modeling the suburban shopping
mall, although not in suburban fashion. Seattle, Boston, Pasadena (even St Louis) all
have attempted to bring entice business back to downtown through the mall concept.
Urban malls such as Paseo Colorado in Pasadena, California are successful because they
interweave residential living and amenities with retail.4
Urban renewal was winding down by 1970, and many cities had used the
programs to build conference centers and stadiums that successfully drew suburbanites to
downtown, and many suburban Americans worked in the city. Federal urban policies
were designed to help cities combat their social and economic woes, yet unfortunately
they have led to frustration and left many jaded, displaced and, if able, opting for
suburban communities. After the game was over, the conference had ended or the
workday was done, downtowns remained troubled ghosts of what they once were.
Federally-sponsored programs have changed cities irrevocably and city officials as well
as the business community are still dealing with the after-effects. However the impact of
these programs and the structures built (and demolished) with federal dollars did not
wound all cities universally. Maintaining stadiums, conference centers and vibrant
downtowns allows cities to capitalize on being at the center of the marketplace of ideas
and an entertainment destination. Attracting people the world over to start a business, a
restaurant or to play a concert are good things for a city and as Glaeser (2011) points out,
a city’s success is wrapped up in its ability to be an attractive economic and social hub.
Many cities have been able to increase their attractiveness by leveraging urban renewal
programs to shape their look and appeal in ways that would have been out of reach
without federal help.
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Highways. Since the 1930s, an interstate highway system had been on the wish
list of automakers, trucking and freight unions, that lobbied Congress and policy makers
to craft legislation. It was under President Eisenhower that a highways act (where the
federal government footed most of the bill), finally had enough political traction to
become law. The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 and has had a profound and lasting
effect on how we Americans think about transportation. Cities from New York to Los
Angeles embraced the super highways, believing that they would be able to right many
urban wrongs, from blight to economic decline. Agricultural areas saw highways as a
streamlined, efficient way to bring goods to bigger markets faster, and further away.
Making good use of urban renewal programs, American cities sought out highways as a
means to promote their growth. The expansion of suburbia, too, has been aided by federal
transportation policy that is almost uniformly in favor of automobiles. Highway
construction represented ways to remake the urban landscape and connect cities.
Interstates made living outside the city possible, and practically convenient
precisely because they connected suburban communities with central cities. Arguably the
phenomena of a sprawling suburban landscape surrounding central cities would not have
happened on the same scale without interstates. Not only did freeways provide the
physical connections between cities and suburbs, they were instrumental in the attempts
of cities to clear out their slums and other so-called blighted neighborhoods and to
rejuvenate the central business districts. What city residents and public officials found,
however, was that the cost of placing an interstate through a city was not the magic bullet
solution they had hoped for after all but at times even compounded the same old
problems. In high-density urban areas freeways often cut through neighborhoods causing
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sections to become physically isolated, which caused decay and only encouraged those
residents to move.
State and local transportation departments were responsible for implementation of
the Highway Act. They were also accountable for the location of and allocations for the
freeways. Transportation departments adhered to cultures that value efficiency and
scientific principles as the best means to serve the public and were resistant to change
highway plans based on political influence or neighborhood pleas. As a result, much to
his or her chagrin, the typical local government official had very little to do with where
actual routes would be located. What was important to the national and state highway
departments was alleviating traffic congestion in urban areas by providing the most direct
and timely routes, often to the detriment of community preservation and rational land
development (Fainstein et al 1986).
For many New England or Midwestern cities struggling against the changing tide
that was carrying their populations and businesses out to the suburbs, an efficient network
of highways implemented at the national level and largely on the federal dime had
seemed as if it would be a win/win for everybody. Many of these officials believed
interstate highways would boost the city’s economies and entice their citizens to remain,
at least for shopping and entertainment. However, one of the well-documented effects of
highway development is how it spurred on suburbanization (Fainstein et al 1986, 14;
Jackson, 1985). Competition among cities for business and capital investments as well as
government funding for projects and improvements has always been fierce (Logan &
Molotch, 52) and the need to incorporate an interstate highway within the city meant that
rarely were cities leaders able to approach highway construction with thoughtful,
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articulated plans. A significant exception to this was New York City planner Robert
Moses, who seemed to have no shortage of grand plans for interweaving federally-funded
highways throughout the entire New York region (Caro 1975). Moses' plans were not
benign, he was a master of using highways as a means for removing poor minority
residential neighborhoods away from downtown and their residents ultimately into
segregated public housing. A number of city leaders emulated his schemes or hired him
as a consultant. Through at least the 1970s, top government officials and members of the
business community viewed interstate projects as necessary for the future of their cities
and an economic godsend.
Public officials felt a real sense of urgency when it came to highway
development. Similar to the pressure to have multiple railroad lines going through a city,
if an urban area failed to connect with a major highway, officials knew the effect would
be crippling. They foresaw that highways were necessary to keep businesses located in
the city. The interstate system was a key component in shaping the economic
connectivity between states and regions, as well providing ease for people to travel great
distances (Dunn 1998). Transportation policy at both the national and state levels came to
be dominated by road construction and the auto industry at the expense of all other modes
of transportation. In Detroit and other cities public transportation fell into serious
disrepair or else was nearly choked out of existence. Scholars such as Jackson (1985) and
Judd et al. (1998) have linked highway development to increases in urban sprawl and
cultural separatism. Highways disproportionately favored white households who desired
to take advantage of home ownership opportunities made possible by federal housing
policy in the suburbs. Minorities who remained in central cities were left with a severely
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underdeveloped public transit system as transit funding dwindled or were bought and shut
down by private organizations who would benefit from auto industry expansion (Bullard
2004).
Teaford (1990, 1993) has examined how cities such as Pittsburgh and Baltimore
have struggled to cope with declining economic vitality and a changing population postWWII. Interstates in particular have acted as double-edged swords because though people
were attracted downtown for jobs, entertainment or cultural events, highways have also
facilitated movement out to the suburbs, which helps explain cities' struggles with urban
highway development.
Cities clamored for express highways to be built within their borders, hopeful it
would stimulate and grow their market economy. They were unable to manage the
negative effects highways had on neighborhood redevelopment. For many cities,
expressway projects only served to demolish minority neighborhoods, herding those
displaced into other marginalized neighborhoods, thereby causing stress on social
services and unrest (Squires, 191). Interstate highways have had some severe effects on
cities, but they have made commuting in and out of the city convenient. Highways alone
did not create suburban sprawl and cannot bear the entire burden for population loss of
urban cores. Breugmann (2005) argues that suburbanization would have occurred
whether interstate highways had been built or not because there was a strong desire by
many to move to communities outside the city limits. While there are differences in the
degree highways impacted a city, the location of highways within cities and historic
differences between cities, all major US cities are on interstate routes and highways
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represent an unchanging, universal factor – thus they cannot entirely explain the
differences in growth or decline that cities have experienced.
Manufacturing. Beyond population loss, cities also faced the loss of commercial
activity, most especially in production. In the Fordist Era manufacturing industry has
traditionally been a source of reliable, entry-level work that paid relatively well and did
not require a college degree. During the 1940s through the 1970s thousands of AfricanAmericans were migrating to cities, dealing with the not-so-easy task of finding decent
housing for their family and adjusting to life in a new place. Over the same time period,
America's industrial economy was being transformed into one based almost solely on
service. Technological innovations in transportation and communication enabled many
industries to relocate outside the urban core and even in other countries where regulation
and oversight were less strenuous and where trade unions were weak (Sugrue 2005). The
global marketplace also impacted US manufacturing such as the steel industry, which
was devastated when international steel production became competitive in price and
quality.
John Portz’s work The Politics of Plant Closings considers the various responses
a city or community takes when faced with a plant closing. Portz (1990) shows how
developing relationships with key industry leaders and being quick to form alliances in
order to amass resources on behalf of a threatened industry had a decisive impact on
whether a plant ultimately closed. However, policy makers are constrained by the tools,
bargaining chips, goals, and rules that play into whether a plant will close or remain open.
While no public official wants business to leave the local economy, there are times when
there is little that can be done to affect the decision to close a plant down. This is
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particularly evident in older Northern and Midwestern cities where suburban
municipalities or Sunbelt communities were able to welcome manufactures into their
communities by offering tax incentives. Businesses also found the South and Sunbelt's
lack of organized labor and unions attractive. The movement of manufacturing to the Sun
Belt has been a boon to Southern and Western cities which have grown and prospered
dramatically over the last sixty years (Savitch & Kantor 2002).
The movement of the auto industry’s manufacturing plants from Detroit to
suburban and Sunbelt regions are illustrative of devastating loss and the inability of city
leaders to prevent it. Sugrue describes how the loss of jobs in the automotive industry had
a ripple effect as smaller industries that supported auto manufacturing either went out of
business or moved closer to newer plants, this in turn hurt retail business, bars and
restaurants (2005, 149). The response of Detroit city officials to loss of jobs and high
rates of unemployment was to focus attention on building massive structures that were
largely unneeded and did not provide enough jobs to outweigh the costs of neighborhood
destruction and revenue loss through tax breaks (Glaeser 2011, 62-62). Central cities,
particularly Rust Belt cities, are not the manufacturing centers they were in the 19th
Century. As manufacturing jobs disappeared, city officials have been left overseeing
abandoned factories, vacant warehouses and populations ill-equipped to work in a service
and technology driven economy.
While industrial decline in the US was concentrated in the Rust Belt, some cities
were able to successfully reinvent themselves. Cities such as Detroit, Pittsburgh, New
York and Boston were manufacturing giants but do not all share the same fate. New York
suffered severely from the loss of the garment industry but flourished with the growth of
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its financial services sector. Glaeser (2011, 42) makes the point that while politics and
political mismanagement are a common feature of Rust Belt cities, the critical mistake
was focusing on the built environment rather than promoting commerce, building a
skilled workforce and fostering entrepreneurial innovation. The decline of the
manufacturing industry was harmful to cities but it did not necessarily put cities on a
permanent path to ruin.
Fragmentation and the City
The impact of white flight, federal urban policy, highways and the decline of
manufacturing in the central city are some of the traditional reasons for why some cities
in America have suffered. However these explanations do not fully explain the variation
in outcomes that has occurred over the last 60 years. White flight, urban renewal
programs, highway construction and blue-collar job loss occurred almost universally
across cities and yet not all cities have found themselves in continued decline. In other
words, cities that have grown and thrived do so not because they never experienced white
flight or do not have highways but in spite of them. What then could explain the
differences between cities in decline and cities that grow? I submit that the varying levels
of political fragmentation that exist in metropolitan areas play just such a role.
An additional explanation for why some regions end up in more disastrous
predicaments than others is that higher levels of fragmentation lead to uneven tax levels,
and social disparities (Berry 2009). Political fragmentation has been linked to racial
segregation in school districts and across municipalities. Additionally, fragmentation
creates more stakeholders, which can bog down responses to problems across the entire
region (Leach 1976, 156). In spite of much study across a number of decades which has
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been devoted to sorting out these claims, large gaps in our understanding of political
fragmentation remain. The largest of these and the primary focus of my study is based on
an examination of how political fragmentation compares with other explanations of
decline.
The impact of fragmentation on the condition of the central city is an area in need
of continued study but it is a sensitive topic precisely because the choice of where to live
is a cornerstone of the American Dream. If the decline of central cities is due, even in
part, to political fragmentation, it calls into question the idea that we are free and
independent to choose where to live. As the number of governments grow and
metropolitan areas expand outward, the enticements to exit the central city may become
all the more attractive. Chapter 3 will discuss the role that political fragmentation has
played in city outcomes and demonstrate that cities can at times be at a disadvantage in
competing with their suburbs where housing is both cheaper and larger, schools are
newer and the governing structures young and pliable.
Summary
White flight, federal urban policy, highways and the decline of the manufacturing
industry in Rustbelt cities each offer explanations for urban decline in America. However
they are not able to fully explain the differences between whether a city ultimately
remains in decline or a state of slow growth or even becomes a fast growth city. It is
possible that political fragmentation can explain the disparity. Regions with less
fragmentation may have denser cities and an easier time crafting solutions for
metropolitan wide problems, whereas urban areas with higher levels of fragmentation

Wiedlocher

61

Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments

may succumb to a competitive and defensive view of political neighbors and be resistant
to collective action.
How interconnected are the governing bodies that exist around the central cities to
the condition of the central city? Does a region suffer because its central city can only
grasp at solutions to its problems, or because there is a failure to see the struggles of the
city as having anything to do with the behavior of governing bodies within the region?
There are no quick and easy answers to these questions but building a better
understanding of how cities decline in relation to their region. Chapter 3 will fill in the
gap left from urban political theories will address this with an in-depth consideration of
metropolitan government and its structures.
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Notes: Chapter 2

1

Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, Census Bureau Reports. Census
Newsroom update Monday, March 26, 2012. CB12-50.
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html
2
In the top 25 high schools as ranked by U.S. News and World report in 2012, 10 are
located in the central city. U.S. News and World Report rankings for research hospitals in
2012 for specialties such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiology are all located within central
cities. The FBI's Crime in the United States report for 2012 showed that violent crime
rates have been falling for the last ten years.
3
Renn, November 4, 2009. “Detroit: Urban Laboratory and the New American Frontier,”
NewGeography, http://www.newgeography.com/content/001171-detroit-urbanlaboratory-and-new-american-frontier.
4
Pasadena, California is a classic suburb and on the surface may not appear to fit within
the same list with cities like Seattle and Boston. The example of Paseo is included
because as the metropolitan area of Los Angeles has expanded, suburban Pasadena
became more urbanized and experienced problems that were typically associated with a
central city, particularly disinvestment in its central business district. Its mixed use mall
is touted as a success story for reinvestment and development.
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Chapter 3
Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments
"A Region is an area safely larger than the last one whose problems we found no
solution."
-Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities
A common caricature of the suburbs is that they are uniform in their upper-class
values, populated by those who are wealthy or upwardly mobile and politically
Republican. Suburban communities have also been credited for causing the central city to
carry an unfair share of the expenditures to support public welfare, pollution control,
museums, highway and street maintenance, as well as public safety and crime fighting
(Rehfuss 1977). Rehfuss is swift to point out that these attributes do not apply to all
suburbs but are at times formed and perpetuated from cherry-picked examples. Still
decades after his writing, works like Bishop's The Great Sort ascribe much the same
characteristics to the suburban way of life.1 As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many
reasons why cities have experienced dramatically different outcomes over the last century
such as the out migration of manufacturing, technological innovation, neighborhood
destabilization, crime, blight, and failing schools. Alone, none of these factors can
adequately explain the sometimes vast differences in outcomes that exist between cities.
Political fragmentation may be the missing link in these explanations, indeed the
persistence of the "suburbs are exploitive and harmful to core cities" hypothesis is due in
part to the continued linking of governing structure to uneven paths of renewal and
decline that continue to play out in U.S. cities.
The idea that metropolitan growth outside of the central city and political
fragmentation can have a negative impact on the city is not path breaking. Indeed it is a
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common complaint in the literature stretching back to 1926 Supreme Court affirmation of
Euclidean zoning in Euclid v. Ambler which essentially allowed suburbs to exclude
undesirable residents (Wolf 2008) to reports by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations of the economic and social disparities between central city
and suburb (ACIR 1965). Though warnings of the dangers in unbridled political
fragmentation have been sounded for decades, the empirical evidence that fragmentation
actually causes harm to central cities is still developing. All metropolitan areas in the
U.S. are politically fragmented to varying degrees but does the amount of fragmentation
play a role in the growth, economic vitality, or diversity of a central city? In light of that
question, this chapter will consider empirical evidence that has accumulated over the last
half century to ascertain what is understood about the effects of fragmentation on central
cities.
Fragmentation is pervasive in metropolitan areas and because of this scholars
have developed many ways of defining and quantifying the concept. What is most
commonly meant by the term political fragmentation, at least in the local government
context, is the division of some geographic space into units of government, commonly
municipalities. But fragmentation also occurs in the hierarchy of government as
municipalities are nested within special districts, counties, states, and ultimately the
federal government. In addition to the layering and multiplicity of governments, I add in
this study a third arena of fragmentation for consideration, and that is the division of
political power within a level of government among elected official,s referred to as
internal fragmentation. Taken together, these three components of fragmentation
comprise a more comprehensive and nuanced definition of political fragmentation which
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sets this study apart. Each of these components has its own body of scholarship focused
on understanding the impact fragmentation has on a range of topics from political
participation and land use, to service delivery and taxation. It is common for studies to
examine only one level of fragmentation at a time, but this singular view obscures
complexities in fragmentation's effects that emerge when each component is represented.
While Chapter 1 included a discussion of metropolitan organization and political
fragmentation, this chapter drills down deeper into the discussion of how political
fragmentation shapes city outcomes and how this may impact the greater metropolitan
area.
Horizontal Fragmentation
The multiplicity of governing units within a metropolitan area is horizontal
fragmentation. Perhaps the most common conceptualization of political fragmentation is
simply the number of governments in any given geography. Within a metropolitan area,
the number of municipalities or special districts would be a general indication of how
much fragmentation exists within the region. Horizontal fragmentation occurs wherever
there are coterminous governing units of the same type within the metro area, such as
local municipal governments. Fragmentation at this level varies in cities and metro areas
both across geographic space and through time. In general urban areas in the Northeast
and Midwest have more horizontal fragmentation than regions in the South and West.
Horizontal fragmentation has leveled off in terms of the number of new municipal
governments. However, growth is steady in special districts which continue to be created
in metropolitan areas. There has also been a downward trend in school district growth,
primarily because of consolidation during the late 1930s through 1980. Although
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consolidation has been concentrated in rural districts it was driven at the state level by a
bureaucratic push for professionalism and centralization of district control (Strang 1987).
While horizontal fragmentation generally is the proliferation of non-overlapping
governing units in a metro area, the bulk of the scholarly research focuses on the
municipal level.
There is a deep well of scholarly work on horizontal fragmentation showing its
impact on everything from governance, to the movement of jobs and population from the
central city to the urban fringe. High concentrations of governments in a metro area have
been linked to racial isolation and separation, growth of the metro area at the fringe, and
economic disparity between the core city and suburban municipalities. A review of these
findings and how they impact city outcomes is useful to establish what the expected
effects of horizontal fragmentation will be for the analysis.
The literature on urban and metropolitan politics broadly classifies metro areas
into central cities and suburbs. This city-suburb dichotomy has produced two
perspectives about the effectiveness of local governments in using their legal powers and
the ability of local officials to control the affairs of their own jurisdiction. The disparities
that developed between cities and their suburbs during the 1950s and 1960s were
systematic and observed in urban areas across the country leading to the suburban
exploitation hypothesis. The work of Kasarda and others, who examined the city-suburb
dynamic, developed the suburban exploitation hypothesis as a framework to explain the
economic stratification occurring between city and suburb. In essence the exploitation
hypothesis claimed that suburban residents take advantage of central cities by demanding
services and facilities, but avoid the attendant costs by living beyond the city's
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jurisdiction (Kasarda 1972). Later work by Slovak shows the fading of suburban
demands for services such as streets and recreational facilities but a growing demand for
protective services (1985). This led Slovak to conclude that exploitation of cities still
occurs, just in a more focused way (185). The exploitation hypothesis has faded, pushed
back by scholarly reviews such as Hawkins and Ihrke (1999) who argue that it is now
suburbs that instead of taking from cities, are providing income through taxes and fees,
employment, retail revenues and then provide parks, retail, jobs and other recreation to
city residents.
In some aspects Hawkins and Ihrke’s criticism is valid, Kasarda's work looked at
metropolitan areas during the 1950s and 1960s before cities had adopted measures to
limit suburban "free-riders" such as fee-for-service, earnings taxes, and special
metropolitan taxing districts. However the argument that central cities and suburban
governments are on unequal footing remains relevant in terms of autonomy over land use
policies and as a question of whether fragmentation facilitates racial and economic
sorting, consumption of green space and unplanned growth.
A common view of fragmentation is that it encourages growth at the fringe by
turning green space into residential neighborhoods, office parks and retail space. The
movement of people and firms is in the same direction, towards the periphery. However
the empirical link between sprawl and fragmentation is not conclusive. Razin and
Rosentraub's (2000) study of U.S. and Canadian cities finds a weak correlation between
sprawl and fragmentation. They also note that having a region with less fragmentation
does not equate to compact development or high population density. However
Carruther’s (2003) research at the county level found a significant relationship between
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fragmentation and urban sprawl. He found that municipal and special district
fragmentation, infrastructure investments and white flight all have significant impacts on
growth in unincorporated areas on urban fringes (475). These studies demonstrate that
sprawl is not solely a factor of growing horizontal fragmentation but a result of variations
in the powers and restrictions on land use. There is evidence that development on the
edges of metropolitan areas is driven not only by population growth, but by localized
zoning laws that direct and manipulate development to the benefit of housing prices
(Poindexter 2005). The desire to control land use, exclude undesirable businesses and
low-income housing are also key factors in metropolitan political reorganization
according to Hogen-Esch (2001) and Purcell's (2001) studies on secession attempts in
Los Angeles' San Fernando Valley. The conditions necessary to promote competition
between governing units and to use limited governing authority to be attractive to
upwardly mobile households seems to be magnified in urban areas with higher horizontal
fragmentation.
In that same vein, a centralized metropolitan area would be characterized by less
income sorting and competition between communities. Portland, Oregon is notable for its
mechanism put in place to control sprawl, reduce the zero-sum nature of competition
between the city and its suburbs, and to keep low-income housing decentralized by
requiring multi-family, affordable housing throughout the region (Aoki 2005). The city of
Portland has certainly benefited from being within a centralized region but the conditions
are somewhat unique to Portland. Metro areas have not eagerly sought to model the
governing arrangements of Portland, but this is partly due to the role of state law and the
way it defines and limits the choices available to communities within a metropolitan area.
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Peterson (1981) makes a compelling argument that cities are limited by state laws
in the choices they make. Jurisdictions must compete with other governments within the
region and because cities are limited, this compels them to narrow down to a singular
focus on economic development. Redistributive policies that would directly benefit
neighborhood residents are relatively ineffectual or pushed to the backburner. City
officials must focus on bringing in private investments, at times to the neglect of local
residents, who are then more likely to move outside the central city to places where they
perceive their needs will be better met. Limited political autonomy and fierce competition
then become the causal mechanism to explain city outcomes. In regions where there are
more municipal governments surrounding the central city, the more magnified the focus
will be on economic development and perceptions of competition.
While Peterson's work emphasizes the limited scope of local autonomy,
Danielson's work focuses on what cities do with the autonomy they possess. He argues
that municipal governments utilize their power to protect boundary lines, set lot sizes,
establish building codes and housing densities, in order to ensure that residents meet a
minimum economic threshold. This allows local governments to keep a high value
property tax base and a low tax rate (Danielson 1976). Danielson's concern is not what
central cities are unable to do with their local authority but the ability of suburban
governments to effectively exclude certain groups of people - though history shows cities
are not naive of exclusionary powers. When suburban communities systematically
exclude apartment buildings and other multifamily housing and demand that new
residences and lots be a certain size, they restrict the types of households that are able to
move into the community. Central cities end up with disproportionally higher levels of
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homeless, mentally ill, low-income, and elderly populations (Parks 1997). By this
reasoning, cities surrounded by more municipal governments should find themselves
shouldering a disproportionate burden of poorer residents.
Horizontal fragmentation is also a source of blame when it comes to racial
separation and isolation across geography. Part of this is historic in nature because early
federal housing policy routinely favored white households over minorities and
encouraged whites to move outside the city limits. Municipalities also commonly adopted
laws and policies that made it illegal to sell, lease, or rent property to racial minorities.
While racially motivated restrictive covenants have been illegal for decades, their ghosts
linger on in urban housing patterns. Jonas (1998) shows that the desegregation of the
Columbus Ohio School District not only encouraged white flight, but housing developers
successfully exploited the fragmented metro area to promote continual residential
development.
There is scholarly evidence to suggest that higher levels of horizontal
fragmentation in the metropolitan area have led to greater concentrations of minority
groups in the central city (and then in first-ring suburbs) and less integration in
municipalities, within municipalities and across the region (Massey and Denton 1988,
Massey and Hajnal 1995). Logan (2001), Massey and Denton (1993) and Farley (2008)
clearly show that not only are communities and neighborhoods still highly segregated but
white exposure to other races, in particular African-Americans, is limited. Segregation
and isolation of races appears to be more pronounced in larger metropolitan areas
(Glaeser and Vigdor 2001). This pattern of segregation extends beyond the neighborhood
or municipality. Bischoff’s (2008) investigation of segregation across political units
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shows that increasing the number of school districts in a region increases the levels of
racial segregation. Despite the relative decline of research on the suburban exploitation
hypothesis, the factors of that framework still studied point to evidence that political
fragmentation, specifically horizontal fragmentation remain important for understanding
the racial composition of metropolitan areas.
Segregation and poverty have not respected the central city-suburban bright line
and have not remained confined to city ghettos and slums. Municipal decline and poverty
have found their way into suburban neighborhoods in metropolitan areas across the
country. Suburban municipalities, particularly traditional working-class communities,
have witnessed an influx of poorer residents, economic disinvestment, struggling schools,
and rising crime. Barron and Frug (2005), Dreir (2004), Orfield (2002), and Vicino
(2008) are among those who demonstrate that local autonomy over land use, tax levels
and education policy are often not enough to leverage the fiscal capacity necessary to
combat decline. The problems of central cities are now common complaints in inner-ring
working-class suburbs. The decline of suburban communities has brought to light an
interesting pattern in local autonomy over land use. It would seem that the tools available
for local government to shape what happens within their boundaries appear more
powerful when cultivating residents of higher incomes but when faced with the demands
that accompany poorer households and a need for more redistributive policies, the tools
seem inadequate.
The amount of fragmentation in a metro area is a further complexity of local
autonomy. Vicino’s study of Baltimore is illustrative. The typical pattern goes something
like this: High levels of fragmentation allow newly developing fringe areas to exclude
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lower income households through zoning codes; older suburban communities lose
residents to the newer neighborhoods and are replaced by poorer households who require
a higher level of public services. Metro areas with higher fragmentation would be
expected to have more extreme levels of income sorting, demonstrating the pattern
described above. In the Baltimore case struggling suburban communities exist in very
low levels of fragmentation. Outside of the City of Baltimore, Baltimore County has no
other municipal governments and so presents an opportunity to test the assumption that
where there is centralized local autonomy to pool resources and redirect funds, there will
be less blight and poverty. Vicino finds that despite a consolidated political structure and
concentrated redevelopment efforts Baltimore County lacked the regional tools and
funding from state and federal government needed to adequately stop and reverse decline
(2008). Our understanding of how horizontal fragmentation shapes suburban and central
city outcomes is still not entirely clear and this is due to the complex nature of
metropolitan fragmentation in America. The actions of other governments certainly
impacts central cities, but the way that vertical and internal fragmentation exert
themselves on the city are different.
Summary. The scholarly evidence suggests several conclusions about the impact of
horizontal fragmentation. Metropolitan areas with higher numbers of municipal
governments surrounding central cities have greater degrees of racial sorting leading to
higher levels of segregation and racial isolation. Increases in municipal growth increase
the likelihood that there will be pockets of isolated poverty and wealth not just in the
central city but in the suburbs as well. Municipal growth is also linked to greater
development of green space and growth of the metropolitan area at the fringe. Horizontal
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fragmentation may also negatively impact the population density of the central city as
residents have more options beyond the city limits. Cities surrounded by greater numbers
of municipalities may view the surrounding communities as competition for resources
and revenues and thus are more likely to tax wages on those who work or reside within
the city.
Hypotheses. The literature on horizontal fragmentation leads to the following hypotheses
to be examined in this study. Differing levels of horizontal fragmentation will have a
negative impact on central city population change. As the proportion of governments,
particularly school districts and municipalities, increase in a metropolitan area the
population in the central city is expected to decrease. Horizontal fragmentation is also
expected to have a significant relationship with segregation across the metropolitan area
(measured by racial dissimilarity and isolation). As the proportion of municipal
governments and school districts increase in a metropolitan area, the levels of
dissimilarity and isolation are also expected to increase. In other words, more government
will indicate higher levels of overall segregation.
.
Vertical Fragmentation
Political fragmentation is not only the proliferation of governing units of the same
type across the metropolitan area, but also occurs whenever governing bodies overlap
each other. In the United States, governments exist in a top-down hierarchy; federal,
state, county, and municipality where each level has constitutional authority over a
smaller unit. Within a metropolitan area however, governments exist in an additional type
of vertical fragmentation called jurisdictional overlap. Governing units do not always fit
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neatly within the boundary lines of larger geographies and so vertical fragmentation is
created whenever jurisdictions intersect each other (Berry 2009, Park 1997, Wagner and
Weber 1975). For instance, a resident of the city of St. Louis, Missouri pays taxes to 10
different taxing authorities. Some of these taxing authorities, like the public schools and
city operations only collect revenue from city residents but others, such as the sewer
district and the zoo and museum district, collect taxes from city residents as well as noncity (i.e. suburban) residents. Typically with metro areas, governing units that overlap
other governments do not exercise authority in a hierarchical sense but only over a
specific area of service provision. The focus in this study is where vertical fragmentation
occurs at the metropolitan level, which is mainly in special districts. Following the work
of Berry (2009) vertical fragmentation will be defined as the territorial overlapping of
special districts within metropolitan areas. Governments such as counties and
municipalities rarely have boundaries that overlap, however school districts, sanitation
districts, parks, and even libraries can pile on, one on top of another.
Scholarly evidence on vertical fragmentation show that it creates financial
disparities between the central city and the rest of a metro area (Sacks 1968), increases
the redundancy in service provision (Parks and Oakerson 1993) and has a harmful effect
on the economic growth and incomes of a region (Nelson and Foster 1999). There has
been a rise in the number of studies on regional governance. The discussion of the effects
of vertical fragmentation includes both the differences in cities with decentralized and
centralized regional government as well as instances where there is no formal regional
government structure but networks of governance.
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Vertical fragmentation creates an environment ripe for competition not only
between governments with similar powers but also between governing units of different
powers. Park (1997) interprets this intergovernmental competition as something innate to
our federal system: The constitutions, statutes and rules of states encourage counties,
central cities and suburbs to compete with each other in order to prevent political
monopoly and preserve jurisdictional autonomy (730). This is demonstrated by Miller's
(1981) finding that local governments desire to maintain prominence and power and will
do so by increasing their service responsibilities. Local governments are attuned to their
position within the metropolitan area, particularly the policy activities of the central city,
and will adjust their expenditures in order to compete for development or cooperate on
public safety policies (Park 1997, 743).
Jurisdictions may engage in competition on the horizontal level but with vertical
fragmentation, where governments overlap, there is also a pull towards monopolistic
behavior (Wagner and Weber 1975). Governments balance a combination of profit
maximization and output maximization and so when the population is small, less than
150,000 according to research by Wagner and Weber, governments will focus on costreduction. Beyond that population size they switch and focus more on controlling supply
(1975, 679). Fragmentation is also accused of causing inefficiencies in service delivery,
as well as driving up the cost of providing those services. This cost can be seen overtly
through higher taxes or covertly through special districts that take in tax revenue, but it is
sometimes hard to distinguish for the typical citizen (Berry 2009). But when intermunicipal cooperation occurs, it can promote efficiency, equity and voice (Warner and
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Hefetz 2002). Dowding and Mergoupis (2003) also find that fragmented governing
systems do not increase efficiency either at the jurisdiction or at the metropolitan level.
Beyond effects on governing behavior, vertical fragmentation has some distinct
impacts on political participation. In fragmented metropolitan areas citizens are not better
informed about their local government's service-tax package; they are not more likely to
participate in local affairs; nor are they more satisfied with their local services when
compared to residents of a consolidated, regional government (Lyons and Lowery 1989).
Kelleher and Lowery note that fragmented governing arrangements in metro areas do not
promote turnout until it reaches a theoretical point where there are so many governments
it resembles a competitive market scenario. However when a metro area moved to
consolidated government political participation by voting was predicted to be higher
(2004). The level of political participation is also an important factor when it comes to
understanding the role of special district governments.
Special districts vary widely in size from subdivision-size to large enough to
overlap other governing boundaries. Special districts are designed to provide a single
service such as education, airports, highways, water, or mass transit. These governing
units may collect a tax or issue fees for service in order to operate and over the last sixty
years they have grown more than any other type of government. The distribution of
special districts varies across metropolitan areas, something which Foster (1996)
attributes to the legal environment in states. She finds that metropolitan areas with greater
concentration of special districts exist in states where the ground rules for creating
governments that oversee service delivery are more permissible (306). The growth of
special districts can be attributed to a pattern of officials utilizing lenient state laws to
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simply create a new, single-purpose governing unit and avoid putting a tax increase
before voters. Though residents are unable to avoid paying for the new service, they
typically accept a special district as legitimate. The works of Berry (2009), Foster (1997)
and Hendrick, Jimenez and Lal (2011) clearly show that vertical fragmentation actually
increases total government spending. In other words, it is more expensive to live in metro
areas that have higher levels of vertical fragmentation.
Single-service governments are criticized for not carrying the same expectations
of transparency and accountability that are ascribed to elected offices at the county or
municipal level. The role of special districts on metropolitan governance and city service
provision is a particular concern in this regard because even in cases where officials are
elected there is still a risk that they will become captured by special interests. Special
interest capture takes place because political participation is significantly lower for
single-function elections versus general-purpose elections; they typically do not occur at
the same time as other elections. Berry (2009, 65-67) discusses how the lower turnout can
mean that the voters who do participate are not representative of the general public but of
those select few who have a vested stake in the actions of the single-purpose government.
The end result is that single-purpose governments tend to increase the cost of service
provision as elected officials align policy closer to the desires of those who voted for
them (Berry 2009).
The number of special districts, and the level of overlapping governments can
also create an environment where public policies are ineffective and private developers
can take advantage of fragmentation. Jonas’ (1998) study of Franklin County and its
central city Columbus, Ohio underscores this phenomenon. A busing program
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implemented in the early 1980s to bring racial balance to the Columbus School District
instigated a wave of white flight into other areas of Franklin County not included in the
Columbus district. This was further exasperated by housing developers who utilized the
vertical fragmentation – school districts, municipalities, county and state governments –
to expand water and sewer services in order to build more housing outside of the
Columbus School District. Developers also worked to keep school district and municipal
boundary lines intact to keep the Columbus School District from incorporating new
territory. Ultimately this maintained conditions for further white flight out of city schools
(Jonas 1998, 335). The experience of Columbus is unique but it emphasizes a byproduct
of vertical fragmentation: Where there is perceived demand economic development will
work governing structures to their advantage in order to meet supply.
Central cities tend to have less vertical fragmentation because they produce many
services in house. Suburban governments have higher levels because many governments
produce the same package of services (Parks and Oakerson 1993). Sacks (1967) found
that fiscal disparities – the gap between needs and resources – are higher in central cities
than in suburban areas. This is driven by differences in expenditures. Cities were found to
have lower resources and higher tax rates, and to focus less spending on education but
more on non-education services compared to their surrounding region (Sacks 1967, 249).
If a multiplicity of governments encourages sorting and drives disparities in income
between the central city and its suburbs then it makes sense that cities would have to
increase spending on other areas such as safety and health. In contrast, suburban
governments are free to spend more on education services because there is less demand
for safety and health services.
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There is also evidence that vertical fragmentation impacts the central city’s
economic growth. As political fragmentation in a metropolitan area grows, economic
growth and population growth increase as individuals and households have greater choice
of where to reside. Stansel (2004) finds that the number of municipalities and the number
of counties per 100,000 residents have a positive effect on economic growth as measured
by population growth and per capita income. His analysis lends support to the idea the
fragmentation is not harmful to cities but economic growth is actually encouraged in
areas with more government.
The work of those like Rusk (1993) and Peirce (1993) suggest that in states where
the laws of incorporation are more lenient central cities are doing better because they
have been able to grow and expand their territory and population through annexation.
Houston is an iconic example of this. The city was given a significant amount of
autonomy from the state government to determine what areas were annexed into the city.
No other major city has successfully adopted ten annexations between 1978 and 1996.
Houston demonstrates that expanding territory is an effective way to capture population
and revenues. Cities that exist in states where incorporation laws are harder are less likely
to have successfully expanded their borders. This is because vertical fragmentation
allows the higher level government to set the rules that influence a lower level of
government. Rusk's elasticity hypothesis has been criticized though because his models
fail to control for region and most states that have easier incorporation laws are located in
the South and West, whereas the tougher incorporation states are primarily in the North
East and Midwest. As Houston incorporated more and more territory, suburban areas felt
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threatened enough that the state of Texas changed its laws to limit the geographic growth
of the central city.
Summary. Vertical fragmentation occurs when governing units territorially overlap one
another. Within the metropolitan area, vertical fragmentation exists as governments are
piled on in a top down fashion, counties, special districts, municipalities and towns.
While municipalities do not overlap, special districts do overlap each other as well as
other governments. The work of Berry (2009) shows that jurisdictional overlap leads to
higher tax rates among governments that share a common tax pool. This is primarily
because individual jurisdictions will cater to special-interest constituencies while the
costs are covered by the entire tax base. Vertical fragmentation also impacts what areas
governments focus spending. In central cities more resources are allocated to safety and
health compared to suburban municipalities. School districts represent a type of vertical
fragmentation that may increase levels of segregation within a metro area as residents
sort by race and wealth along school district boundaries. While horizontal fragmentation
focused on the proliferation of governments across space and vertical fragmentation
occurs when special districts overlap other jurisdictions, internal fragmentation involves
the fragmentation of political power within the central city.
Hypotheses. Vertical fragmentation is expected to have a positive relationship with ownsource revenue. As the levels of jurisdictional overlap increase across the metropolitan
area, the level of tax burden borne by city residents will also increase.
Internal Fragmentation
A common charge laid against political fragmentation is that too much of it
prevents crafting solutions to the problems that are notorious for crossing jurisdictions
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(pollution, traffic congestion, water runoff) because there are too many decision-makers
at the table. As central cities compete with their surrounding suburbs for residential and
economic investment, they may find their own government structure presents another
obstacle, particularly in regards to the number of elected officials. Internal fragmentation
refers to this division of political power within a governing unit. Public officials are
asked to balance the need to cooperate with officials from competing municipalities to
craft regional policies and the need to focus on the constituents within their own
jurisdiction. I posit that central cities where there is greater division of government
among elected officials will have a harder time forming cooperative agreements and
formal arrangements with other governing units across their region.
City planners and mayors may focus on economic investment, downtown
redevelopment and working with other elected officials within the region, but for locally
elected officials such as council members or aldermen elected from districts, the primary
focus is on the neighborhood and its constituents. This inevitably can lead to conflict
when making budgets, voting on tax policy, or education issues, because the various
stake-holders have differing goals. Suburban cities often have newer, more streamlined
government and so may have less internal politicking or at least an easier time moving
legislation forward. Kantor's (2002) appraisal of New York City post 9/11 views the
politically fragmented landscape of the city as a detriment to the city's recovery. Part of
the problem is budgetary, but the key impediment is the governing structure and gridlock
on key issues (budget, education, and finance) between the city council and mayor
(Kantor 2002, 122). Cities with more elected officials represent a conundrum of too many
cooks in the kitchen and the policies that emerge from their efforts may be too bland to
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be effective. Taken together, elected official such as those on a school board, city council
or board of aldermen may find that issues affecting their constituent base and protecting
their political turf are more pressing and act as self-seeking profit maximizers.
The levels of internal fragmentation may also affect the maneuverability of the
city because each official acts as a gatekeeper for projects and developments within his or
her jurisdiction. Public officials may find that issues affecting their constituent base
demand their attention more than issues pertinent to constituents outside of their voting
district or even their city. There is a tendency to have a singular focus on matters that
impact ‘the folks back home’ and to leave issues that impact the greater good to the
mayor and planning commissions. Zhang's (2011) study of how political representation
affects preservation and economic development efforts within Chicago demonstrates this
phenomenon. When development was supported by local aldermen the process for
preservation initiatives moved forward, but when aldermen were not on board, such as
when development cut through ward boundaries, the initiative went nowhere (Zhang
2011, 535). Efforts by community-based organizations for development or preservation
may reasonably be easier in cities that are less internally fragmented simply because there
are fewer actors with agenda setting or veto power.
The work of Feiock (2004, 2010) clearly lays out some of the hurdles facing
elected officials when it comes to regional collaboration. Feiock's depiction of elected
officials as risk averse, considering decisions in the short-term, able to veto policy by
withholding information or consent, and resistant to giving up authority represent
substantial barriers to solving regional problems (2010). Inter-government agreements are
potentially more difficult to craft in urban areas where the number of elected officials
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who are necessary to share information and take political risk are higher relative to
others. However, Feiock consistently argues that collaboration is not only possible in
light of these obstacles, but occurs in cases where there is sufficient incentives. When
cooperating with other local governments for federal grants, officials will use collective
action to work together (2004). This willingness of public officials to work together is
present in Lindstrom's study of the Chicago area mayor's caucus. The Mayor's Caucus
was formed to bring together mayors from across the Chicago region to collaborate on
mutual concerns. Lindstrom details the group's struggle to restructure and refinance the
public transportation systems into one, centralized system and he demonstrates how
politically difficult it is to enact a policy that an elected official perceives to be harmful
to his community (2010). The difficulty is not necessarily assuaged even when the policy
would clearly benefit the greater good of the region.
Rubin's (1992) case study analysis of budget reform in central cities finds a trend
between adopting reform and a reformed governing style. This fits within the internal
fragmentation framework that stipulates that the division of political power among
elected officials impacts the city's ability and willingness to deal with problems. Cities
that have adopted fewer progressive reforms are hallmarked by the persistent presence of
patronage, politics playing an important part in policy-making, and less accountability
and transparency in administration processes and documentation. Less reformed cities are
slower to adopt budget reforms, to innovate, and to alter control of department operations
(Rubin 1992). Central cities who have a more reformed style of government, such as citymanager, typically have more at-large elected officials than less reformed cities which
could reduce turf protection and encourage regional cooperation.
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There is also some literature on the impact politically fragmented systems have on
levels of corruption. Wilson (1966) makes a strong case that at least at the state level, the
fragmented American system creates an environment that allows individuals to use
political means for their own benefit. This is due in part to less visibility of public
officials - particularly in special purpose districts. Meier and Holbrook (1992) argue that
corruption has historical and cultural roots in urban America because of political
machines and a culture among politicians that valued favors, loyalty and personal gain
over efficiency. The work of Litt (1963) finds a link between cynical views about
government and political participation. Individuals are less likely to participate if they
feel that elected officials are corrupt and Litt found that this effect varied by location. His
comparison of Boston, suburban Boston, and communities in Oregon show that
proximity to a central city is associated with increased political cynicism towards local
politics and politicians (Litt 1963, 318). Density of elected officials is not only an issue
for central cities but for the greater urban area as well.
While internal fragmentation is primarily a central city phenomenon,
theoretically elected officials could impact political participation and growth in suburban
areas as well. The conventional wisdom about elected officials in suburban governments
is that since these governments tend to be smaller in comparison to the central city and
typically represent more reformed government, they are more likely to have residents
who know who their elected officials are and be more in-tune with local issues. However,
Lyons and Lowery (1989) find that citizens in internally fragmented metropolitan areas
do not feel a closer connection to their elected officials, at least when compared to
residents of consolidated government. Nelson and Foster (1999) actually find that the
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density of elected officials at the special-district level has a negative effect on per capita
income growth. This implies that greater concentrations of elected officials cost more to
sustain than in areas with fewer elected positions.
Summary. A common approach to cure a metro area of the ills of too much political
fragmentation is to consolidate government and reduce the number of elected officials.
However resistance to regional government and governance does not only come from
individual voters who do not want to see their municipality absorbed into a larger form of
government, but also from elected officials who risk political impotence and do not want
to lose their jobs and livelihood. The concentration of elected officials may have a
negative impact on central cities as they compete with their surrounding governments for
residents and resources because elected officials may resist new developments or
participation in collective action if they perceive such things as being harmful to their reelection. Higher numbers of elected officials are also associated with higher residential
political cynicism. The density of elected officials in older central cities may be resistant
to political reforms, less likely to adopt budget reforms, slower to innovate and alter
control of department operations. Ultimately high levels of internal fragmentation may be
harmful for cities because they are unable to craft solutions to region-wide problems and
substantial policy innovation may be watered down or take decades to become politically
palatable to elected leaders.
Hypotheses. Internal fragmentation is expected to have an overall negative effect on city
outcomes. Increases in the number of elected officials will likely increase the tax burden
and increase levels of segregation.
Summary
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The continued growth of metropolitan areas, while meeting consumers’ demands,
comes at a cost. Each individual unit of government tends to be inward looking and does
not consider its actions and policies within the broader context of the metro area. There
tends to be not just competition between city and suburb but each municipality competes
with all those surrounding it for residents, businesses, and revenues. This lends itself to a
kind of hostile fiefdom mentality. While competition among municipalities is lauded for
promoting practices that ideally would be efficient and cost effective, in reality it
produces an environment where city officials are able to exercise restrictive zoning to
keep out multi-family housing and less desirable businesses. Because residents are loathe
to raise their own taxes, it is commonplace for service provision to be controlled by
special district governments. Special districts are more likely to be run by officials
beholden to special interests, which means there is less accountability and transparency.
When it comes to the central city, the impact of political fragmentation across the
metropolitan area is often overlooked. This is an area rich in potential research that can
be a great benefit to regions as a whole. Many studies consider only the dynamics
occurring within the suburbs or only within the central city but I argue that understanding
the relationship of cities within their regions is critically important. Regions, at least by
Census Bureau definitions, exist as functional wholes or in some cases dysfunctional
units, and by not studying cities and suburbs in context to each other means that
phenomena occurring at a system level will be systematically missed. Pivotal to the study
of the functionality of a metropolitan area is an understanding of the context of
jurisdictional development within the region. The crafting of research studies, policy
recommendations and public initiatives that address issues of crime, education, political

Wiedlocher

87

Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments

participation, public health disparities and poverty will be strengthened by also
considering the political explanation of the living and economic conditions within the
region. Political fragmentation potentially plays a causal role in this political and policy
explanation.
Chapter 4 defines and explains the role of horizontal, vertical and internal
political fragmentation on central city outcomes. The focus of the chapter is findings
which help to understand the outcomes associated with varying levels of political
fragmentation, particularly how it affects disparities in publicly provided services, tax
burden and racial segregation. Chapter 5 describes the way in which the types of
fragmentation are operationalized and measured. Utilizing data from the 100 largest cities
in 1950 and their metropolitan areas, measures for fragmentation and city outcome are
discussed.
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Notes: Chapter 3

1

Bishop’s “Big Sort” hypothesis has come under scrutiny since its debut in 2008.
Abrams and Fiorina (2012) find very weak evidence that geographic political sorting
drive Americans into culturally homogenous communities. They agree that sorting occurs
in the U.S. but contend that political party association and polarization are unrelated.
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Chapter 4
Measuring Political Fragmentation and Central City Outcomes
In every metropolitan area in the U.S. there exists political fragmentation of three
types, horizontal, vertical and internal. The prevalence of fragmentation at each level
varies by region and through time. The question considered here is whether the changes
over time and the different amounts of fragmentation impact central city outcomes?
Political fragmentation has been accused of aiding urban decline (Lowi 1979; Dreier,
Mollenkopf & Swanstrom 2004) both of the central city (Teaford 1979) and the suburbs,
(Orfield 2002; Peterson 1985), costs residents more as governing arrangements become
more complex (Berry 2009), and increasing racial isolation and disparity (Gordon 2008;
Kasarda 1985; Wilson 1985) as the population sorts along racial and economic lines.
Conventional wisdom suggests that cities like St. Louis, Missouri and Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania struggle more than cities such as Phoenix, Arizona and Houston, Texas
because they have more political fragmentation ceteris paribus. This chapter describes
the levels of fragmentation as well as city outcomes for growth and decline for a sample
of cities between 1950 and 2000.
The empirical claim that I test in this study is that political fragmentation at any
level (horizontal, vertical or internal) affects a central city’s political economy,
population or racial disparity. My sample is the 100 largest cities in 1950 by population.
The following sections describe the measures used for horizontal, vertical and internal
fragmentation and the measures used to assess how well or poorly a city is faring. These
measures are then quantitatively modeled using panel-study time series to investigate
how cities are impacted by political fragmentation at each level, through time. While the
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time period of 1950 to 2000 does not represent the beginning and end of urban decline or
boom, it was chosen for two reasons. During this time period Rustbelt cities acutely felt
the decline of the manufacturing industry, the large in-migration of minority populations,
and the out-migration of whites to suburban neighborhoods. Southern and Western cities
and their metropolitan areas experienced population booms, with the steady growth of
industries built on high-tech, service, and administration. The second reason this time
period is chosen was for the general consistency of U.S. Census record keeping; 1950
was the first year the U.S. Census recognized metropolitan areas in a standard way,
which is a key component of this analysis. Examining fragmentation over time is critical
because the effects are not always immediate and may be missed using cross-sectional
data. This study utilizes a panel-study regression analysis which allows for the effects of
political fragmentation to be seen though time.
100 Cities and Their Metro Areas
The primary sources of data for this study are taken from the U.S. Census City
and County Data books. Measures of population, race, income, education, employment,
age, and poverty were collected for each of the 100 cities and their metropolitan area at
each census year between 1950 and 2000. The 100 largest cities by population in 1950
were chosen to populate the sample for this study. While there is some arbitrariness to the
number of cities, overall they represent a wide assortment of population, size, geography,
degree of fragmentation and outcome. The selection of cities and the time period also
have the advantage of hindsight. It is already known that some cities on this list will
diminish in size and stature, but other cities will grow and expand and this variability in
outcome enables an analysis of how much fragmentation matters in these outcomes. The
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distribution of the cities across the continental U.S. is shown in Figure 4.1. There is a
clustering of cities in the Northeast and Midwest, which is expected as 1950 is still at the
beginning of the great shifts of population and economic development to the South and
West. This sample of cities is also notable for cities that are absent such as San Jose,
California which grew significantly over the five decades. Cities such as Peoria, Illinois,
which was one of the 100 largest cities in 1950 but declined in population and size over
time, do not make the list of the 100 largest cities today. There could be meaningful
trends and findings that will go overlooked in this study by the exclusion of some cities.
However, for the purposes of answering the research question - what is the impact of
political fragmentation on central cities - having a variety of cities that have declined and
grown over the time period is the crucial component.
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Figure 4.1: Map of the 100 Biggest Cities by Population in 1950. Population was
clustered in the Northeast, Midwest and South in 1950. The shifts of economic
development and population to the West were still in its beginning.This is evident by the
notable absence of cities like San Jose, California which grew significantly over the next
five decades.
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The cities represent over 20% of the total U.S. residential population in 1950 and
18% in 2000. When the populations of each core city’s metro areas are included, it
represents 47% in 1950 and 61% of the residential population in 2000. Table 4.1 show a
breakdown of the population change and rank, the number of local governments and the
city’s proportion of the metro area population as of 2000 for the top 10 cities in 1950.
What this table conveys is a glimpse of the degree of change these cities have
experienced. New York City maintained its number 1 ranking over the time period
whereas St. Louis slipped from number 8 to 49th. Looking at the rank of the top ten cities
in 1950 along with the total number governments (counties, municipalities, townships,
school districts, and other special districts) and comparing to their rank and number of
governments in 2000 hints at the complex relationship fragmentation has on central
cities. Cities surrounded by higher numbers of governments are among the highest and
lowest ranked cities by population.
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Table 4.2: Top 10 Cities in 1950 Compared with 2000 and the Total Number of
Governments in each Metropolitan Area. Looking at the rank of the top ten cities in
1950 along with the total number governments (counties, municipalities, townships,
school districts, and other special districts) and comparing to their rank and number of
governments in 2000 hints at the complex relationship fragmentation has on central
cities. Cities surrounded by higher numbers of governments are among the highest and
lowest ranked cities by population. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Census of
Government.

2000
population
MAs

Total #
local govs
1950

Total #
Rank
2000

local govs
2000

Top 10 cities in 1950

% of
centralcity metro
area
population
2000

1 New York City

7,608,070

1,760

1

2,225

37.8

2 Chicago City

9,157,540

1,553

3

1,851

31.6

3 Philadelphia City

6,188,463

1,133

5

950

24.5

4 Los Angeles City

16,373,645

481

2

713

22.6

5,456,428

394

10

529

17.4

6 Baltimore City

7,608,070*

23

17*

262*

8.6*

7 Cleveland City

2,945,831

227

33

463

16.2

8 St. Louis City

2,603,607

690

49

979

13.4

9 Washington DC

7,608,070

141

21

262

8.6

5,819,100

289

20

952

10.1

5 Detroit City

10 Boston City

*In 1990 the U.S. Census placed Baltimore and Washington D.C. within the same
metropolitan region the numbers for 2000 MAs represents both cities.
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While the cities remain constant through time, the metropolitan areas may change every
census year. The U.S. Census has developed several definitions of a metropolitan area
over the decades. In 1950 when the concept of a metropolitan area was first used by the
Census, a region was defined by the Office of Management and Budget as the immediate
counties surrounding a city where economic and market activity reached a minimum
threshold. Each decade, as suburban communities grew outward definitions of
metropolitan areas were expanded. By the 2000 Census the classifications for what
constituted a metropolitan area had evolved to include more nuanced classifications
ranging from the primary metropolitan statistical area, which just contained the urban
core, to the larger consolidated metropolitan statistical areas, which include outlying and
even rural counties.
For this study I chose to use the OMB’s most geographically expansive definition
of metropolitan areas for each census year. Starting with the standard metropolitan area
definitions in 1950, I expanded the metro area each census year according to the broadest
classification used by the Census. This means that over the course of time some central
cities have had their metropolitan area swallowed by other regions as they grew. Cities
like Dallas and Fort Worth quickly had a combined metropolitan area but others are more
dramatic, such as the inclusion of Baltimore in Washington D.C.'s metro area in 1990.
The purpose of using this broad definition, rather than maintaining the boundaries
established in 1950 was to keep the growth of an area in line with the Census’ own
measures. This was critical for my counts and measures of political fragmentation. In
order to accurately count the numbers, types, and levels of fragmentation at play in a
region it was necessary to account for expanding metro areas. To establish a count of
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local governments the U.S. Census of Government reports were used to tally up the
number of county, municipal, school district, and special district governments in the
metropolitan areas over the time span of the study.1 The count of governments was taken
from the Census of Government in 1952, 1962, 1982, 1992 and 2002. Information for
total area of a metro area is from the Census and represents the most geographically
expansive definition of the metropolitan statistical area as defined by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The Census Bureau utilizes several population data,
economic activity and commuting patterns to determine if a county is a part of an urban
area.
In 1950 when metropolitan areas were first defined by the OMB they comprised
the county containing the principal city and a few surrounding counties but as population
and economic activity have continued to grow at the periphery, the definition of a
metropolitan area has become more expansive. At the 2000 Census a metropolitan area
was made up of the largest city of at least 10,000 people or more, termed the principal
city, and the surrounding urbanized counties made up of 50,000 people or more, plus
outlying counties that have a high degree of economic and social integration.2
Commuting patterns are used to determine the degree of economic and social integration.
The Census created differing levels of metropolitan area to show the primary
metropolitan area as well as secondary and outlying areas. The Bureau has also given
special designation to the towns and cities in New England. For the purposes of this
research, I selected the most geographically expansive Census definition of the
metropolitan area associated with each of the 100 cities in my sample. Often this
designation was the consolidated or combined statistical area and as a metropolitan area

Wiedlocher

97

Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments

expanded over time, several of the cities became part of larger, faster growing
metropolitan areas nearby. For the 100 cities included in this study, there are 84 unique
metropolitan areas associated with them in 1950. By the 2000 Census only 55
metropolitan areas are associated with the 100 cities due to their metro area definition
expanding or being consolidated into surrounding urbanized areas.
There are also regional differences between cities and their metro areas in term of
the geography they cover and their population density. Figure 4.2a shows the average
area in square miles for central cities along with the average population density broken
out by region.3While the Northeast has retained the highest population densities within its
cities, the levels have been declining over the time period. Western cities are a notable
exception – in this case the average population density began to rise in 1980 and by 2000
is close to its 1950 level. Cities in the South and West have been able to significantly
expand their territories on average when compared to the Midwest, which saw just
moderate growth and the Northeastern cities which have experienced almost no growth in
area. A similar pattern plays out at the metropolitan level. Metro areas in the Midwest,
Northeast and South have declining population densities and expanding geographies,
while the West is growing both in territory and density.
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Figure 4.2a: Average Population Density and Area in Square Miles of Central Cities
by region, 1950-2000. Across most regions the population pattern is similar, the solid
line for population density has declined meaning fewer people per square mile in cities.
However the geographic growth in square miles differs by region. In the Northeast the
size of cities has remained almost unchanged while the South has seen a large growth of
average city size. Source: US Census
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Figure 4.2b: Average Population Density and Area in Square Miles of Metropolitan
Areas by region, 1950-2000. Like the cities they surround, metropolitan areas have seen
a decline in population density. The growth of the metro areas has been steady but it is
important to note that the size of metro areas is dramatically larger than cities. This
makes the average growth of western metro areas the more dramatic, going from an
average of 3,000 square miles to near 12,000. Source: US Census
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Regional differences in cities and metro areas serve as a common mechanism for
comparing cities to each other. Southern cities have a common culture, climate and
political development and this is distinct from the Midwest, Western and Northeastern
cities. The same can be said for each region and examining fragmentation and city
outcomes within these distinctions help to reveal patterns that would be missed if the
study only took a national level perspective. Regional differences have also served as a
key explanation for why certain cities have fared better over time. For example the work
of Rusk (1995) discusses the importance of region. Typical of this narrative is that
Northern and Midwestern cities have struggled because they have higher levels of
fragmentation compared to their counterparts in the West and South (Rusk 1995).
Regional breakouts of the fragmentation measures as well as the central city outcome
measures will help illuminate whether similar patterns emerge in this data.
Political Fragmentation
The overall pattern of government growth in metropolitan areas has been positive.
While in the 1970s the average number of governments in a metro area declined due to
school district consolidation and the leveling off of municipal growth, since then there
has been a steady increase. Figure 4.3 shows two plots, the average number of
governments in the metropolitan areas associated with the cities included in the study and
a break out of government by type over time. County and municipal inclusion in
metropolitan areas has been small, if not stagnant when compared to changes in school
districts and special districts. After a period of school district consolidation during the
1970s, the addition of school districts in metropolitan areas has leveled off. The bulk of
new government growth in recent decades is driven by special districts. The average
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number of governments reflects this larger pattern, a steady rise in the number of
governments, followed by a decline during the 1970s and then the uptick begins again.
Figure 4.3: Mean number of governing units in Metropolitan Areas, 1950-2000. The
average number of governments in a metropolitan area rose sharply through 1970 and
then declined, primarily due to school district consolidation and the leveling off of
municipal government creation. The continued rise in governments is driven by the
growth of special districts. Source: US Census of Government.
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Total Fragmentation. As a general concept fragmentation is governing units in
geographic space and this can be measured simply as the total number of governments in
a region. A simple count of governments, while informative, only scratches the surface of
fragmentation’s prevalence in metropolitan areas. The literature on political
fragmentation represents a kind of taster’s choice of definitions and measurement
calculations and not surprisingly the variation in measurement has yielded disparities in
findings. In a recent Urban Affairs Review article, Hendrick, Jimenez, and Lal (2011)
identify twenty unique measurements of fragmentation. As discussed in Chapter 3, the
levels of fragmentation across a metropolitan area's geography represents the division of
political power with governments that are territorially exclusive (horizontal
fragmentation), governments that overlap jurisdictions (vertical fragmentation) and also
internal division of power among elected officials. This complexity of governing
arrangements is what contributes to the variety of measures. For this study eight measures
of political fragmentation are utilized for their conceptual relevancy to horizontal, vertical
and internal fragmentation and are further discussed along with descriptions of each
measurement and summary statistics. Table 4.2 gives the definition of each fragmentation
measure and what level of fragmentation it conceptualizes.
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Table 4.2: Measures of Political Fragmentation by Type in Metropolitan Areas and
Central Cities.
Type
Total

Horizontal

Measure
1

Total number of local governments per capita (10,000) within the
metropolitan area (political fragmentation)

2

Total number of local governments per square mile within the
metropolitan area (spatial fragmentation)

3

Ratio of municipal governments per capita (10,000)

4

Proportion of municipal governments to total governments in
metropolitan area

5

Percentage of metropolitan area population in central city

6

Proportion of school districts to total governments in metropolitan
area

Vertical

7

Ratio of jurisdictional overlap to municipalities and non-territorial
overlapping towns

Internal

8

Total number of elected officials per capita (10,000) in the central
city
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The first two measures of fragmentation considered represent traditional or
common variables in the literature. Spatial fragmentation and political fragmentation
represent the counts of governments per square mile and per capita. I define spatial
fragmentation as the number of local governments per square mile which include
counties, municipalities, townships, schools and other special districts within each
metropolitan area. Metro areas with greater density of governments, or more
governments per square mile, are considered more fragmented.
Political fragmentation is measured as the total number of governments for every
10,000 individuals. While spatial fragmentation gives a sense of the geographic density
of governments, political fragmentation is a general picture of the density of governments
to population. Political fragmentation gives a bird's eye view of how prolific governing
units are in any metro area, but does not convey much about the variation and type of
governing arrangements within a metro area. Figure 4.4 shows the average political and
spatial fragmentation over the time period. Both political and spatial fragmentation
experienced a sharp drop between 1950 and 1960 and then in the case of political, began
growing. Mean levels of spatial fragmentation continued to decline but begin rising
steadily in 1980. Though the levels of spatial and political fragmentation never reach
their averages in 1950 again, their rates of growth suggest that the typical metropolitan
area is gradually growing in its density of government.
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Figure 4.4: Average Political Fragmentation (number of governments per 10,000)
and Spatial Fragmentation (number of governments per square mile) in
Metropolitan Areas, 1950-2000. Both political and spatial fragmentation experienced a
sharp drop between 1950 and 1960 and then in the case of political, began growing.
Mean levels of spatial fragmentation continued to decline but starting rising steadily in
1980. Though the levels of spatial and political fragmentation never reach their averages
in 1950 again, their rates of growth suggest that the typical metropolitan area is gradually
growing in its density of government. Source: US Census of Government
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The patterns of spatial and political fragmentation are more nuanced when
considered by region. Figure 4.5 shows a breakdown of these measures for the Midwest,
Northeast, South and Western metro areas. Here it is evident that the concentration of
governments is quite different by region, averages of political and spatial fragmentation
reflect a similar pattern as shown in Figure 4.4 sharp declines in the 1950s and then, with
the exception of Western metros, an increase through 2000. Western metropolitan areas
continued to experience declining political fragmentation whereas Midwest and Southern
cities saw notable increases in average levels. This indicates that while Western urban
areas maintain low concentrations of government, other areas have actually experienced
increases in the number of governing units per capita and square mile. These general
measures offer a succinct picture showing that for the typical metropolitan area there was
a decline in governments in the early decades and this reflects shifts in population and
land area. As metro areas and populations expand the density of governments goes down
but then grows over time. These measures give a general picture of how densely
fragmented a metropolitan area is, but no indication in terms of the variation in the levels
of fragmentation. Looking at measures of horizontal, vertical and internal fragmentation
will help explain some of the variation in fragmentation and why some urban areas had
continued growth in government while others did not.
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Figure 4.5: Average Political Fragmentation (number of governments per 10,000)
and Spatial Fragmentation (number of governments per square mile) in
Metropolitan Areas by Region, 1950-2000. Regional averages of political and spatial
fragmentation reflect a similar pattern, sharp declines in the 1950s and then, with the
exception of Western metros, an increase. Western metros continued to experience
declining political fragmentation whereas Midwest and Southern cities saw notable
increases in average levels. Source: US Census of Government

108

Chapter 4

Measuring Fragmentation and City Outcomes

Horizontal Fragmentation. After measures of spatial and general political
fragmentation, horizontal fragmentation measures are fairly common in the literature.
The bulk of the fragmentation measures used in this analysis represent aspects of
horizontal fragmentation. Horizontal fragmentation is non-overlapping, coterminous
governments of the same type, across the metropolitan area. The most common indicator
of horizontal fragmentation is municipal governments which do not overlap and
geographically cover the entire metro area. For this study I included the proportion of
municipalities of all governments in the metro area as an indication of general purpose
government fragmentation. Also included is the proportion of school districts of total
governments in a metropolitan area. The percentage of the metropolitan area population
that resides in the principal city is another variable included in order to account for
whether or not the population is concentrated outside of the central city. The last measure
of horizontal fragmentation used is the number of municipalities per capita (10,000),
however, this measure is highly correlated (0.68) with political fragmentation (total
governments per capita) and so the two variables are indexed to create a measure of
governing density.
Higher index values of density of governments indicate greater amounts of
government. The data is skewed right with a mean of -0.001 and a median value of -0.2
with a standard deviation of 0.91. This is not altogether surprising as the amount of
governments varies widely by metropolitan area and region. This is seen in Figure 4.6
where the average density of government ranges over time from -1.2 to a high of 6.5.
Overall the average dropped until 1970 and then has grown steadily and this same pattern
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can be seen regionally with the exception of Western metro areas, which saw growth in
government density between 1960 and 1980 and experienced a decline through 2000.
Figure 4.6: Average Density of Governments and Average by Region. Density of
Government indexes the number of governments per capita (10,000) and the number of
municipalities per capita (10,000). The average over time is -0.001 and ranges from -1.23
to 6.48. Regionally the average for the Midwest is 0.6, the Northeast is -0.1, the South
and the West are both -0.3. Overall the average has dropped until 1970 and then grown
steadily and this same pattern can be seen regionally with the exception of Western metro
areas who after seeing a growth in government density between 1960 and 1980
experienced a decline through 2000.
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Overall the average percent of the metropolitan area’s population contained in the
central city is 36% with a standard deviation of 24% and ranges from low of 0.4% to a
high of 90%. Over time the average has been declining from a high just over 50% to
close to 25% in 2000. The rate of decline appears to be slowing after 1980. Regionally,
the South still contains the highest percentage of metro area population in its principal
cities with an average of 49%, followed by the Midwest (39%), the West (30%) and then
the Northeast (22%). The amount of a metropolitan area residing in the central city gives
an indication of how competitive the core city is as a residential choice and so higher
percentages of the population residing in the central city is to the benefit of the city. For
the metropolitan areas included in this study, Southern cities have been more likely to
retain to attract residents relative to cities in the Northeast.
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Figure 4.7: Average Percent of a Metropolitan Area’s Population in the Central
City by Region. Overall the average percent of the metropolitan area’s population
contained in the central city is 36%. Over time the average has been declining from a
high just over 50% to close to 25% in 2000. The rate of decline appears to be slowing
after 1980. Regionally, the South still contains the highest percentage of metro area
population in its principle cities with an average of 49%, followed by the Midwest (39%),
the West (30%) and then the Northeast (22%).
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Considering the proportion of municipal governments to the total number of
governments in a metropolitan is another measure of horizontal fragmentation. Greater
municipal choice may support higher levels of sorting along racial and economic lines as
higher degrees of municipal fragmentation could create more competition for residents
and economic investment. The ratio of municipal governments to total governments in a
metro area has a mean of 0.2 with a standard deviation of 0.13 and a range of 0.01 to a
high of 0.79. Over time the proportion of municipal governments has held steady with a
sharp increase between 1970 and 1980. This is mirrored regionally with the jump being
more pronounced in Southern (0.3 average) and Midwestern (0.2) metropolitan areas and
more gradual in Northeastern (0.12) and Western (0.13) metros. Southern metropolitan
areas represent an interesting case because in general they have higher levels of residents
choosing to reside in the core city, but they also have a greater proportion of municipal
governments relative to other types of governing units. Higher concentrations of
municipal governments relative to other types is thought to be indicative of higher
fragmentation and more residents and firms opting for suburban enclaves over the central
city.
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Figure 4.8: The Average Proportion of Municipalities to Total Governments by
Region. The ratio of municipal governments to total governments in a metro area has a
mean of 0.2 with a standard deviation of 0.13 and a range of 0.01 to a high of 0.79. Over
time the proportion of municipal governments has held steady with a sharp increase
between 1970 and 1980. This is mirrored regionally with the jump being more
pronounced in Southern (0.3 average) and Midwestern (0.2) metropolitan areas and more
gradual in Northeastern (0.12) and Western (0.13) metros.
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The proportion of school districts to total governments in a metropolitan area is
similar to the proportion of municipalities. In this case a type of special district is singled
out because school district has a powerful influence on resident choice. There is also
some evidence that metropolitan areas with more school districts have greater racial
sorting. The average proportion of school districts to total governments is 0.19 with a
standard deviation of 0.1 and a minimum of 0.02 and a maximum of 0.64. Between 1970
and 1980 the average has dropped and then risen near its 1950 high of just over 0.2. Since
1980 the average proportion of school districts seems to be declining slightly through
2000. This pattern is echoed regionally with the Northeast (0.24) maintaining a higher
proportion of school districts, followed by the West (0.2), Midwest (0.2) and the South
(0.16).
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Figure 4.9: Average Proportion of School Districts to Total Governments by Region.
The average proportion of school districts to total governments is 0.19 with a standard
deviation of 0.1, a minimum of 0.02 and a maximum of 0.64. Between 1970 and 1980 the
average has dropped and then risen near its 1950 high of just over 0.2. Since 1980 the
average proportion of school districts seems to be declining slightly through 2000. This
pattern is echoed regionally with the Northeast (0.24) maintaining a higher proportion of
school districts, followed by the West (0.2), Midwest (0.2) and the South (0.16).
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These measures of horizontal fragmentation are selected to distinguish not only
the differences in the number of governments across metropolitan areas regionally but
also that certain areas of the country have more choice in terms of residential government
or school districts. Schools and municipal government represent salient distinctions to
individuals when deciding where to live within a metropolitan area. Greater choice in
terms of the number of schools and municipalities relative to other governments will also
have an impact on the proportion of metropolitan population in the core city. There is a
similar pattern regionally between metropolitan areas with higher densities of
government and share of metropolitan population. Cities that have lost population share
over the time period are also located in regions that have higher levels of horizontal
fragmentation.
Summary. Historical trends of horizontal fragmentation are similar across the
regions and follow a pattern of decline between 1950 and 1960 and then gradually
increase through 2000. The Midwest and Northeast tend to have higher density of
governments compared to other regions and this corresponds to their share of
metropolitan area population. While the city's share of the metro area population has been
decreasing over time, this has been most dramatic in the Northeast. In terms of the
proportion of governments that are municipalities, the typical metropolitan area saw a
steady uptick between 1970 and 1980 with the South having the highest proportion of
governments that are municipal and the Northeast the lowest over time. The proportion of
governments that are school districts round out the horizontal fragmentation measures
and show a general trend of decline through 1970 but do increase in 1980. The Northeast
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has the highest proportion of school districts and the South has the fewest during the time
period of the study.
Vertical Fragmentation. Unlike horizontal fragmentation where governing
boundaries do not intersect, vertical fragmentation considers the impact of governments
that do overlap each other. Berry (2009) argues that where there is more vertical
fragmentation, defined here as overlapping boundaries, governments will have higher
taxes. Greater levels of taxation are driven by special districts that seek to provide
benefits to special-interest constituencies and which are paid for from the common tax
base (89). Ideally, to quantify this effect I would use geographic boundaries and
jurisdiction specific tax rates and compute the total tax rate wherever governing
boundaries overlap. In this study using 100 cities and the governing bodies included in
their region represents over 2,000 jurisdictions. Accumulating both the mapping data and
taxing information for each government through time is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. I follow Berry's prescription and use his measure of overlapping
jurisdictions per municipality. This is defined as the number of special districts,
territorially overlapping townships and counties over the number of municipalities, which
are cities and territorially exclusive towns.4 This measure uses horizontal fragmentation
as the denominator and the numerator reflects the amount of vertical layering in a
metropolitan area.
The ratio of overlapping to non-overlapping territories is skewed right with a
mean of 4 and a median value of 2, and a standard deviation of 6. Jurisdictional overlap
ranges from a low of 0.19 to a high of 94. Figure 4.10 show that the average amount of
jurisdictional overlap has been decreasing over time though there was a period of growth
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between 1960 and 1970 and again between 1980 and 1990. Across regions the average
amount of overlap has been steady with the West (6.3) at much higher averages than the
Midwest (3.3) and South (2). The pattern in the Northeast (4.5) reflects that of the overall
average with two jumps in growth followed by decline.
Figure 4.10: Average Jurisdictional Overlap (Vertical Fragmentation) Across Metro
Areas and by Region, 1950-2000. The average amount of jurisdictional overlap is 3.7.
The average has been decreasing over time though there was a period of growth between
1960 and 1970 and again between 1980 and 1990. Across regions the average amount of
overlap has been steady with the West (6.3) at much higher averages than the Midwest
(3.3) and South (2). The pattern in the Northeast (4.5) reflects that of the overall average
with two jumps in growth followed by decline. Source: US Census of Government.
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The measure of vertical fragmentation is designed to capture the degree of
overlapping jurisdictions in a metropolitan area in relation to the number of municipal
governments. For example, in 2000 Sacramento's metropolitan area was home to 317
special district governments and only 21 municipal governments, putting it in the 98th
percentile for vertical fragmentation. For the same census year, in the metropolitan area
of Baton Rouge there are 36 municipal governments and only 6 special districts putting it
in the 5th percentile for vertical fragmentation. This variation in the amount of
jurisdictional overlap could have a direct relationship with the tax burden born by the
individual resident who ultimately supports special district governments through their
taxes.
Summary. Over time vertical fragmentation has been decreasing although there is
a noticeable spike in the overlap in the 1970s. Regionally the trend in overlap varies with
the South maintaining almost the same amounts across the time period and the West and
Midwest maintaining much higher levels. Most of the movement occurs in the Northeast,
which has steadily decreased its levels of jurisdictional overlap with the exception of a
large jump in 1970.
Internal Fragmentation. Political fragmentation is commonly thought of as just the
number of political entities in a geographic area (general purpose governments, school
districts, special districts) and to this list I also add the number of elected officials in a
central city. A metropolitan area with a multiplicity of governments is generally thought
to be inefficient on the one hand but responsive to the populace they serve. In the same
way, having a large number of elected officials can be a frustration to the policy process
and central planning but citizens may have the benefit of having a public servant
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responsive to local issues. At the city level having a small number of elected officials is
generally considered a sign of a progressive, streamlined ("reformed") government
whereas a city with a large number of elected officials is arguably more cumbersome,
because officials will resist any changes or policies that they perceive to threaten their
political turf.5 The number of elected officials in each city represents another layer of
political fragmentation and is a proxy for the potential vitality and efficiency of the
central city.
Within a metropolitan area there is great variety in the number and types of
elected officials that serve residents. Beginning with the executive level, the typical city
has a mayor and a legislative body, usually a council that ranges in size, where members
are elected at-large or by district and is headed by a president of the chamber. Other
common elected offices are those that conduct day to day functions such as a city clerk,
treasurer, auditor, or comptroller. The judicial branch of a city usually has several elected
offices as well and these range from municipal judges to sheriff. School districts are
generally governed by an elected body, for example a Board of Education, and these
offices can be elected by district or at-large, range in size, and in some cases the mayor is
a member. There can also be special district offices that are filled by popular election
such as water/sewerage districts. From city to city the offices that are elected by popular
vote or appointed by the mayor with the approval of the legislative body vary. Within the
sample of central cities included in this study, cities such as Birmingham, Alabama elect
a mayor, a handful of council members and a school board, an average of eight elected
officials over the time period. Compare this to Chicago where citizens elect not only a
mayor and council, school board, but a city clerk, treasurer, and judges, on average over
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fifty-three elected officials. The variation in elected officials begs the question does it
make it harder for a city to compete for residents and economic development when there
are eight officials or fifty-three?
When measuring elected officials it would be ideal to have the total number of all
elected offices (municipal government, city/county officials, special district elected
officials, and school boards). This level of historic detail is difficult and cumbersome to
gather with accuracy, particularly for those cities in the lower half of the top 100 list that
spent the last fifty years in continual decline. The Municipal Year Book published lists of
municipal level elected offices for cities with populations 25,000 and greater with
consistency between 1950 and 1970. The number of municipal elected officials in 2000
was compiled by searching each city’s official website. For many cities the number of
municipal elected officials could then be backfilled by comparing the number in 2000
with the number in 1970. For those cities that had a different number of officials in 2000
than in 1970 the average number of elected officials was used for the missing years.
The typical city had an average of 0.6 elected officials for every 10,000 and this
remains somewhat unchanged over the time period, with a slight decrease leading to 1970
and then gradually growing through 2000. Figure 4.11 shows the average elected officials
per capita as well as a break out by region. Average regional levels of elected officials
per capita are highest in the Northeast with an average of 0.81 and the Midwest with an
average of 0.54. This is followed by the South which averages 0.43 officials per capita
but between 1990 and 2000 the rate of elected officials appears to be growing. The
average level in Western cities is 0.4 and this appears to be declining into 2000.
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Figure 4.11: Average Ratio of Internal Fragmentation, Elected Officials per Capita
(10,000) in Central Cities by Region, 1950-2000. The average (0.56) number of elected
officials per capita is somewhat unchanged over time with a slight decrease leading to
1970 and then gradually growing through 2000. Regionally average levels are highest in
the Northeast (0.81) and Midwest (0.54) followed by the South (0.43) which between
1990 and 2000 is growing however average levels in the West (0.36) appear to be
declining. Source: US Census and Municipal Year Book.
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Summary. Internal fragmentation measured as the number of elected officials per
capita in central cities represents a potentially understudied component of fragmentation.
While the number of elected officials in central cities has not changed dramatically over
time, it has been gradually increasing. Regionally, the number of elected officials per
capita varies widely with the Northeast having the highest and Western cities the fewest.
This pattern of fragmentation is not unexpected given scholarly work that tends to
characterize Western cities as more progressive and reformed whereas Northeastern cities
may still have carry over from when government was run by political machines. The
amount of internal fragmentation also seems to be growing over the time period but part
of this growth could be driven by the decline of population in central cities, which may
artificially inflate the number of elected officials per capita.
Central City Outcomes
There are three aspects of city well-being against which the measures of
fragmentation will be modeled. While there are many ways to measure how well or
poorly a city is faring, for the purposes of this study three basic indicators of central city
health will serve as dependent variables: the ratio of population change between census
years, racial dissimilarity and isolation at the metropolitan level, and fiscal health. Factors
of population, racial segregation and fiscal health represent very general but key
indicators of urban decline and growth. Cities not well off are often hallmarked by near
constant population loss, declining revenues and racial segregation, while cities that are
considered more successful have growing population densities, revenues, and declining
segregation over time. Each of these outcome measures are discussed and their expected
relationship to the cadre of fragmentation measures.
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Population Change. Population is one of the most basic indicators of a city's wellbeing. Population drives national and state standing and ranking among metropolitan
areas and for individual cities is a key determinant in funding decisions by the state and
federal government. It is also a fundamental component in redistricting of voting districts.
Shifts in population can effect a city’s political representation in state government
dramatically. Every municipality is concerned about its numbers and while coping with
population loss is a common concern for many central cities, not all of the principal cities
have declining populations. Cities in the South, after having experienced some population
loss around 1970, have seen their average levels of population grow since then. Western
cities have had periods of slow growth but overall these cities have experienced growing
population.
Population change is measured by taking the total population of the current year
and dividing by the previous census year population central city. This gives a ratio of
population change where values less than one indicate population loss and values greater
than one indicate population growth from the previous census year. Figure 4.12 shows
the distribution of population change by time period in a series of box plots. The
dispersion of this ratio is shown by drawing a box around the first through third quartile
with a bold horizontal line at the median value. The whiskers extending from the boxes
denote relative extreme values and the individual cities listed are outliers. The general
picture is that over time, median population change values hover around one with half of
the cities losing population and half gaining population between census years. What
emerges in this plot is a pattern of cities with extreme values over one, indicating leaps in
population growth from the previous census year, which is somewhat unexpected given
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the focus of the literature on cities that have suffered dramatic population decline. This
growth is regionally concentrated in the South and West. The plot is useful in that it gives
a visual representation of population shifts that focus on growth rather than decline.

Figure 4.12: Box plot of Central City Ratio of Population Change (log) 1950 - 2000.
The distribution of population change is shown by drawing a box around the first through
third quartile with a bold horizontal line at the median value. The whiskers extending
from the boxes denote relative extreme values and the individual cities listed are outliers.
The general picture over the time period is that the average population change has
remained relatively stable over time. Most cities in 1950 had ratios of population change
greater than 1 meaning they had gained population since 1940, but population ratios shift
down in later decades. While cities in the first quartile tend to fall below one, indicating
population loss, many cities in the South and West had dramatic gains in population.
Source: U.S. Census.
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Racial Dissimilarity. A common charge leveled against the growth of political
fragmentation is the role it has played in separating urban populations by race within a
metropolitan area. In order to test for segregation and racial separation across the
metropolitan area, I used the black-white dissimilarity and isolation indexes from the
American Communities Project located at Brown University. The index is based on
census tract level information and ranges from 0 to 1, where one is perfect integration and
zero is perfect segregation.
The Index of Dissimilarity conveys an idea of how integrated a metropolitan area
is by measuring what percent of African-Americans would need to move in order to
achieve complete racial integration. As shown in Figure 4.13, the average dissimilarity
score over the time period is 0.71 indicating that nearly three-fourths of the AfricanAmerican population would need to change areas in order to be evenly distributed across
a typical metropolitan region. The dissimilarity index rose to its peak in 1970 and has
tapered to a low of 0.62 in 2000. By Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor's (1999) standard, any
score over 0.6 is considered high. For the cities and metro areas included in this study,
the levels of segregation are not only high but persistent.
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Figure 4.13: Racial Dissimilarity and Isolation for Metropolitan Areas, 1950-2000.
The average dissimilarity score over the time period is 0.71 indicating that nearly threefourths of the African-American population would need to change areas in order to be
evenly distributed across the metropolitan region. The dissimilarity index rose to its peak
in 1970 and has tapered to a low of 0.62 in 2000. The average isolation index score is
0.45 and indicates that 45% of blacks in the metro area are not exposed to whites. The
isolation index follows a similar pattern to dissimilarity, rising in 1970 to a high of 0.52
and then declining to a low of 0.35 in 2000. Source: American Communities Project.
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Figure 4.14 also shows the average levels of racial isolation which is a measure
that indicates the likelihood of seeing or interacting with someone of another race. The
black-white isolation index values reflect exposure of African-American to white
individuals across the metro area. The index also ranges from 0 to 1 and the average
isolation index score is 0.45 and indicates that 45% of blacks in the metro area are not
exposed to whites. The isolation index follows a similar pattern to dissimilarity, rising in
1970 to a high of 0.52 and then declining to a low of 0.35 in 2000. Cutler, Glaeser and
Vigdor characterize a city as having a ghetto if dissimilarity scores are over 0.6 and
isolation greater than 0.3 (1999, 459). This study utilizes these indexes to approximate
segregation levels at the metropolitan level and while unable to identify at this level if
individual cities meet this criteria, it is reasonable to use the 0.6 dissimilarity score and
0.3 isolation score as a threshold of evidence for geographic segregation.
The index scores for isolation and dissimilarity also vary by region. Average
dissimilarity index scores for the Midwest are 0.78, in the Northeast 0.71, in the South
0.69 and 0.67 in the West. Average isolation scores in Midwestern metros are 0.53, in the
Northeast 0.38, in the South 0.51 and 0.28 in the West. In general the regional pattern
matches the overall picture of segregation, as levels increase though 1970 and then begin
declining. Looking at geographic regions, evidence of segregation is evident here too.
Western metropolitan areas have higher levels of exposure of black to whites, but
dissimiliarty and isolation scores indicate the existence of systematic spatial segregation.
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Figure 4.14: Racial Dissimilarity and Isolation in Metropolitan Areas by Region,
1950-2000. Average dissimilarity index scores for the Midwest are 0.78, in the Northeast
0.71, in the South 0.69 and 0.67 in the West. Average isolation scores in Midwestern
metros are 0.53, in the Northeast 0.38, in the South 0.51 and 0.28 in the West. In general
the regional pattern matches the overall picture of segregation, levels increase though
1970 and then begin declining. Source: American Communities Project.
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Fiscal Health. The financial health of a city is an important benchmark of overall
well-being. The quality and diversity of services offered by city governments ranges from
maintaining streets and parks, trash pickup, police and fire protection, public schools, and
even some health services. The ability of city officials to hire adequate staff, offer
pensions and other benefits as well as contract out services depends on its financial
standing. Cities do not share the ability of the federal government to take on debt and so
economic downturns can have a direct impact on a city’s financial stability. The most
recent economic recession has left cities such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Chicago,
Illinois, Washington D.C. and New York City facing large budget deficits that must be
reconciled. This can ultimately mean cuts in government services, employee layoffs and
pension negotiations. Detroit, Michigan filed for bankruptcy in 2013 and this represents
an extreme case both in terms of the contributing factors to its financial descent. It is the
largest city to date to file for bankruptcy.6 Suburban growth may also be a contributing
factor as outlying municipalities offer more choices of exit to households and firms. Over
the last century, the tax bases of many cities, particularly within the Rustbelt, have eroded
while the demands for services have increased. Sunbelt cities have remained attractive to
households and businesses and typically have experienced revenue growth over the last
sixty years.
City governments take in revenue through taxes, fee for service,
intergovernmental transfers and state and federal aid. For the purposes of this study, each
city’s own-source revenue is measured because it represents what capital a city is able to
bring in through taxes on residents and firms. Own-source revenue can also be a rough
representation of the tax burden in the city. Following Berry (2009)’s investigation of
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fragmentation on own-source revenue, I operationalize this measure by taking the sum of
all revenues raised by each city, excluding intergovernmental transfers, as well as state
and federal aid, and divide by the city population. Figure 4.15 shows the average ownsource revenue from 1950 through 2000. The average amount of own-source revenue
collected by central cities is $1,220 per capita and has been increasing over the time
period from a low of $438 in 1950 to a high just over $1,800 in 1990. Regionally the
Northeast has had higher averages ($1,598) that have risen steadily but appear to be
leveling off between 1990 and 2000. The South ($1,167) and West ($1,150) have almost
identical trajectories of consistent growth and then leveling off between 1990 and 2000.
The Midwest has also seen increases in average own-source revenue ($932) but the
growth rate is slower and plateaus around 1980.
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Figure 4.15: Average Own-Source Revenue per Capita (10,000) and by Region. The
average amount of own-source revenue per capita collected by central cities is $1,220 and
has been increasing over the time period from a low of $438 in 1950 to a high just over
$1,800 in 1990. Regionally the Northeast has had higher averages ($1,598) that have
risen steadily but appear to be leveling off between 1990 and 2000. The South ($1,167)
and West ($1,150) have almost identical trajectories. The Midwest has also seen
increases in average own-source revenue ($932) but the growth rate is slower and
plateaus around 1980. All dollar values are CPI-adjusted to year 2000 dollars. Source: US
Census of Government.
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Additional Factors
In addition to the measures of fragmentation, several control variables are
included in the models in order to reflect key variables that urban scholars have identified
as critical to city growth or decline. There are many explanations for why cities have
differing outcomes and while Chapter 2 covered in detail some of the common threads in
this literature, the quantitative analysis must also include measurements that take into
account the impact of factors like poverty, manufacturing, and household income.
Race. The first factor is the percent African-American of central city population.
This measure attempts to capture the argument that central cities historically are home to
minority populations that were typically kept out of higher-wage jobs due to
discrimination. African-Americans also experienced discrimination in the housing market
and were effectively barred from suburban home ownership until federal fair housing
laws were passed in 1968. Figure 4.16 is a box plot of the percent African-American in
central cities and shows how the median percentage has risen steadily during the six
decades considered in this study. The box is drawn around the first and third quartile with
a horizontal line showing the median value for that year. The typical percent of AfricanAmerican population in central cities rose from a low of 13% in 1950 to 30% in 2000.
The vertical lines give a sense of the dispersion and outlying values where it is evident
that some cities have a much higher portion of their population that is African-American
than the typical. In 1950 outliers were clustered in the South but Washington, D.C. and
Gary, Indiana are notable outliers in later years.
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Figure 4.16: Box plot of Percent African-American in Central Cities, 1950 - 2000.
The average percent of African-American population in central cities rose from a low of
13% in 1950 to 30% in 2000. The vertical lines give a sense of the dispersion and
outlying values where it is evident that some cities have a much higher portion of their
population that is African-American than the typical. In 1950 outliers were clustered in
the South but Washington, D.C. and Gary, Indiana are notable outliers in later years.
Source: U.S. Census.
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Manufacturing. Manufacturing jobs were an attraction that drew many new households to
cities well into the 1950s until industries began moving facilities and processes to other
areas of the country and overseas. Cities located in the Rustbelt felt these changes keenly,
particularly those in which the auto and steel plants that had been the cornerstone of the
local economy. Figure 4.17 shows a box plot of the percent employed in manufacturing
industries in central cities. The average percent employed in manufacturing has fallen
from a high of 28% in 1950 to a low of 15% in 2000. The inter-quartile range between
the first and third quartile has been steadily shrinking as well indicating that as a whole,
fewer cities have less of their workforce employed by manufacturers. The vertical
whiskers, however, indicate that there are still some cities with over 30% of the
workforce in manufacturing. Rustbelt cities of Fall River, Massachusetts, Rochester, New
York, and Reading, Pennsylvania are notable outliers and demonstrate that even while the
sector as a whole has pulled back from central cities, there are still some that rely on
manufacturing jobs.
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Figure 4.17: Box plot of the Percent Employed in Manufacturing Industries in
Central Cities, 1950 - 2000. The average percent employed in manufacturing has fallen
from a high of 28% in 1950 to a low of 15% in 2000. The inter-quartile range between
the first and third quartile has been steadily shrinking as well indicating that as a whole,
fewer cities have less of their workforce employed by manufacturers. The vertical
whiskers however indicate that there are still some cities with over 30% of the workforce
in manufacturing. Rustbelt cities of Fall River, Massachusetts, Rochester, New York, and
Reading, Pennsylvania are notable outliers. Source: U.S. Census.
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Income. In a similar vein as declining employment, the variability of household income
of city residents can also play a role in overall city health. When households are faced
with job loss or other income reduction, some will choose to move out of the city to find
other work. At the aggregate level, when whole sectors of the economy suffer and are
located in central cities, this can have a disproportionate effect on residents and
ultimately city budgets as tax revenues fall. Figure 4.18 shows a box plot of median
family income in core cities between 1950 and 2000. The income values have been
adjusted to 2000 dollars and the average ranges from a low of $23,981 in 1950 to $40,687
in 2000. Income reached a high of $41,055 in 1970 but declined quickly between 1970
and 1980. The vertical lines show the dispersion of the measure beyond the first and third
quartile and indicate that in later years some cities remain stubbornly at the bottom for
average family income while cities like Seattle, Washington and Berkeley, California are
wealthy outliers. This reflects the regional component of economic success and family
wealth in cities. Cities home to industries that grew during the time period, such as
defense, aeronautics and technology, have see median family incomes grow and reaped
the benefits of being home to these industries.
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Figure 4.18: Median Family Income in Central Cities 1950 - 2000. Income is adjusted
to 2000 dollars and the average ranges from a low of $23,981 in 1950 to $40,687 in 2000.
Income reached a high of $41,055 in 1970 but declined quickly between 1970 and 1980.
The vertical lines show the dispersion of the measure beyond the first and third quartile
and indicate that in later years some cities remain stubbornly at the bottom for average
family income while cities like Seattle, Washington and Berkeley, California are wealthy
outliers. Source: U.S. Census.
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Poverty. Another common thread running through the urban politics literature is that
cities historically have a concentration of poor households which cost more to provide
services for and contribute less to overall revenues. Cities which experienced white flight
and the decline of manufacturing industries were also home to residents unable to move
to suburbia and disproportionately impacted by economic disinvestment. Figure 4.19
shows the percent of families in poverty in central cities between 1950 and 2000. The
median percent of families considered in poverty by the U.S. Census declines from a high
of 20% to a low of 11% in 1970 and then rises again to a high of 19% in 2000. The
dispersion of the measure gradually tapers off indicating fewer extreme values. Outliers
switch in 1980 from concentrating in Southern cities to Rustbelt cities, notably Camden,
New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan which were hard hit by manufacturing decline and
white flight.
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Figure 4.19: Percent of Families in Poverty in Central Cities, 1950 - 2000. The
median percent of families considered in poverty by the U.S. Census declines from a high
of 20% to a low of 11% in 1970 and then rises again to a high of 19% in 2000. The
dispersion of the measure gradually tapers off indicating fewer extreme values. Outliers
switch in 1980 from concentrating in Southern cities to Rustbelt cities. Source: U.S.
Census.
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Unemployment. During the time period of this study, cities changed dramatically and
while some did decline in the face of economic disinvestment, white flight and increased
poverty, other cities grew and were prosperous while having success in technology and
service industries and a growing population. Including the percent of the labor force that
is unemployed for each city will help show where cities have done well and that others
have struggled with persistent unemployment. Figure 4.20 shows the percent of civilian
labor force unemployed in central cities. The box plot shows that the typical city has
relatively low unemployment percentages until the 1980 and 1990s. Unemployment in
central cities declines from 1950 through 1970 to a low of 4.5% but rises significantly to
a high of 8.3% in 1990, and then declines again in 2000. There are many outliers
however where cities such as Detroit, Michigan and Camden, New Jersey who have felt
job losses over time acutely, and then unemployment remains persistently higher than
median levels of unemployment.
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Figure 4.20: Percent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed in Central Cities, 1950 2000. The box plot shows the dispersion of unemployment but drawing a box around the
first and third quartile, the horizontal lines shows the median value, and the extending
vertical lines indicate extreme values. Unemployment in central cities declines from 1950
through 1970 to a low of 4.5% but rises significantly to a high of 8.3% in 1990, and then
declines again in 2000. There are many outliers denoting cities such as Detroit, Michigan
and Camden, New Jersey who have felt job losses over time acutely. Source: U.S.
Census.
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Region. The last control variable included in the models takes into account the impact
that geography plays on city outcomes. As mentioned already, there are key features of
cities in the Northeast and Midwest, such as decline of the manufacturing industry, that
make these cities different than cities in other regions. In that same vein, cities in the
South and Southwest have seen industries relocate to their region and in some cases have
also experienced rapid population growth. While the Census breaks the continent into
four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) for the purposes of this study I have
chosen to control for cities located in the Sunbelt or Rustbelt.1 Figure 4.21 is a U.S. map
with Rustbelt states shaded light blue and Sunbelt states shaded light yellow. Rustbelt
cities are located in the Northeast and upper Midwest where manufacturing, iron and steel
works, and other heavy industries were concentrated. Of the 100 cities analyzed in this
study 52% of the cities are located in the Rustbelt. Sunbelt cities are located in the South
and West and are characterized by mild weather and rarely have had hard freezes. These
cities rose in prominence between 1950 and 2000 and represent 27% of the cities.
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Figure 4.21: Regional Map of Rustbelt and Sunbelt Cities 1950 - 2000. Rustbelt cities
are located in the Northeast and upper Midwest where manufacturing, iron and steel
works, and other heavy industries were concentrated. Of the 100 cities analyzed in this
study 52% of the cities are located in the Rustbelt. Sunbelt cities are located in the South
and West and are characterized by mild weather and rarely have a hard freeze. These
cities rose in prominence between 1950 and 2000 and represent 27% of the cities.
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Summary
Chapter 4 has identified eight measures of political fragmentation to test its
impact on cities’ population change, own-source revenue and metropolitan wide racial
segregation. Political fragmentation is classified into three types, horizontal, vertical and
internal fragmentation. Measures of horizontal fragmentation include an indexed variable
for the number of governments per capita (10,000) and the number of governments per
square mile which declined through 1960 before increasing steadily to levels similar to
1950. Measures looking at the proportion of municipal governments as well as the
proportion of school districts to other governments have also increased, particularly
between the decades of 1970 and 1980. Vertical fragmentation has been decreasing over
time. However, there are stark regional differences notably in the West where
jurisdictional overlap has been historically much higher. Internal fragmentation has
remained steady over the time period but regionally the Northeast and Midwest have
higher levels and this appears to be increasing. In general the levels of city population
have been steady, while the tax burden and segregation levels have been increasing.
Whether this is related to the amount and types of political fragmentation is the question
at the heart of this study. Chapter 5 formally models these expected relationships with
four separate time series regression analyses with six periods of panel data from 1950
through 2000.
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Notes: Chapter 4

1

The US Census of Government is not entirely accurate in its counts of governments.
Definitions for metropolitan areas, principle cities, combined metropolitan statistical
areas as well as micro and macro statistical areas are taken from the United States
General Accounting Office "Report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Information
Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives," Metropolitan Statistical Areas: New Standards and Their
Impact on Selected Federal Programs, 2004: GAO.
URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04758.pdf
3
Regional definitions follow the state designations of the US Census which is broken
into four divisions (Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania; Midwest: Indiana,
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota and South Dakota; South: Delaware, DC, Florida, Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas; West: Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, California, Oregon
and Washington).
URL: http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf
4
Only 20 states have a government classification of towns or townships and in some
states they act much like a municipality and do not overlap (Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota and
Wisconsin). But in the other states, towns act more like a special district and may overlap
municipalities (Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Vermont). I include the 11 states with overlapping towns
as part of the numerator for jurisdictional overlap and the remaining 9 states with
territorially exclusive townships as part of the denominator.
5
For example the City of St Louis has had the same number of aldermen/alderwomen for
decades, despite continual losses in population. During the 2012 election, Proposition R
passed by 61.5% to decrease the number of aldermen from 28 to 14 in 2020 to fit the
current dynamics. There is a racial component to this proposition, in the northern
predominately African-American areas of the city a majority of residents voted against
Proposition R. Aldermen in this area were unconvinced that reducing elected officials
would save money and they feared that residents would lose direct connections to city
government.
URL: http://nextstl.com/2012/11/understanding-st-louis-proposition-r-ward-by-ward/
6
Information about cities on the brink of financial collapse and Detroit’s filing for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy are taken from Governing.com.
URL: http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-anddefaults.html
2
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Chapter 5
The Effects of Political Fragmentation
The relationship between political fragmentation and central city outcome
measures is expected to be complex and vary by type of fragmentation - horizontal,
vertical and internal - as well as by outcome, population density, racial dissimilarity and
isolation and own-source revenue. Before presenting the models and analysis of the
results, the reasoning for certain expected relationships between fragmentation and city
outcome are stated.
Horizontal fragmentation is expected to have a negative impact on central city
population density. As the number of residential choices increases across an urban area,
households are more likely to choose to exit the core city by selecting a suburban
residence over a city neighborhood. Central city population is predicted to be negatively
associated with vertical fragmentation. Jurisdictional overlap is an indication of
overspending by special districts as they seek to provide increased service and protect
special interests. Theoretically, increases in services would only serve to further attract
residents reducing the population pool for the core city. Internal fragmentation is
expected to have a negative impact on city population. The assumption here is that more
elected officials represent cities that have less reformed governance, more bureaucracy
and internal politicking and will be disadvantaged in comparison to streamlined suburban
governments.
Higher levels of horizontal and vertical fragmentation are also expected to
increase the amount of racial separation and isolation between the city and the metro
area. Historically racial sorting has been facilitated through restrictive covenants and
racially biased financial incentives. Though many minority households have left racially
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homogenous city neighborhoods for suburban ones, metropolitan areas are hardly a
picture of integration and diversity. It is expected that higher levels of political
fragmentation in terms of the multiplicity and stratification of governments have
effectively allowed for increased segregation and isolation between white and AfricanAmerican households. Cities surrounded by higher levels of horizontal and vertical
fragmentation will likely have more households that would need to move in order to have
racially integrated communities and travel farther to be exposed to individuals of a
different race.
The fiscal stability of central cities is predicted to be adversely affected by
horizontal fragmentation. A city’s ability to increase its own-source revenue stream is
tied to residents and property values. The tax base of cities shrinks as residents opt for
suburban communities and this process is more pronounced as the numbers of municipal
and special district governments increase. Cities are also more likely to produce services
in house or to spend more on redistributive policies and other services, putting them at a
further financial disadvantage. The amount of jurisdictional overlap in a metro area is
expected to have a positive impact on central cities’ fiscal health. The city represents one
more potential participant dipping into in the common fiscal pool and increases in
jurisdictional overlap could increase the tax burden of city residents.
In order to determine the impact of political fragmentation on central city
outcomes I utilize panel regression models fitted to four aspects of outcome: population
change, racial dissimilarity, racial isolation and own-source revenue. Using data on the
100 largest cities in 1950 and following their progress over five decades the influence of
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fragmentation is presented and described at the horizontal, vertical and internal level.
This chapter discusses the hypotheses, methodology, and the results of the four models.
Quantitative Analysis
One of the central motivations for conducting an analysis with a historical lens is
the argument that political fragmentation is not well illustrated in cross-sectional data.
Utilizing a pooled time series regression analysis allows the combination of multiple
cross-sections to capture variation between different cities as well as differences over
time (Sayrs 1989). In order to achieve coefficient estimates that are efficient and unbiased
specific consideration is given to the behavior of error in the model. In a cross-section
time series regression error variance occurs within observations for each year and also
between years. For instance, changes in the city outcome variable in 1960 may influence
the estimates for that variable in 1970. There are three major concerns about the behavior
of the error term in cross-sectional time series: to determine whether differences in the
error term is across entities (i's) given the vector of betas matter (selecting either fixed
effects or random effects), to determine whether the error variance within each group is
constant (assumed to be homoskedastic), and to check that errors across time are not
correlated (assumed to have no serial correlation) (Wooldridge 2002). The Hausman test
is commonly used to decide between random and fixed effects, and methods exist to
calculate errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation if either
assumption is violated.
A key difference between using a random versus fixed effect regression to
estimate the parameters is that random effects are assumed to come from one normal
distribution whereas fixed effects assumes there are time invariant qualities (Wooldridge
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2002). The advantage of the random effects model is that it is efficient, only one degree
of freedom is used up when estimating the constant, which is the mean random effect.
This means that differences between entities do not matter because if it is a normal
distribution and 95% of the observations fall within two standard deviations of the mean,
the vector of explanatory variables added to this random draw for any i will yield very
similar predictions (Wooldridge 2002). On the other hand, for fixed effects each i's
constant is drawn from its very own distribution, which adds (i-1) parameters, eating up
degrees of freedom and giving each i its own constant. Fixed effect panel OLS is equal to
OLS with a dummy for each i. While this allows the unique attributes of each city, at
each point in time, to be in a sense accounted for, its primary disadvantage is the
additional parameters eat up degrees of freedom and the standard errors of the parameters
are subject to bias (Wooldridge 2002). The loss in efficiency is traded for less omitted
variable bias in parameter standard errors. Fixed effects would theoretically account for
unobserved, unobservable and even unmeasurable city idiosyncrasies. In other words,
there may be unique attributes to a city such as Detroit that make it different from the
other cities included in the sample. If fixed effects estimates are statistically significant
different from the random, these time invariant characteristics must be controlled for,
according to convention and the Hausman test.
Population Change and Political Fragmentation
The first model examines at the impact of political fragmentation on the ratio of
population change in the central city. The distribution of population change is skewed
right and so the natural log was taken so the functional form would approximate a normal
distribution. Political fragmentation measures attempt to model the three aspects of
fragmentation (horizontal, vertical and internal) previously discussed. Horizontal
Wiedlocher
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fragmentation was measured using the percent of the metropolitan area's population
residing in the central city, the proportion of school districts to total governments in the
metro area, and an indexed variable of the ratio of total governments per capita (10,000)
and the number of municipalities per capita (10,000). The index, referred to as density of
governments, is also skewed right and so the natural log was used in the model. Vertical
fragmentation is measured using Berry's (2009) measure of jurisdictional overlap and
internal fragmentation is measured as the number of elected officials within the central
city per capita (10,000). A measure for spatial fragmentation is also included as a general
measure of fragmentation and as it was also skewed right, the natural log was used in the
model. Measures in the central city for the percent African-American, percent employed
in manufacturing, the percent unemployed, the percent of families in poverty and location
in the Sunbelt and Rustbelt are included as controls.
Table 5.1 shows the model diagnostics that informed my selection of the best
fitting model. The Hausman, which checks for the presence of statistically significant,
city-specific time-invariant fixed effects not captured in the model (Wooldrige 2002) is
the first diagnostic test. The null hypothesis of no city-specific effects is not rejected
which means that the more efficient random effects model performs better than fixed
effects. The second and third tests are designed to test assumptions about the behavior of
residuals in longitudinal models. The Breusch-Pagan null hypothesis tests for constant
error variance or homoskedasticity in the residuals. In this model the assumption of
homoskedasticity was violated indicating that there is group-wise heteroskedasticity,
meaning that the non-constant error variance is within cities which can cause the standard
errors for the coefficients to be biased downwards, and ascribing statistical significance
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to variables that are not significant (Wooldridge 2002). In the third test, the BreuschGodfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation, the null hypothesis was also rejected
meaning that the residuals are correlated across time within cities. For any given city in
the sample, the best predictor for the value of its residual at time t is the value of its
residual in the previous time period (time = t-1). The result of the violation is that the
estimates for the coefficients are inefficient. To correct for violations of serial correlation
and heteroskedasticity a variance covariance matrix with robust standard errors was used
to estimate the model in order to make the estimates more efficient and unbiased.
Table 5.1: Central City Population Change Model Diagnostics
Test
Hausman
Breusch-Pagan

Ho
Random over Fixed
Effects

Statistics
Χ2(15) = 18.35
p = 0.24

Homoskedasticity

Χ2(17) = 37.22
p = 0.003

Rejected

Χ2(1) = 4.3
p = 0.04

Rejected

BreuschNo Serial Correlation
Godfrey/Wooldridge

Result: Ho
Not Rejected

LaGrange Multiplier

Significant Time-Fixed
Effects

F(5, 474) = 6.69
p = 0.000

Rejected

Pesaran

Cross-Sectional
Dependence

Z = 3.44
p = 0.001

Rejected

The fourth and fifth diagnostic tests look for significant time-fixed effects and
cross-sectional dependence. The Lagrange Multiplier tests the statistical significance of
time, essentially looking to see if there are fixed effects in population change between
1950 and 1960 that are different than between 1970 and 1980. The null hypothesis that
there are no time-fixed effects was not rejected and so time-fixed effects are included in
the model. Population change may trend upwards or downwards simply with the passage
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of time and including the time-fixed effects wards off the impact of omitted variable bias
and gives a degree of confidence that the explanatory power of variables in the model are
wrongly assigned. The final diagnostic test, the Pesaran test for cross-sectional
dependence looks to see if residuals are correlated within time periods across cities. For
example there may have been significant events such as highway construction or riots in
cities between 1960 and 1970 that cause residuals to be significantly lower or higher than
in other time periods. The inclusion of time-fixed effects helps to avoid cross-sectional
dependence and the null hypothesis was not rejected so it is not necessary to address.
The results of the population change model reveal an interesting though modest
relationship with political fragmentation which can be seen in Figure 5.1 and Table A5.1
in the appendix. Figure 5.1 plots the estimated coefficients with 95% confidence intervals
extending in horizontal lines through each point. The lines that do not cross the vertical
zero line indicate the variable is statistically significant in the estimated model. The
percent of the metropolitan area living in the central city and the proportion of school
districts to total governments in the metro area were statistically significant fragmentation
measures. Percent African-American in central cities and location within the Sunbelt
were the significant control variables.
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Figure 5.1: Central Cities Ratio of Population Change Random Effects Model
Results, Census Years 1940-2000.

To further explore the size and meaning of the significant variables, their
predicted effect on population change is graphed. Figure 5.2 is a layered plot that shows
the distribution of the percent of a metro area living in the central city in the shaded
histogram with the first and third quartiles noted with vertical white lines. Plotted over
the histogram is the predicted change in cities population ratio across the range of the
cities’ share of the metro population. The actual values of the ratio of population change
variable are shown and indicate that while holding all other variables at their median and
year to 1970, as the percentage of a metropolitan area’s population living in the central
city increases the model predicts the population change ratio would be greater than one,
indicating a city’s population is increasing from the previous census year. The model
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predicts that all else equal, cities in the first quartile which are cities that hold 16% of
metro area population or less, would lose population from the previous census year. As
cities remain population centers in their regions, their population tends to keep growing.
Figure 5.2: Predicted Change in Population across the Range of the Percent
Metropolitan Area Population Located in the Central City. The distribution of the
percent of a metro area living in the central city is shown in the shaded histogram with
the first and third quartiles noted with vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is
the predicted change in cities population ratio across the range of the cities’ share of the
metro population. The actual values of the ratio of population change variable are shown
and indicate that while holding all other variables at their median and year to 1970, as the
percentage of a metropolitan area’s population living in the central city increases the
model predicts the population change ratio would be greater than one, indicating a city’s
population is increasing from the previous census year.
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The second significant fragmentation measure on population change is the
proportion of governments that are school districts. The predicted effect on population
across the range of school district proportion is shown in Figure 5.3. This plot shows the
distribution of proportion of total governments that are school districts in a metropolitan
area in gray with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical white lines. The
predicted population change ratio is superimposed with the 95% confidence interval
across the range of the proportion school districts values. While the logged population
change ratio is modeled, the actual values are shown in the plot to make interpretation
more straightforward. With all other variables held at their median and the year set to
1970, increasing the proportion of governments that are school districts is predicted to
decrease central city population from the previous census year. While the slope of the
line is positive, it does not cross the 1.0 threshold which would indicate population
growth from the previous decade. Having a greater number of public school choices
seems to be something that encourages families to leave central cities.
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Figure 5.3: Predicted Population Change Ratio across the Range of Proportion
School Districts of Total Governments in Metropolitan Areas. The distribution of the
proportion of total governments that are school districts in a metropolitan area is shown
in gray with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical white lines. The predicted
population change ratio is superimposed with the 95% confidence interval across the
range of the proportion school districts values. While the logged population change ratio
is modeled, the actual values are shown in the plot to make interpretation more
straightforward. With all other variables held at their median and the year set to 1970,
increasing the proportion of governments that are school districts is predicted to decrease
central city population from the previous census year. While the slope of the line is
positive, it does not cross the 1.0 threshold which would indicate population growth from
the previous decade.
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While fragmentation has a moderate impact on population change, it is significant
and meaningful. A population change ratio presents a general picture of population,
indicating only whether there is growth or decline and little information beyond that. For
measures of horizontal fragmentation to be significant demonstrates that there is a
relationship between the governing arrangements in a metropolitan area and city
outcomes. The population change model also hints at the complexity of the relationship
since not all measures of fragmentation reveal harmful effects on cities. This model finds
that cities with greater shares of metropolitan area population are predicted to keep
gaining population over time. However school districts have a harmful effect on central
cities and as they represent a greater proportion of the governing mix, population is likely
to decline.
Dissimilarity and Political Fragmentation
The second model utilizes the Index of Dissimilarity between African-Americans
and whites in the metropolitan area as the dependent variable. The index ranges from 0 to
1 and values indicate the proportion of the population which would need to move in order
for the metro area to achieve integration. The model is built on the same fragmentation
and control variables as the population change model. Horizontal fragmentation was
measured using the natural log of the percent of the metropolitan area's population
residing in the central city, the proportion of school districts to total governments in the
metro area, and the log of an indexed variable, the density of governments. Vertical
fragmentation is measured using Berry's (2009) measure of jurisdictional overlap and
internal fragmentation is measured as the number of elected officials within the central
city per capita (10,000). The natural log of spatial fragmentation is also included as a
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general measure of fragmentation. Measures in the central city for the percent AfricanAmerican, percent employed in manufacturing, the percent unemployed, and the percent
of families in poverty are included as controls.
Table 5.2 shows the model diagnostics that informed my selection of the best
fitting model for racial dissimilarity. The results of the Hausman test, which checks for
the presence of statistically significant, city-specific time-invariant fixed effects not
captured in the model (Wooldrige 2002) tests a null hypothesis of no city-specific effects.
The null hypothesis was not rejected which means that a fixed-effects model is
recommended. Using the fixed-effect model means that an estimated effect is figured for
each city and included as a control in the model. The downside of including each city as
control is the loss of degrees of freedom due to estimating an additional 100 coefficients.
The upside is that this controls for statistically significant time-invariant differences
between cities, i.e., institutionalized racism and segregation, history that matter more for
the Index of Dissimilarity than for population density.
Table 5.2: Black-White Dissimilarity Index Model Diagnostics
Test
Hausman
Breusch-Pagan

Ho
Random over Fixed
Effects

Statistics
Χ2(15) = 2,422.59
p = 0.000

Homoskedasticity

Χ2(17) = 57.63
p = 0.000

Rejected

Χ2(1) = 9.5
p = 0.002

Rejected

F(5,440) = 55.75
p = 0.00

Rejected

BreuschNo Serial Correlation
Godfrey/Wooldridge
LaGrange Multiplier
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In this model the assumption of homoskedasticity was violated indicating that
there was heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis of constant error variance was not
rejected. The test for serial correlation was also violated and the null hypothesis was not
rejected, meaning that the residuals are correlated across time within cities. For any given
city in the sample, the best predictor for the value of its residual at time t is the value of
its residual in the previous time period (time = t-1). The result of the violation is that the
estimates for the coefficients are inefficient. To correct for violations of serial correlation
and group-wise heteroskedasticity, a variance covariance matrix with robust standard
errors was used to estimate the model in order to make the estimates more efficient. The
Lagrange Multiplier tests a null hypothesis that there are no time-fixed effects was not
accepted and so time-fixed effects are included in the model.
The results of the dissimilarity model are displayed in Figure 5.4 and are also
shown in Table A5.2 in the appendix. The figure shows a plot of the coefficients with
their confidence intervals as well as a vertical line at zero. Any variable whose
confidence interval crosses through zero is not statistically significant. The percent of the
metropolitan population in the central city, density of governments, proportion of school
districts and percent African-American in the central city all have a positive and
significant predicted effect on dissimilarity and percent employed in manufacturing in
central cities has a significant negative effect on dissimilarity.
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Figure 5.4: Black-White Dissimilarity Index Fixed-Effects Model Results.
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To further explore the effect size and substantive interpretation of the significant
fragmentation measures have on dissimilarity, a series of plots are used to examine the
predicted effects. The impact of density of governments, which is an index of the number
of governments per capita and the number of municipalities per capita, is the first
significant variable to be examined. Figure 5.5 shows a plot of the distribution of the
density of governments in metropolitan areas and the first and third quartiles of
government density are shown with vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is the
predicted dissimilarity score across the range of government density while holding all
other variables at their median and the year set to 1970. All else equal, increasing the
governments around a central city is predicted to increase the dissimilarity score for the
entire metropolitan area. As density of governments increases from the 25th to 75th
percentile, racial dissimilarity increases from 0.80 to 0.82. While the size of the effect
may seem small, what is implied is that according to this model, the typical metropolitan
area would need for 80% of its residents to move in order to achieve racial integration.
Having a greater number of governments, particularly municipal governments seems to
increase segregation in metropolitan areas.
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Figure 5.5: Predicted Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Index Score Across the
Range of Government Density. Plotted is the distribution of the density of governments
in metropolitan areas which is an indexed variable comprised of the number of
governments per capita (10,000) and the number of municipalities per capita (10,000).
The natural log of government density is modeled but the actual values are shown along
with the first and third quartiles which are indicated by the vertical white lines. Plotted
over the histogram is the predicted dissimilarity score across the range of government
density while holding all other variables at their median and the year set to 1970. All else
equal, increasing the governments around a central city is predicted to increase the
dissimilarity score for the entire metropolitan area.

164

Chapter 5

Effects of Political Fragmentation

The second significant fragmentation measure, the percent of a metropolitan area
living in the central city, is also an indication of horizontal fragmentation and was
significant in the population change model. Figure 5.6 shows a histogram of the percent
metro area population living in the central city in gray with the first and third quartiles
marked by vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is the predicted dissimilarity
score across the range of the percent of metropolitan population living in the central city.
All things equal, as a city’s share of the metropolitan area population increases, the
predicted dissimilarity index score also increases. As the city's share of metropolitan area
population increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, 16% to 54% of metro
area population, dissimilarity increases from 0.80 to 0.82. As with governing density, this
implies that the typical metropolitan area would need 80% of its population to move in
order to achieve racial integration between African-American and white residents. Also
noteworthy is that while holding all things constant, the model predicts metropolitan
areas to be highly segregated as indicated by the range of dissimilarity in Figure 5.6
(0.79 - 0.85) and this is consistent with the effect of governing density on dissimilarity.
Since the data is aggregated at the metropolitan level it is not possible to say where
within the region minorities are residing but studies such as those done by Orfield (2002)
suggest that in a typical metro area minorities reside primarily in the central city and
inner-ring suburbs. Cities which have a greater share of metropolitan population seem to
have more regional segregation .
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Figure 5.6: Predicted Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Score Across the Range of
the Percent of a Metropolitan Area in Central City. A histogram of the percent metro
area population living in the central city is shown in gray with the first and third quartiles
marked by vertical white lines. Plotted over the histogram is the predicted dissimilarity
score across the range of the percent of metropolitan population living in the central city.
All things equal, as a city’s share of the metropolitan area population increases, the
predicted dissimilarity index score also increases.
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The third and final significant fragmentation measure on dissimilarity is the
proportion of school districts of total governments in a metropolitan area. Figure 5.7
shows a histogram of proportion of school districts of total governments in metropolitan
areas with the first and third quartiles denoted with vertical white lines. Overlaid the
histogram is the predicted dissimilarity score across the range of proportion school
districts holding all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970. The 95%
confidence interval is shown by the dashed lines. All things equal, increasing the
proportion of school districts in a metropolitan area is predicted to increase the
dissimilarity index score for the metro area. As the proportion of governments in a metro
area that are school districts increases from the 25th (0.12) to the 75th percentile (0.28),
dissimilarity increases from 0.80 to 0.82 across the metro. The impact of school districts
on racial segregation suggests that it is not just the number of governments in a
metropolitan area that matters, but also the types of government. In this case of this
model, having more school districts in relation to other governments, increases
segregation which is troubling given evidence that school segregation drives disparate
outcomes in student achievement (Condron, Tope, Steidl, Freeman 2013). Having more
school districts in a metropolitan area increases the amount of segregation in that region.
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Figure 5.7: Predicted Metropolitan Area Dissimilarity Index Score Across the
Range of the Proportion of School Districts to Total Governments. Plotted is a
histogram of proportion of school districts of total governments in metropolitan areas
with the first and third quartiles denoted with vertical white lines. Overlaid the histogram
is the predicted dissimilarity score across the range of proportion school districts holding
all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970. The 95% confidence interval is
shown by the dashed lines. All things equal, increasing the proportion of school districts
in a metropolitan area is predicted to increase the dissimilarity index score for the metro
area.
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Own-Source Revenue and Political Fragmentation
The third model considered the impact of political fragmentation on own-source
revenue in central cities. Own-source revenue is an indication of the revenue generating
power of cities from their own tax and fee collection and reflects the general tax burden
born by residents. The values are per capita and CPI adjusted to year 2000 dollars, the
median value is $984 but the standard deviation is $1,006. The data is skewed right
which is common for income measures. The natural log of own-source revenue was used
as the dependent variable in this model and the transformation created a normalized
distribution with a mean value of 6.85 and a standard deviation of 0.7. Determining the
best model fit was the same for the previous models and the results of the tests are shown
in Table 5.3. The first diagnostic test was the Hausman and the results supported using
the fixed-effects model over the random effects. The Breusch-Pagan test looks for
homoskedasticity and in this model the null hypothesis was not rejected, meaning that
this model did not violate the assumption of constant variance in the standard errors.
Table 5.3: Own-Source Revenue Model Diagnostics
Test
Hausman
Breusch-Pagan

Ho
Random over Fixed
Effects

Statistics
Χ2(17) = 107.37
p = 0.000

Homoskedasticity

Χ2(19) = 29.03
p = 0.07

Not Rejected

Χ2(1) = 0.17.86
p = 0.00

Rejected

BreuschNo Serial Correlation
Godfrey/Wooldridge

Result: Ho
Rejected

LaGrange Multiplier

Significant Time-Fixed
Effects

F(5,469) = 45.81
p = 0.00

Rejected

Pesaran

No Cross-Sectional
Dependence

Z = -0.9
p = 0.37

Not Rejected
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The third diagnostic test, the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test looks for serial
correlation in the residuals and for this model the null hypothesis was not accepted
meaning that for any given city, the best predictor for its residual at time t is the residual
in the previous time period (time = t-1). To improve the statistical efficiency of the
estimated coefficients a variance covariance matrix was estimated to make the estimates
more efficient. The last two diagnostic tests consider the effects of time and in the case of
the Lagrange Multiplier test the effect is significant. This indicates there are significant
differences across the time periods and so time-fixed effects are included in the ownsource revenue model. The final diagnostic, the Pesaran test, looks for cross-sectional
dependence which if present would mean that the residuals are correlated within time
periods across the cities. The null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence was not
rejected so within time correlations are not a problem at this time.
The results of political fragmentation and own-source revenue are presented in
Figure 5.8 and also shown in Table A5.3. Figure 5.14 plots the coefficients as points with
their 95 percent confidence intervals as horizontal lines extending through them. In this
model the statistically significant variables are ones that do not cross the vertical line at
zero. The percent of the metropolitan area residing in the city limits has a negative effect
on own-source revenue whereas jurisdictional overlap, the proportion of the metropolitan
area that is municipalities, the elected official per capita in central cities, the percent
African-American, the percent employed in manufacturing, and median family income in
central cities are all positive.
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Figure 5.8: Own-Source Revenue Fixed-Effects Model Results
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To further explore the effect size and substantive interpretation of the significant
fragmentation measures on own-source revenue, a series of plots are used to examine the
predicted effects. Figure 5.9 is the first of the four significant fragmentation measures and
shows the distribution of the percent of metropolitan areas living in central city with the
first and third quartiles noted with white vertical lines. Plotted over the histogram is the
predicted own-source revenue score for the metropolitan area across the range of percent
metropolitan area in the central city. The 95% confidence interval is shown by the dashed
lines. All things equal, increasing the city's share of the metropolitan area population
decreases the own-source revenue for the central city. As the city's share of population
moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile, 16% to 54% of metro area population ownsource revenue is predicted to decrease from $846 dollars per capita to $799. Essentially
the more individuals who live in the central city, the model predicts would experience
less of a tax burden than cities with a smaller share of the population. Cities that have a
greater share of the metropolitan population have a smaller own-source revenue per
capita, meaning that city residents pay less in taxes.
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Figure 5.9: Predicted Own-Source Revenue Across the Range of Percent of
Metropolitan Area in Central City. The graph shows the distribution of the percent of
metropolitan areas living in central city with the first and third quartiles noted with white
vertical lines. Plotted over the histogram is the predicted own-source revenue score for
the metropolitan area across the range of percent metropolitan area in the central city.
The 95% confidence interval is shown by the dashed lines. The log of own-source
revenue is used in the model but actual dollar values are shown. All things equal,
increasing the city's share of the metropolitan area population decreases the own-source
revenue for the central city.
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The next significant fragmentation measure considered is the proportion of total
governments in a metro area which are municipalities. Figure 5.10 shows in gray a
histogram of the proportion of municipal governments of total governments in the metro
area with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical white lines. Drawn over this is
the predicted own-source revenue across the range of the municipality's proportion of
total governments while holding all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970.
In the model both own-source revenue and municipalities are logged but what is shown is
actual values. All things equal increasing the proportion of municipal governments to all
other governments in a metropolitan area increases the central city's own-source revenue.
As the proportion of municipalities increases from the 25th percentile (0.11) to the 75th
percentile (0.27) revenues are predicted to increase from $784 to $855 per capita. This is
evidence that the governing arrangements around a central city, particularly at the
municipal level, have a direct impact on the city. What is suggested by the relationship
here, is that it costs more for city residents - they bear a higher tax burden - when the
surrounding metropolitan area has a higher proportion of municipalities to total
governments. Cities surrounded by more municipal governments may need to levy higher
taxes to increase their own-source revenues.
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Figure 5.10: Predicted Central City Own-Source Revenue Across the Range of the
Proportion Municipal Governments of Total Governments in Metropolitan Areas.
The plot shows in gray a histogram of the proportion of municipal governments of total
governments in the metro area with the first and third quartiles marked with vertical
white lines. Drawn over this is the predicted own-source revenue across the range of the
municipality's proportion of total governments while holding all other variables at their
medians and year set to 1970. In the model both own-source revenue and municipalities
are logged but what is shown is the actual values. shown are actual values. All things
equal increasing the proportion of municipal governments to all other governments in a
metropolitan area increases the central city's own-source revenue.

Wiedlocher

175

Cities Awash in a Sea of Governments

The next fragmentation measure to have a significant relationship with ownsource revenue is the number of elected officials per capita in the central city. This is the
first and only model where this variable was significant. Figure 5.11 shows a histogram
of the distribution of the number of elected officials per capita in gray with the first and
third quartiles noted by the vertical white lines. Overlaid is the predicted own-source
revenue across the range of elected officials per capita with the 95% confidence interval.
The log of city own-source revenue is modeled but the actual dollar values are shown.
Holding all other variables at their medians and year set to 1970, increasing the number
of elected officials per capita in the central city is predicted to increase its own-source
revenue. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the number of elected officials
per 10,000 residents is predicted to increase own-source revenue from $792 to $883 per
capita. Implied here is that cities with fewer elected officials will have a lower tax
burden. The impact of elected officials on city outcomes is a relatively understudied
measure of fragmentation and this model suggests that it is an area worth further
investigation. Cities with more elected officials seem to have a higher tax burden per
capita.
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Figure 5.11: Predicted Own-Source Revenue Across the Range of Elected Officials
per Capita (10,000) in Central Cities. A histogram showing the distribution of the
number of elected officials per capita is shown in gray with the first and third quartiles
noted by the vertical white lines. Overlaid is the predicted own-source revenue across the
range of elected officials per capita with the 95% confidence interval. The log of city
own-source revenue is modeled but the actual dollar values are shown. Holding all other
variables at their medians and year set to 1970, increasing the number of elected officials
per capita in the central city is predicted to increase its own-source revenue.
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The final significant fragmentation measure is jurisdictional overlap which is the
variable based off of the work of Berry (2009) and aims to isolate the impact of vertical
fragmentation on own-source revenue. The plot in Figure 5.12 shows a histogram of the
distribution of jurisdictional overlap in metro areas with its first and third quartiles noted
by white vertical lines. Superimposed is the predicted own-source revenue across the
range of jurisdictional overlap with the 95% confidence interval. Own-source revenue
and jurisdictional overlap are both modeled using their natural log but actual values for
these variables are shown in the graph. Holding all other variables to their medians and
year set to 1970 increasing the amount of jurisdictional overlap in a metropolitan area
increases the own-source revenue for the central city. As jurisdictional overlap increases
from the 25th (1.6) to the 75th (4.2) percentile, own-source revenue is predicted to
increase from $802 to $850 per capita. This finding is in-line with Berry's, though his
work was at the county level, and this further suggests that the governing arrangements
and the levels and types of fragmentation that exist in a metropolitan area matter and
have a direct impact on the central city. In this case, the model suggests that all else
equal, city residents have a higher tax burden in regions where there is greater levels of
vertical fragmentation. Residents appear to have to pay more in taxes for living in the
central city when there is greater amounts of vertical fragmentation in the region.
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Figure 5.12: Predicted Own-Source Revenue in Central Cities Across the Range of
Jurisdictional Overlap in Metropolitan Areas. The plot shows a histogram of the
distribution of jurisdictional overlap in metro areas with its first and third quartiles noted
by white vertical lines. Superimposed is the predicted own-source revenue across the
range of jurisdictional overlap with the 95% confidence interval. Own-source revenue
and jurisdictional overlap are both modeled using their natural log but actual values for
these variables are shown in the graph. Holding all other variables to their medians and
year set to 1970 increasing the amount of jurisdictional overlap in a metropolitan area
increases the own-source revenue for the central city.
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Summary
Overall the model results are in line with many of the hypotheses proposed at the
start of the chapter, but there were also some unexpected results. Three models were
estimated to investigate the impact of political fragmentation (horizontal, vertical and
internal) on central city population change, black-white dissimilarity across the
metropolitan area and own-source revenue for the central city. A fourth model was also
estimated for black-white isolation across the metro area but the results were minimal and
are presented in the following appendix.
The first hypothesis considered the impact of horizontal fragmentation on
population change in central cities over time. Though most of the fragmentation
indicators were not significant, the proportion of school districts of total governments in a
metropolitan area and the percent of the metro population in the central city did impact
whether city populations change. Cities that had a larger share of the region's population
were predicted to grow in population from the previous census year. The proportion of
school districts to other governments has a negative effect on population change. The
model predicts that cities would lose population between census years as the proportion
of school districts increases. This supports the hypothesis and is evidence that horizontal
fragmentation in the metropolitan area does impact the central city.
The second hypothesis considered the impact of segregation and political
fragmentation. Horizontal fragmentation was expected to increase segregation between
African-Americans and whites within metropolitan areas and the model estimated
confirmed this. The government density index and the proportion school districts are two
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measures of horizontal fragmentation that had a significant and positive impact on
segregation. Metropolitan areas where there were more governments and where school
districts made up a higher proportion of total governments also had higher levels of
segregation. These results are troubling because, while minorities are no longer only
concentrated in a region's core city, the results indicate that at least for the metropolitan
areas in this sample, governments, particularly school districts are racial dividing lines.
The third hypothesis considered the impact of vertical fragmentation, measured as
jurisdictional overlap, on central city own-source revenue. The results of the own-source
revenue model are in line with work by Berry (2009) and reveal that the governing
arrangements surrounding a central city do have an impact on the tax burden borne by
city residents. Jurisdictional overlap was a positive and significant factor in own-source
revenue, which is the income brought in to city coffers through taxes and fees. An
unexpected finding was the relationship between the proportion of municipal
governments in the metropolitan area and central city own-source revenues. Cities which
have higher numbers of municipalities relative to other governments were shown to have
higher own-source revenue. In other words, city residents are predicted to have a higher
tax burden as the proportion of municipal governments increases. This shows that not
only does horizontal fragmentation impact the central city, but vertical fragmentation in
metropolitan areas does as well.
The last hypothesis looked at the role of internal fragmentation on city outcomes.
In the population change and segregation models internal fragmentation was not
significant. However, the own-source revenue model did show a significant relationship.
As the number of elected officials increases in the central city, so too does the tax burden
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for city residents. The role of elected officials on city revenues has not been widely
examined but fits within a broader narrative that better, more efficient governments have
fewer elected officials per capita and that older, less progressive city governments would
have more elected officials. The findings in this model suggest that there is a direct and
perhaps understudied, link between elected officials and the tax burden borne by city
residents.
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Racial Isolation and Political Fragmentation
A fourth model examining the relationship between political fragmentation and
racial isolation was also estimated but the results did not yield much and so are presented
here within the Appendix. The Isolation Index between African-Americans and whites at
the metropolitan level (and unlike the dissimilarity index which considers the degree to
separation between the races), the Isolation Index measures the amount of exposure one
group has to only members of the same group (Massey and Denton 1988, 288). The index
ranges from 0 - 1 where 0 is no exposure to others outside of your racial group and 1 is
perfect exposure to others of another race. The exposure of African-Americans to white
residents considers the degree of possible contact or interaction between the racial groups
and the same group of political fragmentation variables are modeled to estimate their
ability to predict levels of isolation. In addition variables controlling for the percent
African-American, percent employed in manufacturing, percent unemployed, percent of
families in poverty, median family income in central cities and the proportion of
municipalities to other governments are included.16
The same cadre of diagnostic tests are used to evaluate model fit for racial
isolation. Table A5.1 shows the model diagnostics that informed my selection of the best
fitting model for racial isolation. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test was not
accepted which means that a fixed-effects model is recommended. Using the fixed-effect
model means that an estimated effect for each city is included as a control in the model.
The second and third tests are designed to test assumptions about the behavior of
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residuals in longitudinal models. The Breusch-Pagan null hypothesis tests for constant
error variance or homoskedasticity in the residuals. In this model the assumption of
homoskedasticity was violated indicating that there was heteroskedasticity which means
the standard errors for the coefficients are biased downwards, leading to ascribing
statistical significance to variables that are not significant (Wooldridge 2002). In the third
test, the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation, the null hypothesis was
not rejected meaning that the residuals are not correlated across time within cities. To
correct for violations of heteroskedasticity a variance covariance matrix with robust
standard errors was used to estimate the model in order to make the estimates more
efficient.
Table A5.1: Isolation Index Model Diagnostics
Test
Hausman
Breusch-Pagan

Ho
Random over Fixed
Effects

Statistics
Χ2(16) = 85.75
p = 0.000

Homoskedasticity

Χ2(18) = 51.37
p = 0.000

Rejected

Χ2(1) = 1.31
p = 0.25

Not Rejected

BreuschNo Serial Correlation
Godfrey/Wooldridge

Result: Ho
Rejected

LaGrange Multiplier

Significant Time-Fixed
Effects

F(-) = -p = --

--

Pesaran

No Cross-Sectional
Dependence

Z = -p = --

--

The fourth diagnostic tests look for significant time-fixed effects. The Lagrange
Multiplier's null hypothesis is that there are no time-fixed effects and this was not
rejected. To account for time-fixed effects dummy a factor variable for time is included
in the model. The final diagnostic test, the Pesaran test of cross-sectional dependence
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looks to see if residuals are correlated within time periods across cities. The inclusion of
time-fixed effects helps to avoid cross-sectional dependence and the null hypothesis for
the Pesaran test was not rejected.
Figure A5.1 plots the estimated coefficients with their confidence intervals and
Table A5.2 shows the coefficient values with their standard error and model fit statistics.
Lagging the independent variables on racial isolation was found to produce the more
efficient estimates and model fit. Using the lag of a variable allows us to see the predicted
effect of racial isolation based off of the previous census decade's data. The downside to
lagging variables is the loss of observations, in this case 100 observations are dropped
and prediction for isolation begin with 1960 and go through 2000. Like dissimilarity, the
isolation index is a residential measure and population shifts, such as racial sorting along
residential boundaries, may take additional time before their effect is significant. For the
coefficients plotted on Figure A5.1, any variable whose confidence interval crosses
through zero is not statistically significant. In this model the lagged log of the density of
governments and the lag for percent unemployed in the central city have a positive and
significant impact on racial isolation. The lag for percent employed in manufacturing in
central cities has a significant negative effect on isolation.
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Figure A5.1: Fixed-Effects Model Results for Black-White Isolation Index with
Lagged Independent Variables
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Table A5.2: Black-White Isolation Index with Lagged Independent Variables FixedEffects Model Results
(Dependent Variable = Black-White Isolation Index)
Model
Lagged % Metro Pop in City (log)
Lagged Density of Governments (log)
Lagged School Districts
Lagged Jurisdictional Overlap (log)
Lagged Elected Officials per Capita
Lagged Spatial Fragmentation (log)
Lagged % African-American
Lagged % Manufacturing
Lagged % Unemployed
Lagged % Families in Poverty
Lagged Median Family Income
Lagged Municipalities

-0.001
(0.002)
0.44***
(0.008)
0.11
(0.4)
0.152
(0.116)
0.098
(0.091)
-0.013
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.004)
-.012*
(0.006)
0.045**
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000008
(0.000007)
-0.024
(0.15)

Adj. R2
0.47
F(15, 382)
39.01
p<F
0.000
N
497 (i = 100, t = 4-5)
Time-fixed effects significant and negative (not shown).
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Density of governments is measured by indexing the total number of governments
per capita and the number of municipalities per capita for each metropolitan area. The
coefficient value of 0.44 shows that increasing government density in year one is
predicted to increase isolation between African-Americans and white residents in the
following census year. This supports the hypothesis that racial isolation is residentially
driven and that horizontal political fragmentation that increases residential choice
decreases the exposure of African-Americans to whites. Increases in the number of
governments has a positive and significant effect on segregation.
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Table A5.3: Central City Population Change Model Results for Random Effects
with Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Robust Standard Errors
(Dependent Variable = Percent Population Change in Central Cities,
natural log)
Model
0.02
Density of Governments (log)
(0.02)
0.001**
% Metro Pop in City (log)
(0.0005)
0.28*
School Districts
(0.13)
0.004
Jurisdictional Overlap (log)
(0.01)
-0.012
Elected Officials per Capita
(0.012)
-0.034*
Spatial Fragmentation (log)
(0.016)
-0.002**
% African-American
(0.001)
-0.002
% Manufacturing
(0.001)
-0.01
% Unemployed
(0.003)
0.0003
% Families in Poverty
(0.002)
-0.035
Rustbelt
(0.023)
0.123***
Sunbelt
(0.02)
Adj. R2
0.41
F(17, 571)
24.83
p<F
0.00
N
589 (i = 100, t = 4-6)
Time-fixed effects significant and negative (not shown).
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A5.4: Black-White Dissimilarity Index Fixed-Effects Model Results
(Dependent Variable = Black-White Dissimilarity Index)
Model
0.001*
(0.0003)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.142*
(0.061)
-0.011
(0.01)
0.028
(0.018)
-0.013
(0.009)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)

% Metro Pop in City (log)
Density of Governments (log)
School Districts
Jurisdictional Overlap (log)
Elected Officials per Capita
Spatial Fragmentation (log)
% African-American
% Manufacturing
% Unemployed
% Families in Poverty

Adj. R2
0.55
F(15, 442)
64.81
p<F
0.000
N
557 (i = 100, t = 2-6)
Time-fixed effects significant 1960 and 1970 are positive; 1980-2000 are negative
(not shown).
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A5.5: Own-Source Revenue Fixed-Effects Model Results
(Dependent Variable = Own-Source Revenue, natural log)
Model
-0.001***
(0.0003)
0.01
(0.03)
0.04
(0.4)
0.058***
(0.012)
0.099***
(0.029)
0.214***
(0.051)
0.016
(0.029)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.006*
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.0008
(0.001)
0.000009*
(0.000003)

% Metro Pop in City (log)
Density of Governments (log)
School Districts
Jurisdictional Overlap (log)
Municipalities
Elected Officials per Capita
Spatial Fragmentation (log)
% African-American
% Manufacturing
% Unemployed
% Families in Poverty
Median Family Income

0.84
Adj. R2
200.52
F(19, 566)
0.000
p<F
586 (i = 100, t = 5-6)
N
Time-fixed effects significant and positive (not shown).
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure A5.2: Variance Inflation Factor for Population Density, Dissimilarity Index,
Racial Isolation Index and Own-Source Revenue Models. The dotted line represents a
VIF score of 4 and in each of the models, all of the independent variables are below the
limit.

16

The measurements of median family income and proportion of municipalities of total
government were not included in the population density and racial dissimilarity models
due to high variance inflation factor scores. Figure 5.5 shows the spread of VIF scores
across all four models.
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Notes for Chapter 5
1

Rustbelt cities and states: Bridgeport, Connecticut; Hartford, CT; New Haven, CT;
Chicago, Illinois; Peoria, IL; Evansville, Indiana; Fort Wayne, IN; Gary, IN;
Indianapolis, IN; South Bend, IN; Des Moines, Iowa; Boston, Massachusetts; Cambridge,
MA; Fall River, MA; New Bedford, MA; Springfield, MA; Worcester, MA; Detroit,
Michigan; Flint, MI; Grand Rapids, MI; Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Paul, MN; St.
Louis, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; Camden, New Jersey; Elizabeth, NJ; Newark, NJ;
Paterson, NJ; Trenton, NJ; Albany, New York; Buffalo, NY; New York, NY; Rochester,
NY; Syracuse, NY; Yonkers, NY; Akron, Ohio; Canton, OH; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland,
OH; Columbus, OH; Dayton, OH; Toledo, OH; Youngstown, OH; Allentown,
Pennsylvania; Erie, PA; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; Reading, PA; Scranton, PA;
Providence, Rhode Island; Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Sunbelt cities and states: Birmingham,
Alabama; Mobile, AL; Montgomery, AL; Phoenix, Arizona; Berkeley, California; Long
Beach, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Oakland, CA; Sacramento, CA; San Diego, CA; San
Francisco, CA; Jacksonville, Florida; Miami, FL; Tampa, FL; Atlanta, Georgia;
Savannah, GA; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; New Orleans, LA; Shreveport, LA; Charlotte,
North Carolina; Austin, Texas; Corpus Christi, TX; Dallas, TX; El Paso, TX; Fort Worth,
TX; Houston, TX; San Antonio, TX.
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Chapter 6
Metropolitan Areas as Communities
Metropolitan growth in America means that cities have developed multiple
identities over the last century. For example Houston is a municipality that covers
roughly 580 square miles and has a population of 1.9 million as of the 2000 U.S. Census,
but it is also a metropolitan area spanning 7,700 square miles and is home to over 4.7
million people residing in 130 municipalities. Sixty years ago if a resident of Houston
told someone he was from Houston, Texas that person would probably assume he meant
the city of Houston, a place with a specific municipal boundary. Today it is common to
state the city as the place one is from, while not actually living within the city boundaries.
For instance, a person may say he is from Houston but live in the community of Katy,
Texas, a municipality with over 13,000 residents, its own fire and police departments,
grocery stores, public schools, a mall, animal control, a publically elected mayor, and city
government; a complete city in its own right. While Katy, Texas is legally its own city
because of its proximity to the City of Houston, both in terms of distance and economic
activity, it belongs to the metropolitan area of Houston and its fortunes are tied to the
successes and failures of both the city of Houston as well as the greater region.
Suburban communities like Katy represent what is deplorable in the eyes of critics
like Lowi (1979), who argue that they approach cities as a good to be consumed.
However Katy, Texas lauds itself as the best of both worlds, offering small town charm
with big city convenience. This represents something that is highly desirable to
residential consumers, a chance to escape some of the perceived worst aspects of city
living, like poverty, congested streets, dirt, noise, pollution, crime and live in a single-
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family detached home, in a safe, clean neighborhood in a good school district. In order to
create idyllic suburban communities the geographic space is divided into distinct political
entities which manage and oversee service delivery. In other words, across metropolitan
areas, political fragmentation is the modus operandi to create governments and areas like
Katy, Texas.
Scholars of urban America are divided over whether the governing arrangements
in metropolitan areas represent a success story of democratic choice of where to live and
conduct business, or if they represent a type of exploitation of city resources that fosters
myopic vision among elected leaders who may resist collaboration or regional problem
solving. Among the multitude of reasons public officials, journalists and scholars point to
for why cities or regions struggle, political fragmentation makes a regular appearance.
There are sharp divisions over whether the numbers of governments in a region represent
a potential threat to progress, or if municipal boundaries should be dissolved and as
proponents of reform call for, a unified, metropolitan-wide regional government be
established. Creating a regional government or even getting local actors to agree to a
regional policy plan has been historically and currently difficult (Nelles 2013).
Recap of the Study
Whether or not political fragmentation is harmful to cities is an empirical question
and the heart of this study. In order to answer this question political fragmentation was
carefully defined and measured in 100 cities and their metropolitan areas from 1950
through 2000. Fragmentation is categorized in this study into three components:
horizontal, vertical and internal fragmentation. Horizontal fragmentation is the
proliferation of coterminous governments of the same type across the metropolitan area.
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Municipal governments are a common manifestation of this as they do not overlap
geographically. Vertical fragmentation occurs when governing units do intersect with
other governments. This is common among special districts which may only cover certain
portions of a metropolitan area and not align neatly with municipal borders. Internal
fragmentation is the division of political power among elected officials within a unit of
government and for the purposes of this study was limited to the central cities. These
components of political fragmentation were modeled against three outcome measures,
metropolitan-wide segregation, population change and own-source revenue. These
outcomes were chosen based off scholarly evidence as critical factors for a city and its
region's growth or decline.
The results of the analyses reveal that political fragmentation is a complex but
influential component to city health and how cities and their regions relate to each other.
Analysis of own-source revenue, which represents the tax burden of city residents,
reveals that they pay more in taxes for living in the central city when there are greater
amounts of vertical fragmentation in the region. Cities with more elected officials seem to
have a higher tax burden per capita as well. It was also found that cities surrounded by
more municipal governments may need to levy higher taxes to increase their own-source
revenues. However, cities that have a greater share of the metropolitan population have
smaller own-source revenue per capita, meaning that city residents pay less in taxes.
The analysis of racial segregation across the metropolitan area shows that having
more school districts increases segregation in that region. Having a greater number of
governments, particularly municipal governments, seems to increase segregation in
metropolitan areas. Cities which have a greater share of metropolitan population seem to
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have more regional segregation. The impact of political fragmentation on segregation is
currently a somewhat understudied area of research and this project serves to continue the
dialogue. The population change model reveals that having a greater number of public
school choices seems to be something that encourages families to leave central cities.
However, as cities remain population centers of their regions, their population tend to
keep growing.
Future Research and Parting Thoughts
Over the course of this research, one of the striking aspects of metropolitan
governance which came to light is the role political fragmentation plays in creating
regions where local governments and local officials take on an individualistic point of
view. I argue that this perspective is fostered by those who argue for government
consolidation to be replaced with regional government and those who see the
proliferation of government as a public good, offering greater variation in choice to
residents. Both viewpoints cast issues of government and governance in an “us” versus
“them” mindset where one side essentially calls for reform because of problems caused
by what others have done, while the opposing side resists because cooperation or
consolidation would risk loss of political identity and control of assets. These lines of
argument create a seemingly large cavern between the sides. A possible bridge could be
built by shifting the conversation away from “us” and “them” to nurturing a collective
metropolitan consciousness.
The work of Elinor Ostrom demonstrates that communities with a common
interest or use of a common resource can work together to solve scarcity issues even in
the absence of formal, centralized governments. The collaboration can not only be
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achieved across disparate actors but be maintained and nurtured over time (Ostrom
1990). Theoretically, collective action has potential to guide future research and policy
for metropolitan areas. The population and economic activity of metropolitan areas can
represent a collective good. The strains of this are already present in the approach of
special district creation to capture potential tax revenue in order to provide services and
in metropolitan planning organizations to craft policy solutions for transportation and
environmental monitoring. What is lacking or underdeveloped, is the residential and
business collective conscience, the idea that people belong to not just a local government
but also to a region and their individual actions taken together have impacts that are felt
far beyond their local border. Practically speaking raising the collective awareness of a
region may improve chances for government consolidation, or it may provide political
opportunities for governments to collaborate utilize governance to solve regional
problems.
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